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ABSTRACT 
 
 The British Army provided military assistance missions for friendly nations 
throughout the 20th century. The majority deployed to Africa during the decolonization 
process. By 1980 London had thirty-five years of institutional knowledge on how to 
train armies in newly independent nations. Most notably in Kenya and Zambia, where 
the transition to independence was fraught with racial and economic difficulties. In 
1979, after the conclusion of the Lancaster House Conference the British government 
was called upon to provide newly independent Zimbabwe with military training 
assistance. The British Military Advisory and Training Team helped combine three 
former belligerent armies into the Zimbabwe National Army.  
 London intended to create a military force that reflected Britain’s own army and 
maintained a distance from domestic politics while serving as a bastion for Western 
military values and interests. While the British had both Kenya and Zambia to draw from 
as models, policymakers in London overestimated the cache of British power in a 
changing world. Rather than facilitating an effective transition to representative 
government in Zimbabwe, the British enabled the creation of a one-party state under 
Robert Mugabe. The fundamental misunderstanding on the part of the Foreign and 
Commonwealth Office and the Ministry of Defence as to the expectations of developing 
nations and military assistance handicapped British policy goals in Southern Africa for 
the next two decades.  
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CHAPTER I 
 INTRODUCTION 
 
An independent Zimbabwe first appeared on the world’s stage fifteen long years 
after the Unilateral Declaration of Independence by the Rhodesian Front in 1965. Robert 
Gabriel Mugabe’s new government held great promise for the future. After all, Mugabe 
was a highly educated man, holding no fewer than four Bachelors and two Masters 
degrees. The Commonwealth Monitoring Force (OP AGILA) supervised the elections 
and deemed them free and fair.  After the conclusion of Operation AGILA, a British 
military training team tasked with creating the new Zimbabwe National Army (ZNA) 
deployed to Zimbabwe.  
By February of 1981, elements of the newly created army mutinied against the 
government and were defeated at the Battle of Bulawayo by what had formerly been the 
Rhodesian Army’s 1st Battalion, Rhodesian African Rifles.1  Only a few months later 
Mugabe’s regime began training a new brigade of the Zimbabwean military. Unlike 
other units of the ZNA, it operated outside of the normal chain of command and reported 
directly to Mugabe. The unit, trained by the North Korean Army, had the express 
purpose of suppressing political opposition to the Shona-dominated Zimbabwe African 
National Union – Patriotic Front (ZANU-PF) government.  This notorious unit, simply 
called the Fifth Brigade, was deployed to the ethnic minority homeland of Matabeland in 
                                                
1 Luise White, “‘Whoever Saw a Country with Four Armies?’: The Battle of Bulawayo Revisited,” 
Journal of Southern African Studies 33 (September 2007), 619-631. 
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January of 1983 to stamp out political opposition.2 What followed, Robert Mugabe 
called the Gukurahundi, “the early rain that washes away the chaff before the spring 
rain.”  The Fifth Brigade and other elements of the ZNA killed, raped, and burned their 
way through Matabeland until 1988. In the process, they killed at least 10,000 civilians 
and secured a one-party state for Robert Mugabe and ZANU.3 
The use of military power in an African state to secure control is not, in itself, 
unusual. In this case not only was the British government actively involved in training 
the ZNA, but they were attempting to create a professional, Western-style army that 
remained aloof from domestic politics. The reliance of the Mugabe regime on the 
military to maintain power demonstrates that this mission ended in failure.  The British 
government’s involvement in Africa after the end of colonialism has often been defined 
by the presence of military training teams or military advisors. Additionally, it was often 
teams of military trainers that were sent to assist newly independent nations during their 
first few years of self-government.  
The military involvement of British forces in Africa since 1945 has taken a 
number of forms. In some places it was rather innocuous, as in the 1960 Defense 
Agreement with Nigeria which allowed Britain over-flights as well as the staging of port 
rights in the country.4  In other areas it was a much more pronounced presence, such as 
                                                
2 Daniel Compagnon, A Predictable Tragety: Robert Mugabe and the Collapse of Zimbabwe 
(Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 2011), 24-25.  Up to this point in Zimbabwe, the Shona 
composed roughly 80% of the African population while the Ndebele speakers composed about 20%.  
3 Martin Meredith, The Fate of Africa From the Hopes of Freedom to the Heart of Despair: A History of 
50 Years of Independence (New York: Public Affairs , 2005), 622-624. 
4 Ashley Jackson, “British-African Defence and Security Concerns,” Defence Studies 6 (September 2006), 
351-376. 
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the 1964 army mutinies in Kenya, Uganda, and Tanzania in which British forces were 
called in to restore order.  Compared to the involvement of the French in post-colonial 
Africa, this all seems rather small in scale.5  However, British military training teams, 
while not glamorous and seldom in the public eye, played an extremely important role in 
creating the military culture of the newly independent African states. 
By 1980, the British had trained soldiers in Kenya, Zambia, Uganda, Tanzania 
and many other African nations. They had accrued over twenty years of institutional 
knowledge, and yet the last British colony to achieve independence was one of their 
biggest failures.  Not only did the British fail to create a force that removed itself from 
politics, the British model of military organization and training had fallen out of use by 
the 1990s.  Additionally, only a few short years after independence the Zimbabwean 
government had drifted almost completely away from Britain and the West to embrace 
China, North Korea, and the Non-Aligned powers as their closest allies.  
 The foundation upon which a military force is built often defines how it will 
interact with the government and people that it is intended to serve.  During the English 
Civil War of the 17th century, Parliament raised an army and filled its ranks with 
disciplined, professional soldiers who advanced based on merit.  The commanders of 
this “New Model Army” intended that its officers and men would understand what they 
were fighting for and commit to those ideas.  In the modern era, the tenets upon which 
the New Model Army was founded are the same tenets that democratic states hope to 
                                                
5 The French Army still maintains bases in several African nations, including two large bases in Gabon 
and Djibouti, and a 300-man force in Senegal at the Center for Military Cooperation.   
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instill in their soldiers.  Additionally, these same tenets of professionalism, separation 
from politics, and dedication to the principles of the state guide British military training.  
This is not simply limited to the training given to British soldiers when they enter Her 
Majesty’s Forces, but the training that British military advisors have attempted to 
perpetuate around the world, particularly in former British colonies.   
Armies in anglophone Africa were often formed from the respective colonial 
regiments of the territory, sometimes even retaining the same battle honors and 
regimental days. These colonial regiments each maintained a unique culture and history 
that is the foundation of the British regimental system. This was reinforced by the fact 
that many African colonial soldiers served out their entire careers in the same regiment, 
if not the same battalion.  So the development, wartime experiences, and purpose of 
these colonial military units were extremely influential in the type, size, and character of 
the newly formed African armies. The nature of the colonial forces and the level of 
development that they had already undergone also influenced the level of involvement of 
a British training team.  
 
Historiography  
Military training in missions in Southern Africa lies at the intersection of colonial 
and post-colonial history.  The African liberation wars of the 1950s and 1960s were over 
long before Zimbabwe became independent, and by 1979 the only remaining colonial 
relics were Rhodesia and South Africa.  In many ways, the situation in Rhodesia has 
been seen as another battlefront of the global Cold War between communism and the 
  5 
West. It is also very much one of the last bastions of the colonial system that refused to 
accept the fact that the days of empire had passed. In his memoirs Ian Smith wrote, “it 
was not surprising that the sons of these pioneers were more British than the British. 
That is how we were all brought up and taught to live.”6 It was this very attachment to 
Britishness and the idea of Rhodesian exceptionalism that fed the delusion that the 
settlers’ bid for independence could survive.  
The colonial arrangement that existed in Rhodesia was dependent upon the 
coercive force that the authorities were able to bring to bear on the indigenous 
population. At the outset of the colonial period, settlers used their technological 
advantages to overpower African rulers.  By the 20th century they needed to establish 
regular military units to perform internal security functions and, secondarily, frontier 
defence functions. This was not a situation unique to Rhodesia; settlers across the 
African continent found that while in most cases paramilitary police forces were 
sufficient, they were not prepared to deal with mass unrest or the threat of military force 
from other colonial powers. Anthony Clayton and David Killinggray examined the 
development of colonial police and military forces.7  The study was based on the Oxford 
Colonial Records Project, a collection of interviews, surveys, and miscellaneous 
documents of British officers and Non-Commissioned Officers (NCOs) who served with 
these units. While an excellent introduction to the basic forms and philosophies of 
                                                
6 Ian Smith, The Great Betrayal: The Memoirs of Ian Douglas Smith (London: Blake Publishing, 1997), 3. 
7Anthony Clayton and David Killinggray, Khaki and Blue: Military and Police in British Colonial Africa 
(Athens, OH: Ohio University Center for International Studies, 1989). 
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colonial soldiering, the work is limited to a survey of the forces of Kenya, Uganda, 
Somalia, Ghana, and Zambia. 
The scholarship on colonial soldiering and military assistance has grown, but 
often still focuses on some of the more famous colonial units, namely the King’s African 
Rifles and the Tirailleurs Senegalais.  Examinations of the French use of African 
soldiers are numerous; the interest in French colonial troops could be attributed to the 
peculiarities of the French system. The French used conscription of Africans.  The early 
French use of African soldiers for imperial service to help conquer other territories was 
markedly different from the strategies employed by other imperial powers. Anthony 
Clayton’s book on the organization and employment of the French military system in 
Africa helped to establish a baseline for this type of research.8 Both Myron Echenberg 
and Nancy Lawler looked further into the French use of African troops through the end 
of the colonial period.  Rather than focusing on the use of these soldiers as imperial 
service troops, both Lawler and Echenberg focused on the recruitment and conditions of 
service of Africans in French West Africa.9  While both of these works did an excellent 
job of examining the organization of the conscription system and the ways in which 
Africans saw service in the French Army, they lacked a significant African voice.  
                                                
8 Anthony Clayton, France, Soldiers and Africa (London: Brassey’s Defence Publishers, 1988).  Not only 
does this work cover the use of African soldiers by France in the Sub-Saharan region, it also examines the 
formation of units in North Africa, the development of the French Foreign Legion, and the Naval Infantry, 
all of which played an extremely important role in the French conquest of her African colonies.  
9 Myron Echenberg, Colonial Conscripts: The Tirailleurs Senegalais in French West Africa, 1857-1960 
(Portsmouth: Heinemann, 1990); Nancy Lawler, Soldiers of Misfortune: Ivoirien Tirailleurs of World War 
II (Athens, OH: Ohio University Press, 1992); Charles J. Balesi, From Adversaries to Comrades-in-Arms: 
West Africans and the French Military, 1885-1918 (Waltham, Mass.: Crossroads Press, 1979). This last 
work, while one of the first post-colonial era monographs on the subject, focused more on the attitudes of 
whites regarding African soldiers.  In addition to these works, there are numerous French-language works 
on the subject that I have chosen not to mention here.  
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The examination of the experiences of African soldiers in anglophone Africa has 
generally focused on East and West Africa. Additionally, these studies seldom devote 
any significant time to the transitional period between colonialism and independence.  
As is the case with most colonial regiments, white officers of some of these formations 
commissioned regimental histories, which tend to focus much more on the combat 
narrative of the regiments’ performances in conventional conflicts than on the nature of 
service in the colonies.10 Generally, rank and file Africans of the regiment receive little 
attention in these works beyond their being characterized as simple minded, loyal, and 
courageous servants of the Crown. For example, the only published work on the 
Northern Rhodesia Regiment was written in 1954 by a former officer, and Brelsford’s 
book is detailed in its coverage of the European members of the regiment from subaltern 
to colonel, yet seldom mentions by name the Africans who made up the majority of the 
unit.11 
Some of the latest works dealing with the King’s African Rifles have done an 
excellent job of exploring the role of the regiment in the colonial world, but also 
explored the reasons that many African men had for serving in the military. Timothy 
Parsons’s work has looked at the ways in which the African soldier was able to assert 
some agency within the confines of colonial military service; he also identified the types 
of communities that were specifically targeted by colonial officials as having inhabitants 
suitable for service.  While the concept of martial races migrated to Africa from the 
                                                
10 Hubert Moyse Bartlett, The King’s African Rifles: A Study in the Military History of East and Central 
Africa 1890-1945 (Aldershot: Gale & Polden, 1956).  
11 W.V. Brelsford, ed., The Story of the Northern Rhodesia Regiment (Lusaka, Northern Rhodesia: The 
Government Printer, 1954).  
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British Indian Army, it became widely accepted throughout British Africa that only 
some ethnic groups in a given colony were “warrior peoples.”12 The conditions of 
colonial military service were always rife with inequality, though for many years African 
soldiers were unaware of their unequal status because they seldom served in areas where 
they were exposed to the conditions of service of European rank-and-file soldiers.  
Parsons points out that the experiences of African soldiers during World War II exposed 
them to the fact that European troops were also required to do fatigue work and were not 
invincible in combat.  These experiences led to a change in the view of service by 
Africans and were a contributing factor to the 1964 East African Mutiny that rocked 
several newly independent nations.13   
There are significantly fewer scholarly works on African soldiers in Southern 
Africa. In South Africa this is something that became almost a non-issue after the First 
World War. The Cape Corps was the only armed non-white regiment to serve in the 
conflict, and after it was mustered out of service there would be no other armed African 
forces in the South African security establishment until 1973. The few pieces of research 
that dealt with African soldiers in South Africa were generally produced as anti-
apartheid pieces by social scientists rather than historians.14 Most of these works focus 
                                                
12 Heather Streets, Martial Races: The Military, Race and Masculinity in British Imperial Culture, 1857-
1914 (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 2005); Timothy Parsons, ““Wakamba Warriors are 
Soldiers of the Queen”: The Evolution of the Kamba as a Martial Race, 1890-1970,” Ethnohistory 46 
(1999), 671-701; Timothy Parsons, The African Rank-and-File: Social Implications of Colonial Military 
Service in the King’s African Rifles, 1902-1964 (Portsmith, NH: Heinemann, 1999); Timothy Parsons, The 
1964 Army Mutinies and the Making of Modern East Africa (Westport: Praeger, 2003).  
13 Timothy Parsons, The 1964 Army Mutinies and the Making of Modern East Africa (Westport: Praeger, 
2003). 
14 Kenneth Grundy, Soldiers Without Politics: Blacks in the South African Armed Forces (Berkeley: 
University of California Press, 1983); Gavin Cawthra, Brutal Force: The Apartheid War Machine 
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on how these forces were formed and the political battles that came with arming African 
soldiers in a South Africa governed by the National Party. Nonetheless, scholars like 
Kenneth Grundy have demonstrated some significant reasons for oppressed minorities to 
seek out employment in the military force of the oppressor. He suggests that “economic 
conscription” was the National Party policy of keeping Africans in such a dire economic 
position that the idea of oppressing one’s fellow Africans could be overcome by granting 
some measure of economic advantage not otherwise available.15  
There are a large number of published sources on the Zimbabwean War of 
Independence.  In the 1980s and early 1990s, books on the subject were very much 
dominated by the nationalist rhetoric of the time. The view of Africans who served the 
Rhodesian regime was that they were either traitors or collaborators. Peter McLaughlin 
was one of the first scholars to challenge this in some of his articles on the Rhodesia use 
of African manpower.16 In doing so he also challenged the self-celebratory Rhodesian 
view of itself as a multi-racial country with blacks and whites fighting side by side, free 
of discrimination. Despite the growing number of scholarly pieces on the war in 
Zimbabwe, there is also a very vibrant genre of celebratory literature by former 
Rhodesian soldiers that deals most commonly with the special units of the Rhodesian 
military and is mostly concerned with explicitly military details of the campaigns; as a 
                                                                                                                                           
(London: International Defence & Aid Fund For Southern Africa, 1986); Cynthia Enloe, Ethnic Soldiers: 
State Security in Divided Societies (Athens: The University of Georgia Press, 1980).  
15 Grundy, Soldiers Without Politics, 14. 
16 P. McLaughlin, “Collaborators, Mercenaries or Patriots? The ‘problem’ of African Troops in Southern 
Rhodesia During the First and Second World Wars,” Zimbabwean History 10 (1979), 21-50; P. 
McLaughlin, “Victims as Defenders: African Troops in the Rhodesian Defence System 1890–1980,” 
Small Wars and Insurgencies 2 (1991), 240-75; Paul Moorcraft and Peter McLaughlin, The Rhodesian 
War: A Military History  (Johannesburg: Jonathan Ball, 2008).    
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result, books of this type often neglect to discuss the causes for the conflicts or mention 
the African role in the military effort.17 
While there are a growing number of works regarding the involvement of foreign 
powers in the crisis in Rhodesia, many specifically look at the role these powers played 
in the period of UDI rather than at the transition to majority rule in Zimbabwe. Gerald 
Horne’s work has outlined the role of the United States government in formulating the 
perception and ideas of whiteness in Rhodesia and how many in the United States were 
quite willing quietly to support the Rhodesian war effort.18 Other scholars, such as 
Elaine Windrich, examined the Rhodesian problem as a political issue in the United 
Kingdom.19 The historical works that have examined the end of the conflict constitute a 
much smaller portion of the whole. There are a number of works that have looked at the 
                                                
17 Ron Ried-Daly, Selous Scouts: Top Secret War (Alberton, South Africa: Galago Publishing, 1982); C.J. 
Cocks, Fireforce: One Man’s War in the Rhodesian Light Infantry (Roodepoort, South Africa: Covos 
Books, 1997); Barbara Cole, The Elite: The Story of the Rhodesian Special Air Service (Amanzimtoti, 
South Africa: Three Knights, 1984); Alexandre Binda, Masodja: The history of the Rhodesian African 
Rifles and its forerunner the Rhodesian Native Regiment (Johannesburg: 30 Degrees South Publishers, 
2007).  This is just a small sample of the large number of celebratory works on the Rhodesian Army and 
military forces.  
18 Gerald Horne, From the Barrel of a Gun: The United States and the War Against Zimbabwe, 1965-1980 
(Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina, 2001).  While Horne does address the issue, he also levels a 
large number of slightly conspiratorial accusations against the US government such as accusing it of large-
scale material support of the Rhodesian regime.  These accusations are often based on propaganda 
publications of both ZAPU and ZANU. While these sources do have some merit, many of their facts have 
to be looked upon with some doubt. According to casualty reports in the Zimbabwe Review, the liberation 
forces managed to shoot down most of the Rhodesian Air Force every month, as well as kill hundreds of 
Rhodesian soldiers in many ground engagements.  
19 Elaine Windrich, Britain and the Politics of Rhodesian Independence  (London: Croom Helm, 1978); 
Elaine Windrich, The Rhodesian Problem: A Documentary History 1923-1973 (London: Routledge & 
Kegan Paul, 1975). Other authors have looked at the role that the CAF and Rhodesia played in dismantling 
of the British Empire in Africa; L.J. Butler, “The Central African Federation and Britain’s Post-War 
Nuclear Programme: Reconsidering the Connections,” Journal of Imperial and Commonwealth History 36 
(September 2008), 509-525; Philip E. Hemming, “Macmillan and the End of the British Empire in 
Africa,” Chapter to Harold Macmillan and Britain’s World Role (London: Macmillan, 1996), 97-122. Carl 
Watts examined the reasons the British government ruled out military intervention shortly after UDI; Carl 
Watts, “Killing Kith and Kin: The Viability of British Military Intervention in Rhodesia, 1964-5,” 
Twentieth Century British History 16 (2005), 382-415.  
  11 
process that led to the Lancaster House Agreements and the deployment of the 
Commonwealth Monitoring Force. Both Stephen Stedman and Jeffrey Davidow have 
produced detailed studies of the negotiations and the agreement itself.20 Others have 
examined the transition to majority rule; Ronald Weitzer did a comparative analysis of 
the Rhodesian conflict with the British experience in Northern Ireland.  In this work 
Weitzer also examines the way in which the Rhodesian security forces dealt with 
internal security with Zimbabwean practices in the 1980s, and concludes that in fact 
there were very few differences in the ways that they viewed and interacted with the 
African population.21  
After independence, scholars lost interest in the military establishment of 
Zimbabwe, except in reference to their deployments to the Congo in the 1990s and their 
involvement in the atrocities in Zimbabwe in the 1980s. Terrence Ranger’s work 
examined the experiences of African soldiers in the guerilla armies during the conflict, 
and devotes some space to the experiences of these soldiers in post-conflict Zimbabwe.22 
Norma Kriger published a book on the fates of soldiers in the liberation armies in the 
post-independence world. As a portion of this study, she looked at the process of 
integration of the ZNA.  Her examination was based almost exclusively on newspaper 
publications from the period and certain interviews with British personnel who were part 
                                                
20 Jeffrey Davidow, Peace in Southern Africa: The Lancaster House Conference on Rhodesia, 1979 
(Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1984); Stephen Stedman, Peacemaking in Civil War: International 
Mediation in Zimbabwe, 1974-1980 (Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 1991).  
21 Ronald Weitzer, Transforming Settler States: Communal Conflict and Internal Security in Northern 
Ireland and Zimbabwe (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1990).  
22 Terence Ranger and Ngwabi Bhebe, Soldiers in Zimbabwe’s Liberation War (Harare: University of 
Zimbabwe Publications, 1995).  
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of the BMATT. At the time she wrote, the relevant official British government 
documents had not yet been declassified.23 Other studies of the ZNA and its foundation 
are often parts of studies on the current structure or doctrine of the ZNA, published by 
security policy researchers, with the national security community as their audience.24 
Many of these publications focus exclusively on the integration of the two liberation 
armies into the ZNA and seldom mention the African Rhodesian Army soldiers who 
continued to serve after independence. This is a serious gap in the research, because it 
was these former Rhodesian soldiers who secured Mugabe’s government after the events 
in Bulawayo in February of 1981.25 
All of these studies focused on the aftermath of the creation of the ZNA and its 
role in securing the Mugabe regime throughout the 1980s and 1990s, or they scrutinized 
the atrocities that the regime perpetrated against the Ndebele between 1982 and 1989.26 
                                                
23 Norma Kriger, Guerrilla Veterans in Post-War Zimbabwe: Symbolic and Violent Politics, 1980-1987 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2003). With this said, many of the documents on the BMATT 
after 1983 have yet to be declassified.  
24 Greg Mills, “BMATT and Military Integration in Southern Africa,” South African Defence Review 
(1992); Ashley Jackson, “British-African Defence and Security Connections,” Defence Studies 6 
(September 2006); Martin Rupiah, “Demobilisation and Integration: ‘Operation Merger’ and the 
Zimbabwe National Defence Forces, 1980-1987,” African Security Review 4 (1994); Martin Rupiah, “The 
‘Expanding Torrent’: British Military Assistance to the Southern African Region,” African Security 
Review 5 (1996); Eric Young, “Chefs and Worried Soldiers: Authority and Power in the Zimbabwe 
National Army,” Armed Forces and Society  24 (1997).  
25 Luise White, “‘Whoever Saw a Country with Four Armies?’: The Battle of Bulawayo Revisited,” 
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with ZNA officers and the ZNA public relations directorate. While it is still a useful examination of the 
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What they have failed to consider is how the army that was formed between 1980 and 
1983 out of three separate and very different organizations ended up becoming the main 
pillar supporting continued one-party rule in Zimbabwe. This study will examine how 
the British experience forming and training armies in both Kenya and Zambia influenced 
London’s action in the formation of the Zimbabwe National Army.  Additionally, it will 
consider how the ZNA ended up an entirely politicized and unprofessional force, the 
opposite of what the British intended as a tool to stabilize the region in the middle of the 
Cold War that was raging in Africa.  
 
Kenya 
While the colonial forces of all African colonies went through some sort of 
training period and transition with British forces, the colonies that had significant 
European settler communities most closely reflect the situation in Zimbabwe. The 
bloody Mau Mau Insurrection defined the Kenyan independence struggle that ended in 
1963. While the post-1945 era of the British Empire was punctuated by the 
independence of India in 1947, and the unrest in Palestine and the independence of Israel 
in 1948, Clement Attlee had other plans for the British colonies in Africa.  While very 
much the anti-imperialist with regards to the Asian empire, Attlee and some in his 
cabinet regarded the Sub-Saharan African colonies as India’s replacement in the Empire. 
Additionally, Kenya itself was envisioned as a basing area to forward deploy both troops 
                                                                                                                                           
ZNA in a short space, it fails to incorporate some the information available on the role of the ZNA in the 
atrocities in Matabeleland.   
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and resources.27 However, after significant discussion in the cabinet and the Ministry of 
Defence, it was decided that Kenya was just too far away from the Middle East to be a 
suitable location for a Middle-East Command Headquarters or prepositioning location.28 
The War Office was concerned about the post-war cost of imperial defence and 
did not want to shoulder the burden of garrisoning regular forces all over the empire, 
particularly in the wake of the massive war debt that Britain faced.  Local African troops 
were to be utilized for territorial defence, as well as internal security operations. 
European territorial units could be called up in the event of an emergency. Additionally, 
the Kenya Police had acquired a significant amount of experience in internal security 
operations and were, up to a certain point, equipped to handle outbreaks of violence and 
protest. The Kenya Colony defence establishment was put to the test during the Mau 
Mau Insurrection. The State of Emergency and the massive amount of resources that 
were required to undertake a counterinsurgency operation in Kenya made leaders in 
Britain question the wisdom of retaining it as a colony.  The uprising, which began mid-
1952, required the deployment of regular army units, a call up of territorial forces, the 
creation of reserve police forces, and significant Royal Air Force contributions for the 
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next four years. The State of Emergency lasted until 1960, yet the stage had been set for 
independence; by 1963, independence had come to Kenya.29  
The Africanization program in the East African Land Forces began in earnest in 
1960. Well past independence, these forces continued to have white officers seconded 
from the British Army or on short term contracts with the host governments until local 
national officers could be trained to take their places. The major force in Kenya, the 
King’s African Rifles, had been created in 1902; it distinguished itself in both world 
wars, as well as in the Mau Mau emergency. The Kenyan battalions of this regiment 
served as the foundation for the Kenyan Defence Force.  The training mission in Kenya 
was somewhat easier than in other colonies. East African Land Forces had a significant 
presence in Kenya for many years.  There were a large number of training areas 
available and a large number of British personnel already available to train, mentor, and 
lead the new African force through the transition to independence.  
Even so, there were a significant number of lessons that the British learned from 
this experience, about selecting trainees, recruitment, officer production, and the 
importance of organic supporting arms. This was particularly true after the 1964 East 
African army mutinies. This experience had a significant impact on the way that the 
training mission in Zambia proceeded after the country achieved independence in 1964.  
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Zambia 
While Northern Rhodesia became Zambia only a short time after Kenya gained 
independence, the establishment of the military in the former colony took many of its 
cues from the situation in Kenya. This was due to the fact that the majority of the 
training and Africanization of the forces in Zambia took place after independence. Its 
large European settler community and participation in the Central African Federation 
delayed the course of independence in Zambia.  
The early 1950s brought significant political change to the colony. The Northern 
Rhodesia African National Congress was founded in 1948. At the same time, Roy 
Welensky, future Prime Minister of the Central African Federation (along with other 
settlers) campaigned to secure a federation with the more conservative Southern 
Rhodesia.  The victory of the Conservative Party in Britain in 1951 and the return of 
Winston Churchill to the Prime Minister’s office reduced the chance that African 
opinion would be taken into consideration when deciding the future of the colony.30  The 
creation of a federation in central Africa would serve a variety of British political 
interests. Since 1948, the prospect of Afrikaner domination in southern and central 
Africa had concerned the British government, especially since the National Party in 
South Africa had drifted closer and closer to republicanism.  The Conservative 
                                                
30 Jan Pettman, Zambia: Security and Conflict (New York: St. Martin’s Press, 1974), 12. 
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government felt that a Central African Federation with a very British identity would be 
an excellent counterbalance to the growing power of Pretoria.31 
The British government was very clear that they would never allow the colony of 
Northern Rhodesia to merge with the self-governing Southern Rhodesia. The idea of a 
federation of the two with the addition of Nyasaland, however, was thought to be an 
acceptable compromise.32 The three territories joined together as the Federation of 
Rhodesia and Nyasaland in 1953, commonly known as the Central African Federation 
(CAF). All of the territorial governments remained intact, with the duties of defence and 
foreign affairs falling to the Federal Government in Salisbury.  The federal army was 
made up of forces that had previously composed the Southern Rhodesia Army and those 
British colonial forces that had been stationed in North Rhodesia and Nyasaland. The 
CAF was fraught with problems of jurisdiction and financial responsibility.  There were 
three territorial governments, a federal government, and the British government involved 
in this endeavor; at the simplest of times the lines of communication and authority were 
confusing.  The Federal Government supported British actions in Suez, and had always 
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offered up units of the Federal Army and Air Force to be liable for worldwide service in 
support of British interests.  
The willingness of the Federal Government to be involved in British expeditions 
around the world encouraged British defence assistance to the CAF military.  The Air 
Force was modernized and received Canberra bombers, C-47 Transports, Vampire 
fighters, and Hawker Hunter fighter-bombers.  The influx of technologically advanced 
aircraft made the Air Force one of the most advanced in Africa. At the same time, the 
Federation Army was enlarged. Previously, the force had primarily been composed of 
African regulars led by white officers; in 1961, an all-white regular infantry regiment 
was formed to compliment the all-white territorial force.  
The independence of Ghana in 1957 and the attitude of Harold Macmillan’s 
government brought change to Africa.  During the 1960s, seventeen African colonies 
achieved independence and a number of others were in the closing stages of 
independence negotiations. When he was selected as Prime Minister in January of 1957, 
he presided over a bruised and bloodied Conservative Party. Decolonization in West 
Africa was relatively straightforward.  Ghana was already set to achieve independence 
later that year, and the lack of European settlers in the region made the issue fairly 
simple. East and Central Africa, with their large settler populations, posed more of a 
challenge.  
While Macmillan was of the opinion that dispensing with the Empire did not 
equate to Britain sacrificing its position as a world power, he was also not in any hurry 
to give African colonies independence.  He had witnessed the difficulties that the French 
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had in both Indo-China and Algeria, and reasoned that fighting insurgencies to maintain 
colonial possessions cost far too many lives and far too much money.  The Prime 
Minister decided to slowly prepare the colonies for independence and attempt to channel 
the African nationalist movements into the political process, rather than suppress them. 
What complicated the matter even more was the divided nature of the Conservative 
Party, with the right wing of the party led by the 5th Marquess of Salisbury who 
staunchly supported the settler communities in Africa.33  
This division led Macmillan to delay action on decolonization until after the 
general election in 1959 secured his government’s position.  In 1960, with the election 
out of the way, Macmillan was able to undertake his grand tour of Africa. The trip took 
him through both Northern and Southern Rhodesia, and of course ended with his famous 
“Winds of Change” speech to the South African Parliament in Cape Town.34 Just before 
Macmillan’s trip to Africa, he formed the Royal Commission now known as the 
Monckton Commission (headed by the lawyer and politician Walter Monckton) to 
investigate the future of the CAF.  When the Commission released its findings on 18 
October 1960, it was clear that the Central African Federation was finished. The 
commission recommended that Africans be given equal representation in the Federal 
Assembly, as well as the Northern Rhodesia House of Assembly.35  
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Macmillan’s plan for both Northern Rhodesia and Nyasaland was to see a 
quickened pace towards independence; the hope was that the nations would be able to 
rule themselves.36 Of course, all of this was predicated on the assumption that these 
newly created nations would join and be active members of the Commonwealth of 
Nations. Macmillan envisioned the Commonwealth as a sort of informal empire in which 
the British government would still be able to exert significant political and economic 
influence over their former colonial possessions. He also had intended to speed up the 
process of decolonization in 1960, so as not to be upstaged by the French.  In 1958, 
Charles de Gaulle offered the French territories in Africa autonomy within the French 
community, or full independence. Macmillan did not want to risk falling behind the 
French in world opinion over decolonization.37   
 Elections were held in 1961 to form majority rule governments in Northern 
Rhodesia and Nyasaland. On 31 December 1963, the Federation was officially 
dissolved; Zambia and Malawi became independent nations in 1964.  The third member 
of the Federation, Southern Rhodesia (simply called Rhodesia after the collapse of the 
Federation), reverted back to its status as a self-governing Crown colony dominated by 
the European population. The dissolution of the Federation had significant implications 
for the future of Zambia. Even before independence was declared, the division of the 
resources of the Federal Army and Air Force gutted the Zambian defence establishment. 
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The Victoria Falls Conference in December of 1963 was convened to plan the breakup 
of the Federation.  The major parties represented were the Conservative-led British 
government and the Southern Rhodesia government.  The African leadership of 
Northern Rhodesia were barred from the process.   
It became clear to the Labour party and the United Nations that the British 
intention was to transfer the majority of the Federation’s Army and Air Force into the 
hands of the Southern Rhodesian government. While both Labour and the independent 
African nations protested, the British government planned to move forward with the 
division.  The issue became so pervasive that it was discussed by the Security Council of 
the United Nations. A resolution was proposed demanding that Britain not transfer to 
Southern Rhodesia the aircraft and ground forces as outlined in the Victoria Falls 
conference. In the Security Council, the British government felt as though they had no 
other option.  As a result, they used their veto power for the first time since the Suez 
Crisis in 1956.38 
  Upon independence, Zambia was left with a force of only 2,200 soldiers and 
three transport aircraft in the air wing.  European officers led the entire military; at the 
time of independence there was only one African officer in the force.39 The Europeans 
were either local settlers who had taken commissions in the federal forces who had 
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agreed to stay on after independence, or British officers who were seconded to the 
Zambians until African officers could be trained. This arrangement, while similar to the 
plan used in Kenya, had not even begun until after Zambia had achieved independence. 
A British officer remained the Commander of the Zambia Defence Force until the 
appointment of Colonel Kingsley Chinkuli in 1970.  There were significant issues with 
the employment of the Kenyan training system in Zambia.  
Upon Kenyan independence in 1963, the process of Africanization had been 
going on for several years and had been relatively effective. In the post-1945 years, the 
regiments of the King’s African Rifles had employed a system of promoting Africans to 
the rank of effendi, which gave the East African forces a base of trained and experienced 
African leaders to promote to commissioned rank.40 There was no such system in place 
in Zambia, where the highest rank that an African soldier in the Northern Rhodesia 
Regiment could attain was Warrant Officer I. The Zambian government had almost no 
choice but to rely on European officers until sufficient Africans could be trained.  
The reliance on Europeans proved problematic only a year after independence. In 
1965, Southern Rhodesia came to an impasse with the British government over the 
implementation of majority rule in the colony.  The ultra-right wing Rhodesian Front 
Party had come to power in Salisbury in the election of 1962, on the wave of discontent 
generated by European population over the transition to majority rule by the northern 
members of the Federation. By November of 1965, the Rhodesian Front decided they 
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could no longer negotiate with the British over the issue of independence.  On November 
11, 1965, the Rhodesian government unilaterally declared independence (UDI) from 
Britain.41   
The events of UDI had serious security implications for Zambia.  As a 
landlocked country, they depended on Rhodesia as a trading partner and for access to the 
sea. Additionally, the possibility of hostilities between the two nations was not out of the 
question, and British officers seconded to the Zambian Army were not permitted to lead 
Zambian soldiers into battle in the event of war against the rebel colony.  British defence 
assistance to Zambia put severe restraints on the freedom of action of the Zambian 
government during this period of crisis.  Kenneth Kaunda and his United National 
Independence Party were bound by British policy on Rhodesia for as long as they 
continued to accept British security aid.   
The drawbacks of the system of training in Zambia became evident during this 
time.  The country as a whole was far too reliant on Europeans, even five years after 
independence, not only in the area of defence but also with regard to the country’s 
largest industry, copper.  In 1969 there were still 43,390 European residents of Zambia, 
and five years later there were still 4,000 Europeans occupying technical and managerial 
positions in Zambia’s mining industry.42 After the termination of their training 
agreement by the UNIP government, the British Joint Services Training Team left 
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Zambia in December of 1969.  The Zambians were not satisfied with the rate of training 
by the British team (12 personnel a year) and contracted with the Italian government to 
provide training for the Zambian Air Force, as well as seconded officers.  By this point, 
the Army contingent of the training team had already left, leaving behind only European 
officers until Zambians could be trained.  These officers remained in the Zambian 
Defence Force until 7 January 1971, when the last 17 remaining officers were summarily 
dismissed from Zambian service in reaction to British arms sales to the South African 
government and an increasing need for the UNIP to gain control over all aspects of the 
government.43 
 
Rhodesia/Zimbabwe 
In many ways, Rhodesia was different from any other British colony in Africa. 
When many historians of British Africa write about the colonies, they generally do not 
include Rhodesia with countries such as Kenya, Northern Rhodesia, or Nigeria.44 By the 
1880s, Cecil Rhodes had made his first fortune in diamonds, been elected to the Cape 
Parliament, and launched the De Beers Mining Company.  While a student at Oriel 
College, Oxford, Rhodes had been greatly influenced by the inaugural lecture of English 
art critic John Ruskin.  The speech had painted a romantic image of the British imperial 
mission around the world, and it inspired Rhodes to make his life’s goal “the extension 
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of British rule throughout the world.”45 Rhodes’s part in all of this was focused on the 
British role in Africa and his dream of extending the Realm from the Cape of Good 
Hope to Cairo.46 
Rhodes was able to secure the mineral rights to what became Rhodesia for 25 
years.47  In 1889, the British South Africa Company (BSAC), controlled by Rhodes, was 
granted a Royal Charter upon the amalgamation of the Central Search Association and 
the Exploring Company, Ltd. The BSAC was given control of Rhodesia and used it as 
the basis for the settlement of Matabeleland. The Pioneer Corps of the BSAC was 
formed for the settlement of what would become Rhodesia. In July of 1890, a mixed 
force of about 100 pioneers and 100 troopers from the newly formed British South 
Africa Company Police crossed the Shashi River on their way north. In a series of wars 
with the Ndebele and the Shona, the BSAC consolidated their control over the territory 
that unofficially was known as Rhodesia by 1895. Company rule continued in the colony 
until 1923, when the Colony of Southern Rhodesia was granted responsible 
government.48  
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Since its establishment under the Chartered Company, Rhodesia maintained its 
own security apparatus, largely without the assistance of soldiers from the British Army. 
From the time the Pioneer Corps left South Africa until 1954, the British South Africa 
Police were trained as paramilitary police in the style of the Royal Irish Constabulary 
and charged with the territorial defence of the colony.49   
During the First World War, both European and African regiments were raised 
from the colony.  The all-European Rhodesia Regiment was formed in 1914 as an 
infantry unit. During the course of the war, it saw action in the southern part of West 
Africa and British East Africa.  The regiment was disbanded in 1917, after severe 
casualties seriously impacted the colony’s ability to function without resorting to placing 
Africans in exclusively European military roles. In order to continue to contribute to the 
war effort and to prevent German forces under the command of Paul Emil von Lettow-
Vorbeck from invading the colony, the BSAC raised the Rhodesian Native Regiment.  
While the officers and most of the non-commissioned officers of this unit were 
European, the rank-and-file were African. This was the first employment of armed 
Africans in military service since the use of African auxiliaries during the First 
Chimurenga War in 1896-1897.50  The combat record of the unit was held in high 
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esteem by colonial authorities. Even so, it was disbanded with haste in the opening 
months of 1919.51   
During the interwar period, the Rhodesian defence establishment reverted to the 
previous model, with the BSAP responsible for territorial defence. During this time, 
African constables were, for the most part, not given weapons training. The exception 
was the Askari Platoon. This unit mounted the ceremonial guard at Government House 
and maintained the military nature of the force.  They were also responsible for training 
African constables at the Native Police Training School (NPTS). The troopers in this 
unit were the only Africans allowed regularly to carry firearms on duty throughout the 
interwar period.52 
After responsible government was granted in 1923, the colony maintained a 
small staff corps of officers to resurrect the armed forces, were it to be required. When 
World War II began in 1939, the government again announced its intention that 
Europeans serve as soldiers and Africans only as laborers. Colonial leaders such as Sir 
Robert Tredgold thought the Rhodesian contribution to the war would be to allow men 
from the European community to serve as officers in HM Forces. By 1940, however, the 
colonial administration had decided to resurrect an African regiment.53 The unit was 
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renamed the Rhodesian African Rifles, and as in WWI white officers led the African 
rank-and-file. In 1944, the unit saw action in Burma against the Japanese and was 
applauded for its effectiveness in action. The RAR was demobilized in 1946, and very 
quickly was resurrected in 1949 as a regular unit of the Rhodesian Army.  Between 1949 
and UDI in 1965, the regiment served in Suez, Malaya, the Congo Border, and in 
Nyasaland.  By November of 1965, the RAR made up half of the Rhodesian Army’s 
regular infantry establishment.54 
While UDI gave the Rhodesians de facto independence, UN sanctions and 
British insistence that it was an internal matter prevented any nation from ever officially 
recognizing its statehood.55 Shortly after UDI, African liberation movements began to 
consider how best to combat the Rhodesian Front government. From 1965 until 1980, 
both the Zimbabwe African National Union (ZANU) and the Zimbabwe African 
People’s Union (ZAPU) sent liberation fighters into Rhodesia in an attempt to overthrow 
the regime.56 The most intense phase of the war occurred from 1973 to 1979.  During 
this period the RAR made up a large portion of the military forces of Rhodesia, and was 
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deployed constantly to operational areas. By 1979, four RAR battalions had been 
authorized by the government, totaling 3,500 soldiers.57  
By 1979, the Rhodesian Front had held out for as long as it could; the events of 
the 1970s had increasingly handicapped the Rhodesian Security Force’s ability to 
maintain control over the territory.  The security situation in the late 1970s was tense, 
and put increasing amounts of strain upon the white community simply to supply enough 
soldiers to keep the war going. By the end of 1976 the National Service period had been 
extended from a year to eighteen months, and by 1978 those who had completed their 
National Service and were serving in the Territorial Army were mobilized for active 
service for 190 days a year.58 The Rhodesian economy could not survive the strain of 
war for much longer, and Prime Minister Ian Smith and his Rhodesian Front were forced 
to seek out a political solution to the conflict.  
The British general elections of May 1979 brought Conservative Margret 
Thatcher to the Prime Minister’s office. Prior to taking office, Thatcher and the Tories 
laid plans to recognize the Internal Settlement government of Ian Smith and Bishop Able 
Muzorewa.59 However, she was convinced of the folly of this policy by her experienced 
Foreign Secretary, Peter Lord Carrington. He knew that the recognition of the Muzorewa 
                                                
57 Paul Moorcraft and Peter McLaughlin, The Rhodesian War: A Military History  (Johannesburg: 
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would isolate the British government further from the United States and most African 
nations. After the Commonwealth Heads of Government meeting in Lusaka in August of 
1979, the British attempted to mediate a solution to the Rhodesian problem. By 
December of 1979, an agreement had been made for Rhodesia to return to British control 
for long enough to hold supervised elections to determine how the majority rule 
government would take shape.  The liberation movements conceded that the settler 
community would retain twenty seats in the Rhodesian Parliament until 1986, and there 
would be no forcible redistribution of land.60 A draft constitution was worked out during 
the conference which called for the liberation forces and the Rhodesians to disband their 
military forces and merge them together to create the Zimbabwe National Army (ZNA).  
In December of 1979, the rebel colony returned to British control, and the 
Commonwealth Monitoring Force (CMF) arrived to supervise the elections and the 
orderly assembly of the guerilla forces at designated assembly points. After the elections 
were held in February of 1980, it was a surprise to the European population that Robert 
Mugabe was the winner. The CMF departed by March of 1980, and the mission of the 
remaining British forces in the country became the creation of the ZNA. The mission 
was complex and vast; in addition to demobilizing the large guerilla armies, they had to 
be retrained for conventional warfare and then integrated into a new force to serve with 
the men of the former Rhodesian Security Forces.  The British goal for the project was 
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the same it had been in Kenya and Zambia: to create a professional military force that 
would help protect the democratic process in Zimbabwe. Sadly, by January of 1983 this 
mission had already failed with the beginning of the deployment of the notorious Fifth 
Brigade.  
The first chapter of this research examines the development of the colonial army 
in Kenya and its transformation and Africanisation after independence. It will also 
examine the Kenya Army directly after independence and the lessons learned by the 
British during the 1964 East African mutinies. Chapter two discusses the Zambian 
separation from the Central African Federation and how this process complicated the 
transition to independence and military self-reliance. The third Chapter looks at the 
establishment and organization of the Rhodesian Security Forces and the liberation 
armies during the war for independence. Chapter four deals with the end of the conflict 
and the British planning for peace and reconstruction in Zimbabwe.  This Chapter 
examines the way the British saw post-conflict Zimbabwe developing and the direction 
and nature that they felt the new military should take. The formation of the British 
Military Advisory and Training Team, as well as its performance and challenges, are 
covered in Chapter five. This Chapter also looks at the end result of the efforts of the 
BMATT, the rise of the dominance of ZANU-PF, and the beginning of the atrocities in 
Matabeland in 1983.  
Since 1999, the Movement for Democratic Change, the major opposition party in 
Zimbabwe, has asserted that the Mugabe regime relied upon the military to use 
increasingly coercive force to maintain power.  In order to ensure their loyalty, the ZNA 
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was given large salary increases and a significant stake in major national corporations, 
very much ensuring that the future of most soldiers, particularly those in command, 
would be securely tied to the Mugabe regime. The process of wining the loyalty of the 
Army began with its formation and the way that the BMATT executed its duty to create 
a new army of former enemies
  33 
CHAPTER II  
FROM ASKARIS TO GENERALS: TRANSFORMING THE KING’S AFRICAN 
RIFLES INTO THE KENYA ARMY 
 
 The King’s African Rifles (KAR) holds an iconic place in the imagery of the 
British Empire.  Images of African soldiers in British uniform adorned imperial 
propaganda from the early 20th century until the end of the Second World War. While 
this regiment is undoubtedly famous for its exploits in battle, its role in the formation of 
independent Africa is less often acknowledged.1  
 
Origins of the Kenyan Military Establishment 
The regiment contained battalions from five different colonies, and upon 
independence, these units formed the basis of the national armies in their respective 
territories. Military culture within these units defined the formation of independent 
armies. In some cases the uniforms and insignia of the KAR only changed slightly upon 
independence. In the case of Tanganyika, 6th Battalion KAR’s (6KAR) name was simply 
changed to The Tanganyika Rifles (The 6th Battalion the King’s African Rifles); the 
former Colonel Commandant, Major General W.A. Dimoline, was also retained.2 The 
                                                
1 John MacKenzie, Propaganda and Empire: The Manipulation of British Public Opinion, 1880-1960 
(Manchester: Manchester University Press, 1984). In the text MacKenzie demonstrates how colonial 
images were used not only to market products to the British people, but also how these products helped 
market the empire to people in Britain. The image of the Askari was often displayed on products or as a 
brand symbol so it became a common sight in Britain even if these soldiers rarely set foot in Great Britain.  
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2003), 67. 
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creation of the King’s African Rifles was the result of the combination of a number of 
irregular forces raised by various entities in East Africa.  The Foreign Office was in 
charge of British activities in East Africa and gave the various chartered companies and 
other semi-official entities a free hand in levying troops and keeping order. In 1888, 
Frederick Lugard recruited African irregular troops to combat Muslim slave traders in 
what would become Nyasaland. When the Central African Protectorate was formed in 
1891, an African militia that had been used extensively was formalized and became the 
Central African Rifles (CAR).  This unit, like many in early Anglophone Africa, was 
strengthened by the use of troops from the British Indian Army - in the case of the CAR, 
this was the 175-man “Sikh Contingent.”3 
 In most cases, African soldiers in the 19th and early 20th century played almost an 
exclusively internal security role in the colonies and protectorates in which they were 
formed.  However, early on, the CAR was used in an imperial service capacity. They 
were engaged not only in combating the slave trade, but also in the conquest of 
Somaliland, and other African territories.4 The two other units that were combined in 
1902 to form the KAR were the Uganda Rifles and the East Africa Rifles.  Lugard 
recruited the Uganda Rifles when he was in the service of the Imperial British East 
Africa Company (IBEAC) in 1890.  The troops were initially mostly Sudanese, 
Zanzibarian, and Indian, however; as campaigning in the region became more intense, 
replacement recruits had to be found among local Africans.  The regiment was thrown 
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King’s African Rifles, 1902-1964 (Portsmith, NH: Heinemann, 1999), 15.  
4 Ibid., 15.  
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into disarray in October 1897 when three companies mutinied complaining of poor and 
infrequent pay during long campaigns.5 The loyal Sudanese soldiers, who had continued 
to fight for the IBEAC throughout the mutiny, reformed the regiment. Until the 
amalgamation of the three regiments, the Uganda Rifles never served outside of the 
territory in which they were raised. This was due to the fact that their commitments to 
their internal security mission kept them on operations constantly until the 20th century.6 
 The IBEAC was formed primarily as a trading venture, however, when it arrived 
in Africa and was forced to take on both a political and a military mission it proved to be 
ill prepared. One British diplomat is quoted as having called the IBEAC, “European 
Administration…with no visible force at its back.”7  Due to its lack of preparedness for 
the mission, IBEAC ended up with a military arrangement that was anything but 
uniform.  By 1895, the IBEAC had 866 troops stationed in various locations around its 
coastal African territory. When the company was dissolved and the East African 
Protectorate declared, these soldiers became the East African Rifles. Again the Indian 
influence is apparent in the East African forces, as it was composed of “two British 
officers, 300 Punjabis, 100 Sudanese (raised later to 250), 300 Swahili and a ‘mixed 
force’ of 200 men.”8 The government of India was also asked to second both gunners 
and medical orderlies to this new force. During the short lifespan of the East African 
Rifles, they were engaged in a number of internal security campaigns. The organization 
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6 Ibid., 94. 
7 Sir A. Hardinge, A Diplomat in the East, p. 164. 
8 Ibid., 102. 
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of both the administration and the military arrangements in the protectorate were a 
confusing web of command relationships that made ordering even the simplest supplies 
extremely difficult. By 1902 it was clear that a major reorganization was in order.  
 The forces in early British East Africa were mostly foreign-born Muslims. The 
British authorities assumed that it was best to use troops who were not related in any 
way to the territory they were policing.  This was one of the major reasons that there was 
such extensive use of Indian soldiers in East and Central Africa. However the mutiny of 
the Uganda Rifles in 1897 was evidence that even foreign-born troops could be prone to 
mutiny if not treated well by the imperial authorities.  The British government learned 
from this experience, and throughout the colonial era in Africa, made sure that their 
African soldiers were always better paid than most African civilians.  
 In 1901, the British forces in West Africa were centralized under the banner of 
the West African Frontier Force. The War Office pointed out that it would doubtlessly 
be beneficial to do the same thing in East and Central Africa. The use of Indian troops to 
bolster the strength of forces in Africa was becoming increasingly expensive due to their 
particular dietary restrictions. The creation of a centralized organization would allow one 
territory to call upon the resources of another in times of crisis.9 At this time, none of the 
East African territories were considered completely capable of taking charge of their 
own security without outside assistance, so this arrangement proved advantageous for all 
of the colonies involved. On January 1, 1902 the Kings African Rifles (KAR) was 
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officially formed with six battalions: two in Central Africa, one in East Africa, two in 
Uganda, and one in Somaliland.10 
 In 1905, the Colonial Office was given full responsibility for the KAR. Under 
this arrangement, the individual colonies were responsible for funding and administering 
each battalion. By 1912, all of the Indian contingents of the KAR had been withdrawn.  
These soldiers had been paid more than their African counterparts and required a special 
diet that was more expensive to maintain than the young colonies could afford. During 
the early years many civil officials attempted to disband the KAR due the expenses 
required in supporting the unit. Although the War Office prevented the disbanding of the 
KAR battalions, to ensure there were military forces available in Africa in the event of a 
large war, they were severely downsized in 1913.   
 World War I saw a huge expansion of the KAR. While British authorities did not 
feel that African solders were suitable for the European theater of operations, they did 
find them very useful in countering the German threat in Africa. By 1916, specialist 
units of the KAR were formed; for the first time African soldiers served as gunners, 
sappers, signalers, and many other specialists.  This was the first time that African 
soldiers had the opportunity to leave their service in the British Army with more skills 
and education than when they enlisted.11 These African soldiers saw service throughout 
the campaign against German forces under the command of General Paul von Lettow-
Vorbeck. Overall, the African troops performed better than many officers in the British 
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high command had expected.  Their performance during the war had confronted many of 
the racist views that British officers had of African troops, particularly the claim that 
they were unsuitable as frontline troops.  
 During the years that followed, the establishment of the KAR was significantly 
reduced and control was returned to the Colonial Office. However, there was some 
concern among the European settler community regarding African troops being the only 
military organization in the colony. Therefore, in 1937, a part time Territorial Army unit, 
the Kenya Regiment, was formed.  The Kenya Regiment was an all-European unit that 
was intended to provide both officers and NCOs to the KAR, in case of another large-
scale mobilization in wartime. The regiment was also the holding unit for all 18-25 year 
old European males who underwent compulsory national service in Kenya.12 This 
territorial unit was enough assurance to calm the concerns of many in the settler 
community. They felt safer knowing that there was a white military force available, 
should the African force prove ineffective or disloyal. At the time of independence these 
two units made up the majority of the military establishment of Kenya Colony.13  
 World War II was a period of expansion for the Kenyan military establishment. 
The War Office took control of the KAR in 1939 as Britain was rearming to prepare for 
                                                
12 Guy Campbell, The Charging Buffalo: A History of the Kenya Regiment, 1937-1963 (London: Leo 
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the possibility of war. In 1939, the regiment grew from seven infantry battalions to forty-
three, roughly 13,000 men. In addition to these infantry units, there were a number of 
specialist and support units formed to support the newly created East Africa Command 
(EAC). They included but were not limited to: the East Africa Engineers, East Africa 
Artillery, East Africa Armoured Car Regiment, East Africa Army Service Corps, and the 
East Africa Army Medical Corps. The EAC’s first engagements were not fought until 
1941 when the British launched the Ethiopian Offensive against the Italians.  The 
campaign was a great success; Ethiopia was taken in only two months. KAR units were 
also instrumental in taking Madagascar from Vichy-French forces in 1942.14 
 In 1942, the War Office asked the EAC to send 1,000 soldiers to assist South 
East Asia Command (SEAC) in Burma. EAC eventually sent 5,500 men to fight in 
Burma. Units of the KAR did not arrive in Kenya until 1944 and from that time until the 
end of the war, these East African units fought a hardened enemy in brutal conditions.  
The KAR performed on level with many of the other British and Indian units that were 
in theater, they too, suffered from morale problems that many of these units experienced. 
During this harsh campaign, the African soldiers were exposed to the regular British 
military establishment as well as the British Indian Army (BIA). This is significant 
because the BIA had begun a process of Indianization, the commissioning of Indian 
officers and putting them in command of Indian troops. After seeing other people of the 
Empire placed in positions of leadership, many Africans began to wonder when their 
time would come. Additionally, African soldiers saw that European privates in the 
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British Army were required to perform the same labor duties expected of African troops. 
The exposure to the British class system was an eye opening experience for many 
African men, because for the first time, there existed a population of white men who 
were expected to fulfill the same duties.15 
 African servicemen performed well during the war in theaters across the world. 
While the colonial government of Kenya was often eager to downsize and, if possible, 
do away with the KAR regiments, there were additional concerns after 1945 that had not 
been present prior to the war.  Africans had been exposed to liberties and freedoms they 
never experienced in the colonial environment. There was a certain level of prestige and 
status that was achieved by Africans in military service. Their pay was more than 
competitive with their civilian counterparts and the living conditions were often better 
than working on a farm or in a mine.  These soldiers also had the opportunity to advance 
their education while in garrison by taking advantage of classes in English, reading, and 
mathmatics offered by the East African Educational Corps.  When these men were 
demobilized at the end of the war, many of them wanted to maintain the social 
advantages that they had achieved. They sought to achieve middle class employment and 
lifestyles when they left military service.16  
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 It was not an option for many of these African veterans to return to the pre-war 
social arrangement in Kenya. These men intended to redefine the colonial relationships 
that were in place; interestingly, many of them felt that they could do it from within the 
construct of the colonial system. It was not only the African soldiers who were cognizant 
of the changes that would occur at home in the post-war colonial world—the colonial 
administrations were concerned as well. The Kenyan government was concerned that 
African veterans would not want to return to their traditional homelands and the labor 
market that existed prior to the conflict. Additionally, authorities were concerned about 
war veteran involvement in African labor unions which they thought would further 
destabilize the colony.17 While many military commanders who had served with African 
soldiers thought that the soldiers sacrifice should have won them an equal position in 
society, others in colonial society did not agree. In addition to the colonial government’s 
opposition to the reintegration of African soldiers, the settler community was strongly 
opposed to any changes affecting the labor market. The war years had been immensely 
profitable for white Kenyan farmers, and as a result they enjoyed a heightened level of 
power in the colony than previously. During the war, the British government had been 
unable to devote the same amount of attention to the colonial administration as they had 
in the past, and the result was that the settler community filled the void bolstered by their 
new economic power.18  
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The rising power of the settler community influenced the government’s beliefs 
that the African veterans were destined for the farm labor market. Accordingly, the 
Kenya colonial government made very few arrangements to help demobilized African 
soldiers reintegrate into society.19 Not surprisingly African veterans were eager to raise 
themselves up from their pre-war status. They set up investing groups and attempted to 
translate their military skills into skilled laborer positions. While they resisted being 
thrown back into the position that the colonial government had selected for them they 
did not do it in the way that many settlers had feared. Rather than getting involved in 
African political movements African veterans often sought to gain the maximum amount 
of benefits from the colonial government. They would often wear their decorations in 
public and were granted permission by colonial authorities to carry spears in public as a 
sign of their martial status, a privilege of having served that had long been dormant.20 
They attempted to change from within the relationship between Africans and the 
colonial system; unfortunately this method of advocacy did not produce results.  
 
Post-1945 Colonial Military and the rise of Mau Mau   
 Even though the end of the World War II brought a great deal of change to the 
British Empire the conditions in Kenya Colony did not change as dramatically as many 
Africans had hoped. While the end of the war had brought independence to the largest 
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colony in the empire, India, African independence was not even on the minds of the 
Clemet Attlee’s Labour government in 1945. Additionally the units of the KAR that had 
served in the war had truly been used as imperial service troops around the world, from 
the fighting in Africa, to the Middle East and Asia. This changed the way that British 
military planners saw African forces in the scheme of imperial defense. The collapse of 
the Anglo-Egyptian relationship beginning in 1946 led defense planners to looks for 
other areas in which to base their Middle Eastern forces.21 Both Kenya and Southern 
Rhodesia were seen as excellent candidates to be forward bases for British Forces. This 
reconsideration of the position of Kenya in the British defense plan also led to a 
reconsideration of the KAR simply reverting to an internal security force.  
 While the military prospects for Kenya were looking up the economic situation 
for Africans was much different.  Between 1947 and 1954 the Kenyan economy was 
growing at thirteen percent a year. At the same time the technological advances made 
many African workers redundant.  Unemployed farm workers were increasingly moving 
into shantytowns in cities like Mombasa and Nairobi while European ex-servicemen 
were immigrating to Kenya to take advantage of very generous settlement terms.  The 
African population of Kenya Colony had anticipated that the end of the war and the rise 
of the Labour party in Britain would bring change, yet all they saw was an increase in 
the power of the European community, both politically and economically.22  
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 Kenya Colony was in an odd position among British holdings in Africa it was not 
like any of the West African colonies, which were very much black African colonies. 
Kenya did not have a large enough settler population to be a dominion like South Africa 
or Southern Rhodesia. It also never had the level of self-government that either Rhodesia 
or South Africa had, and was in a state of constant negotiation with British authorities in 
London. Additionally Kenya Colony was very much a product of Britain’s Empire in 
India. Until 1921 the Indian Rupee was the official currency of the colony, Indian troops 
brought order to the colony in its early years and its infrastructure was built by Indian 
labor and engineers.  The colony was initially an African province of India and because 
of this it had a substantial Indian population, in 1963 there were 180,000 Indian residents 
in Kenya. Indians were often merchants and served as low-level government clerks in 
the Kenya administration. The large Indian population of Kenya and the strategic 
relationship between Britain and India even after 1947 put the British government in an 
awkward position.  While the settler community continued to demand a privileged 
status, similar to the position of whites in Southern Rhodesia, London was not able to 
approve any proposition that dramatically favored whites over Indians for fear of 
damaging the relationship between Britain and India.23 
 After the loss of British bases in India in 1947 the British government decided 
that it was necessary to build a large military complex in Kenya to support the forward 
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staging of military stores and troops.  The depot was to be located at MacKinnon Road 
on the rail line to Mombasa.  Skilled labor was an immediate problem it was early 1950 
before any brick and mortar facilities were constructed to house the families of British 
personnel assigned to the base.  However by the end of 1950 the British government had 
decided to stay on in Egypt.24 Since British forces were going to remain at the extensive 
base area already present near the Suez Canal there was no need spend the funds to 
duplicate the effort in Kenya. This turn of events would put the burden of security 
arrangements back on the colony. Even in case of a large war Kenyan forces would not 
be called upon to play as large a role as imperial troops. Rather, these forces were to be 
charged with the internal and border security of the colony itself.   
 At the time the KAR was organized to conduct conventional operations in the 
event of another war. While many of the wartime service support units that had been 
created were now gone, and the main mission of the KAR in 1950 was to be available 
for operations outside of Kenya, as they had performed in World War II. Yet the British 
government was searching for ways to economize in the realm of colonial defence. In 
the past this had been done simply by shifting the cost of these units to the individual 
colonies the increasingly complex nature of warfare made colonial units much more 
costly to maintain. The colonial governments of East Africa could not possibly shoulder 
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the burden. Even so the British government knew that African troops were far less 
expensive to maintain than British Army units, so the decision was made to at least put 
the burden of colonial defence completely on colonial forces with support functions 
coming from a small collocated cadre of British officers and NCOs.25 
 Even with this reduction in forces in East Africa the British government felt that 
the colonial forces themselves were too expensive. The decision was made by the East 
Africa High Commission Defence committee to reduce the size of the KAR battalions 
rather than reduce them in number.26 The result was that each KAR Battalion of four 
companies was reduced from 728 African soldiers to 656 African soldiers. In addition to 
the question of size the members debated who should fund these local forces. The 
Colonial governors wanted the War Office to take complete control while the WO 
continued to insist that the Colonies needed to shoulder the burden of their own defence. 
The compromise was the Colonies would raise an all white Territorial Army (TA) unit 
along the lines of those in the UK. The Kenya Regiment, which had existed in war time 
from 1939-1945, was reborn out of this decision.27 
 The revival of an all European TA unit in Kenya had a detrimental effect on the 
forward progress of African soldiers in the colonies.  When the Kenya Regiment (KR) 
had first been conceived prior to the Second World War it was envisioned that it would 
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train white officers and NCOs to lead KAR units when a wartime expansion occurred.28 
During World War II they fulfilled this role and it served mainly as a leadership-training 
unit. When it was revived, it adopted a more of a standard TA infantry unit identity 
however the goal of forming leaders out of every man was still there.   
Shortly after the return of the KR the Kenya Colony Legislative Assembly 
passed the Compulsory National Service Ordinance of 1951 and the Compulsory 
Military Training Ordinance of 1951. These laws required all resident European British 
Subjects between the ages of eighteen and twenty-three to undergo five and a half 
months of basic military training followed by four years of service in the Kenya 
Regiment as a territorial soldier.29  Young settlers were liable for service not only in the 
colony but also anywhere in the world. In order to bring the KR up to full fighting 
strength during the Emergency the basic training period was briefly reduced to ten 
weeks, and then increased to sixteen weeks in 1956. Annually the regiment would train 
an average of 190 new soldiers. This drastically increased the role of European settlers in 
the defence of the colony. Prior to the revival of the KR, Europeans had been completely 
reliant on African soldier for their defence in peacetime.  
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With the return of the KR there really was little need to examine the idea of 
producing African officers for the KAR due to the fact that there was a leadership 
reserve available in the KR. In 1948 the British government codified peacetime national 
service in the National Service Act of 1948.  National Service officers were often given 
the option of spending their two years term in a colonial unit such as the KAR. With 
primary, secondary and emergency sources of white officers available to the KAR in the 
early 1950s there was no reason for colonial authorities to examine the idea of 
commissioning African officers into colonial service. At the time both military and 
civilian leaders were under the impression that African colonies would not reach 
independence for many years. The Attlee government had plans to develop Africa and 
raise the standard of living rather than grant the colonies immediate independence.  
The development of the Mau Mau movement was the result largly of the 
accumulation of long-term grievances over land ownership among the Kikuyu 
community within Kenya Colony.  The mechanization of post-1945 Kenyan agriculture 
led to the disposition of large numbers of Kikuyu squatters who had relied on 
employment in the White Highlands.  Additionally the end of the war brought more 
European immigration into the colony. Former British servicemen were encouraged to 
come to the colony and set up their own farming and business operations, oftentimes 
with the assistance both the British government as well as the colonial authorities.30 This 
new wave of settlement exacerbated the scarcity of available land for African 
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agriculture. Additionally the colonial government helped make sure that land was clear 
for European development. Between 1946 and 1952 roughly 100,000 Kikuyu squatters 
were removed from their homes and ‘repatriated’ to the Native Reserves.31 The Kikuyu 
farmers were limited to the opportunities that were available in the Native Reserves.  
The resistance movement had begun several years before the mass exodus of 
Kikuyu from there former homes.  As early as 1943 some Kikuyu had brought back an 
old tradition of taking oaths in a time of conflict.  However unlike the oaths of the past 
this oath was administered to not only to men but to women as well. The oath was used 
as a rite of acceptance into a loose anti-colonial resistance organization. By 1945 the 
practice of oathing had spread throughout Kikuyuland and by 1948 it had morphed into 
what became know as the Mau Mau movement.32  
 The Mau Mau uprising dramatically divided Africans in the colony, the Kikuyu 
community itself was divided between those who supported Mau Mau and those who 
simply valued the security and stability in their communities and were often simply 
pigeonholed as regime loyalists. Daniel Branch has asserted that the Mau Mau episode 
was less a conflict between the state and the Mau Mau rebels and more of a civil war 
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between members of the Kikuyu ethnic group.33  ‘Loyalists’ were seldom simply Kikuyu 
who were supporters of the colonial regime, but more often Kikuyu that opposed Mau 
Mau or just wanted to make it through the conflict.  
Due to all of these issues the soldiers of the KAR made it through the Mau Mau 
period rather well.  The British government did not consider the Kikuyu to be a martial 
race and therefore seldom recruited from that population. In 1959 the East Africa Land 
Forces(EALF) reported that Kikuyu, Embu, and Meru men made up only 3.4 per cent of 
the Kenyan KAR Battalions even though the made up 26.9 per cent of the Kenyan male 
population.34 As a whole the men of the KAR fought well against the insurgents there 
were only a handful of cases in which the loyalty of African soldiers was called into 
question. Major H.N. Clemas of the 23rd KAR gave one example of an African NCO 
whom he suspected had questionable loyalties, the NCO had lost his pistol on a patrol, 
later in the campaign the same pistol was found on a captured Mau Mau insurgent.35 
Clemas also made the point that what Kikuyu soldiers there were in the KAR were never 
held in high regard before the conflict, so there was no reason to believe that military 
authorities had any confidence in them to begin with.36 During the emergency the EALF 
restablished a unit that had been disbanded at the end of World War II, 277 Field 
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Security Squadron (FSS) was made up of African soldiers and led by a British 
intelligence officer.  The unit was designed to plant African counter-intelligence agents 
in KAR units to monitor them for subversive activity. In 1957 these duties were 
transferred to Special Branch of the Kenya Police and 277 FSS was disbanded.  Even so 
these security operations continued until Kenya achieved independence in 1963.37 
While British officers had a certain measure of trust in their soldiers they were 
not able to complete the task of defeating Mau Mau on their own. Units of the British 
Army were flown in to assist in Anti-Mau Mau operations, as were RAF ground attack 
aircraft.  The increased militarization of Kenya colony during the period that a state of 
emergency was declared actually expanded the role of the settler community in defense 
of the colony. As previously mentioned the Kenya Regiment stymied the prospect of 
Africans being able to achieve commissioned rank in the near future.  The KR continued 
to expand during the emergency and was increasingly relied upon to provide leadership 
to small detachments of African soldiers tasked with long range patrolling in areas of 
suspected Mau Mau activity. On many occasions men from the KR would simply be 
given rank based on the assignment that they were posted in outside the regiment. The 
former commander of the regiment LtCol. Guy Campbell pointed out that one occasion 
he had made a private an acting sergeant to take up a liaison officer posting with a 
British battalion that had been sent to Kenya. When the officer commanding (OC) the 
British battalion realized he had been sent a sergeant instead of an officer the British 
commander sent the man right back to the KR.  Campbell simply promoted the man to 
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2nd Lieutenant and sent him back out on assignment.38 The also occurred when men were 
sent out to lead African troops, European soldiers were not subject to the orders of 
African NCOs or Warrant Officers (WO). Therefore to avoid any uncomfortable 
situations European soldiers of the KR were always appointed to officer rank to lead 
African soldiers.  
By the end of the emergency in 1960 the KR had units on active service 
throughout the crisis. The regiment itself had been expanded not only for operations but 
to run a tracking school for the British Battalions operating in Kenya.  Even those 
settlers who did not themselves join the army were often pressured to join the Kenya 
Police Reserve, where they were automatically appointed to the rank of inspector.  These 
experiences renewed interest in military service among Europeans and continued to 
impede African opportunities to advance in the Army into the post-colonial period.  
 
Africanization and the foundation of the Kenyan Army 
 During the course of the Mau Mau Emergency the British government was 
considering ways in which to ease the cost of maintain its empire. The rising cost of 
military operations in Keyna took their toll. At the height of the conflict, 1954-55, the 
military costs were £14 Million per annum.39 London was looking to grant a greater 
measure of self-government on Kenya to hopefully reduce the amount of money that the 
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metropole had to spend. The example had been set in 1954 when the Central African 
Federation was created out of the two Rhodesias and Nyasaland.  Even though a greater 
degree of independence for the colony was being considered many in the Kenyan 
government and the EALF did not think that the colonies of East Africa would be 
granted full independence for at least another twenty or thirty years.  
 The EALF had only taken token measures of Africanization by 1956.  That year 
the command revived the rank of Effendi it had last been used prior to World War One.  
An Effendi outranked all African warrant officers and was junior to all commissioned 
officers. The intent on the part of the British was to create a rank similar to the Viceroy’s 
Commissioned Officers in the British Indian Army without actually giving them 
significant officer responsibilities.40  The original idea was that Africans appointed to 
this rank would slowly replace the European NCOs that were loaned to the KAR for 
specialist assignments as well as reduce the number of European junior officers required 
to lead small tactical units.41 The African Effedi’s were required to undergo a six-month 
course before appointment, and would be entirely responsible for the administration and 
training of their units. Trusting African personnel with administrative duties was a new 
development in the EALF and can be seen as significant progress. Even after African 
officers were introduced into the EALF they were not immediately trusted with the same 
set of administrative tasks a European junior officer would have been. While it seems as 
though this measure was taken to increase opportunities for Africans it was more likely 
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done simply to decrease the operating costs of the regiment: an African effendi simply 
was less costly than a European NCO.  
 Interestingly the other arm of the security apparatus in East Africa, the Police 
Services, were encouraged to promote Africans into higher-ranking positions. A 1955 
cabinet report on security in the colonies recommended: “Where practicable, and in 
carefully selected cases, there should be no hesitation on grounds of principle in 
operating a colour bar in reverse, to favour rapid promotion of Africans.”42 In 1955 the 
civil authorities had recognized the need for Africans to have the proper experience to 
manage their own security forces.  This same report also addresses the need to fill 
colonial officer billets with locally recruited officers. There was no hesitation on the part 
of the British government to extend commissions to Africans or other non-Europeans in 
areas where there was not a significant settler community.  In the West African colonies 
there were thirty-five Africans officers serving, additionally there were nineteen West 
Africans that were in training at Sandhurst. Even though the report encouraged and 
recommended that more West Africans be commissioned every year, it also points out 
that the situation in East Africa was far more complicated and did not recommend any 
commissioning program or training program to prepare Africans for commissions.43 
 The introduction of the Effendi rank is often compared to the establishment of the 
KAR Junior Leader Company (JLC).  This unit was established in 1957 and was the 
combination of several East African territorial training schemes that existed at the time. 
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The idea was to consolidate all junior leader training in Kenya for all three East African 
territories. African boys, generally sons of KAR soldiers, between the ages of fourteen 
and eighteen were accepted into the program and were to undergo a training period of 
four and a half years at the JLC.  The objective was to “develop the intelligence, 
education and powers of leadership of suitable African boys with a view to their 
becoming N.C.O.’s and eventually qualifying for warrant rank.”44 Again similarly to the 
Effendi program the JLC initiative was designed to produce an educated batch of African 
NCOs better able to take the place of more costly European personnel. Interestingly 
rather than have these trainees serve in the ranks and then go to a course to become 
NCOs, as had been the practice, the EALF thought it better to have a dedicated training 
program for NCO development.   
The Kenya Colony report for 1957 does say: “It is hoped that one or two suitable 
candidates for Sandhurst might be found from time to time from the output of the Junior 
Leaders Company but it is not the aim of the training to produce Sandhurst 
Candidates.”45 Legally there was nothing preventing an African from becoming an 
officer however officer cadets had to meet the educational requirements and pass a 
selection board in order even to be considered. The educational requirements alone 
ensured that only a very small pool of Africans who could even qualify to go before the 
commissioning board. 
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 Starting in 1958 Kenya colony began sending cadets to the Royal Military 
Academy – Sandhurst (RMA). However there were no Africans in the first three years of 
groups sent to RMA for training. In 1957 the EALF reported that none of the candidates 
that applied to attend RMA were able to pass the selection board. The following year 
one European and two Asians were sent to RMA. Of these three cadets the Asians were 
required to attend Mons Officer Cadet School prior to being admitted to RMA.46 Kenya 
colony only sent Europeans and Asians to RMA until 1963. What stands out about this is 
that other colonies in East Africa began sending Africans to RMA in 1958.47 Between 
1957 and 1960 nine cadets were sent to Sandhurst from Kenya of those nine, six were 
European and three were Asian. During the initial years of localization of the leadership 
of the forces Europeans continued to dominate the officer class of the Kenyan forces and 
showed few signs of diversifying beyond the Asian community.  
 While the Asian community in Kenya made some advances in equality this 
should not be seen as a move towards making the forces completely multiracial. In 1958 
the Kenya government was only beginning to break the dependence on British Army 
personnel seconded to the KAR.  The goal was to train local Asians as technicians and 
specialists instead of Africans, and to commission members of the European and Asian 
community to take over from more expensive British officers. Also in 1958 the KAR 
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started its first Administration course for African Effendi’s, WOs and NCOs. The 
Administration course was launched in 1958, and was deemed to be both successful and 
necessary.48  The following year the Kenya Government reported that the program was 
going well and that they projected that by 1962 African NCOs would be able to replace 
European OR seconded to the KAR.49  
At that time the Colonial Secretary, Iain Macleod, recognized that there would be 
some form of constitutional change in East Africa however he was unsure what form it 
would take. Since taking power back in 1951 Conservative governments and had slowed 
the rate of decolonization in the Empire. In a memorandum he submitted to the 
Macmillan Cabinet in December 1959, Macleod identified four possible scenarios for 
East Africa in the 1960s: one, the United Kingdom would maintain ultimate power in 
Kenya and allow the other territories to become self governing; two, HMG would retain 
control of coastal, and port territories in East Africa and allow the rest to become self 
governing; three, to allow all of the territories to become self governing but under the 
auspices of a federal system controlled by the United Kingdom; four, to simply allow all 
the territories to move towards self government.50  
While the option of allowing complete independence was considered, the 
Macleod’s various scenarios emphasized Britain retaining some sort of legal and 
territorial control over most of East Africa and of Kenya Colony in particular. He also 
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advocated making the forces of East Africa more mutually supporting; if Kenya faced 
internal unrest local forces from Uganda rather than regular British forces could 
reinforce Kenyan authorities. Additionally the Macleod was extremely concerned about 
local politicians gaining influence over colonial forces in East Africa.  This concern 
coincided with increasing participation of Africans in governing the East African 
colonies. The problem that Macleod saw with this was that local politicians would in 
some way politicize the EALF, and would make it problematic for the Governor to use 
colonial forces to secure British interests.51 HMG needed to make sure that EALF were 
insulated from both constitutional change and the influence of local politicians. Even 
before British officials were willing to accept that all East African territories were bound 
for independence within five years they understood that East African military forces 
ought to remain divorced from domestic politics. The British government sought to 
establish an enduring military to military relationship with colonies that would soon 
become independent in order to ensure British influence in the region.  
In late 1959 neither the Kenyan colonial government nor the East Africa 
Commission (EAC) were making serious preparations for independence.  The defence 
establishment in East Africa thought that self-government in the region was decades 
away. The Royal East African Navy (REAN), which had been established in 1952, was 
composed of slightly over 200 men. In1959 the REAN did not have any African officers, 
                                                
51 Ibid., 2. 
  59 
or petty officers, all African members of the force served as ratings.52 There were also no 
plans to train or promote Africans to any leadership positions whatsoever in the small 
navy. All of the changes being made in the defence forces in Kenya were focused on 
reducing costs for both London and the Colonial government and ensuring lasting 
British influence in the region. No one in the colonial defence administration made any 
plans for how the British government would set up national military forces if East 
African colonies became independent.  
 
“National consciousness is a political fact”53 
 The change in the thinking of the EALF came in 1960 when British Prime 
Minister Harold Macmillan spoke famously in Cape Town about the “winds of change” 
in Africa.  This speech came as a shock to many in Kenya and East Africa, particularly 
those in the settler community.  Many settlers had hoped for some sort of arrangement 
akin to the federation in central Africa but were confronted by the specter of Africa 
majority rule in the near future. The EALF and East Africa Command (EAC) had made 
no arrangements for the military forces in Africa to transition into African-independent 
armies.  By August of 1960 EAC was scrambling to figure out how to create an 
independent military force out of these colonial units. One of the major factors in the 
transition was leadership. Administrative and Leadership training among Africans had 
been kept to a minimum. African effendis were never trained to become the leaders of 
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the new army. While they had the necessary military experience—many of them were 
veterans of Malaya or Mau Mau and sometimes the Second World War—unit 
administration above the platoon level, and quartermaster duties had been kept firmly in 
the hands of European officers.  
 The plan for training Africans for service as commissioned officers in the Kenya 
Army took shape slowly. The EAC was unsure how to proceed; they knew that African 
soldiers would not be able to pass the rigorous screening process to be sent to RMA 
since most lacked the educational qualifications. Initially the Colonial Office looked to 
newly independent African nations like Ghana as a model to build a national army from. 
They requested information on recently established Ghana Military Academy and were 
very curious about the prospect of training Kenyan officers in some sort of Kenyan 
military academy. The advantage of such a plan was that it would be significantly 
cheaper than making sure that there was space available at Sandhurst for African officers 
from all over the continent.54 Even so the program in Ghana was in its infancy and most 
of the serving officers in the Ghanaian Army had been sent abroad for training.55 The 
1960 mutiny of the Force Publique in the former Belgian Congo only five days after 
independence changed the way Kenyan authorities viewed the creation of a national 
army.  
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 The Force Publique was considered by European observers to be a professional 
African military force. While political disputes were taking place among the civilian 
leadership the last white commander of the force, General E. Janssens, had refused to 
promote any Africans to senior rank and was intent on making sure that independence 
changed nothing about the force. African NCOs and soldiers in the force felt that they 
were being left out of the independence process since it appeared nothing would change 
for them. This discontent led to a violent mutiny in which soldiers murdered their 
European officers.  The mutineers threw the professionalism of the force aside and, the 
force became a threat not only to the civilian population but the government as well.56 
Order was restored after Belgian troops and UN Peacekeepers from Canada arrived in 
the Congo. Shortly thereafter the force was Africanized and renamed the Congolese 
National Army. The conclusion was that the Force Publique never made the transition 
from colonial army to national army. Observers noted that an Africanization of the 
officer corps and a complete subordination to civilian control were the necessary steps in 
order to ensure that African militaries would support their civilian governments not 
destabilize them.57 
 The events in the Congo struck fear into the settler communities in Kenya and 
the Central African Federation. The settlers in Kenya started to insist upon the creation 
of a European Defence Force in addition to the Kenya Regiment as well as the creation 
of ‘strongpoints’ stockpiled with weapons and other provisions in case a similar event 
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occurred.58 The British government helped to calm the nerves of Europeans by 
reinforcing British forces in Kenya with an additional infantry battalion as well as 600 
Royal Marine Commandos.  This yet again highlighted the how much more complicated 
decolonization was made in Kenya by the presence of a large and powerful European 
settler community.  
 At the end of 1960 there were still no African officers in the Kenyan Battalions 
of the KAR. In 1960 Kenya colony sent 4 cadets to RMA and three of those were 
European and one was Asian. It was not until 1961 that the Kenyan Government and 
EAC would settle on a plan of action for creating a Kenyan Army led by black Kenyans. 
Unlike later experiences the British government did not deem it necessary to send a 
dedicated training team to Kenya to help establish the Army.  The establishment would 
be created using the resources that were locally available and by sending men for 
training in the United Kingdom. One of the issues that the military authorities saw was 
that there would simply not be enough spaces at RMA for cadets from African nations to 
man the new armies in time for independence. The Colonial Office in partnership with 
EAC developed a two-part plan to produce enough officers for the Kenyan Army.  Part 
one was a simple mass solution to the problem at hand: the Kenyan government granted 
short service commissions to selected African Effendis who had demonstrated sufficient 
potential to serve as officers in a post independence army.59 During this period the EALF 
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would begin searching for suitable Africans to send to Mons Officer Cadet School and 
RMA. Part two would see these officers begin to return to the KAR and would be 
accompanied by an influx of commissioned Effendis to fill in vacancies where they 
existed.60 
 The plan moved very slowly in 1961, by July only six of the roughly seventy 
Effendis had been granted commissions. However by this time two Europeans and two 
Asians who had previously graduated from RMA were granted commissions.61  Even 
though constitutional reform in Kenya was moving forward the rate of Africanization in 
the military and civil service was extremely slow. In October 1961 the East Africa 
Defence Committee (EADC) met to discuss the pace of Africanization in all of the East 
African colonies. While Uganda and Tanganyika had both sent African Cadets to RMA 
in the year previous these men would not be prepared to take up duties in their respective 
regiments for at least two years while they finished their training. Additionally, Kenya 
colony had only commissioned a handful of Effendis, the rest of the men in the officer-
training pipeline were Europeans and Asians (at the time of their meeting five Europeans 
and one Kenyan Asian were training at RMA). With this slow pace of training and the 
fast pace of African nations toward independence, the EADC endorsed a proposal from 
MajGen. Richard Goodwin, GOC of EAC, to grant Short Service Commissions to 
seventy Africans by the middle of 1962. Such a move was planned to provide ten 
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officers to each of the six infantry battalions in EAC and leave the remaining ten to take 
up postings in service support units.62  
 In November 1961, Patrick Renison, the head of the EADC and the Governor of 
Kenya at the time, sent a letter to the Colonial Secretary Reginald Maulding who had 
replaced McLeod.  The letter set out the goals and costs of the military training program 
in East Africa with the hope of winning the support of the Colonial Office. Renison was 
held in low regard by Kenyan Africans since many of his public statements did little to 
reassure them of the progress of decolonization. Nonetheless his November letter clearly 
indicated the desires of the EADC: “If when independence comes,” he wrote, “a strong 
officer corps with high professional standards is already firmly established, the East 
African forces will be that much more resistant to political interference, and that much 
less vulnerable to any ill-conceived programs of rapid Africanization which could only 
result in a serious lowering of standards.”63 These tenets would define the way the 
British executed the training program in Kenya, rather than speedily pushing officer 
cadets through sub-par commissioning programs, their goal was to forge a professional 
officer corps.  
 While this ambitious program was slowly getting started, the British military 
took no steps to reduce its presence in East Africa. Since the Suez Crisis and the loss of 
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British influence in Egypt, Kenya was considered by London as an important strategic 
reserve location for both forces and material. Additionally rather than send a training 
team to Kenya to take charge of the transition to the formation of a national army, EAC 
decided simply to leave British officers in their billets in the KAR. In the entire KAR 
establishment in East Africa there were 180 officer billets. It was projected that by the 
middle of 1962 there would be eighty-four local officers (including Europeans and 
Asians). Even so, Secretary of State for War John Profumo said in his November 1961 
report, “It is the intention that during the period of rapid Africanisation, British seconded 
officers will remain at their present strength to train the newly commissioned 
Africans…By the beginning of 1963, the requirement for British seconded officers, 
which now stands at 150 for the three East African Territories, should be reduced by 
half.”64 The reduction of British forces in East Africa was planned to take place 
extremely slowly, as both Harold Watkinson, the Minister of Defence and Profumo were 
concerned about the implications of retaining seconded officers after independence.65  
 Their concern was not based on the perception that the retention of Europeans in 
independent armies would cause problems.  It clearly can be seen that the British 
government was trying to force a multi-racial army on independent Kenya.  Europeans 
and Asians cadets were the only officers that were sent on course from civilian life. Even 
though the government was attempting to Africanize quickly, they felt that the only 
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African recruiting pool that they could choose from were Africans who were then 
serving in the army. Profumo pointed out in his report to Watkinson in January 1962 that 
“Although the G.O.C. East Africa anticipated that suitable material existed in the KAR 
[for commissioned officers], this hope has not, unfortunately, been realized.”66  This 
problem had become public in December 13, 1961 when an article entitled “Kenya 
Becomes Aware of Need to Train African Officers.” The article highlighted the example 
of an attempt to recruit African secondary school graduates.  The selection board had 
identified eleven Africans with the requisite educational credentials; of these eleven only 
three actually showed up for the first interview; and not one of them passed the interview 
process.67 The article not only pointed out the problems that the Kenya government had 
in finding Africans to commission, but it also made the connection between the lack of 
promotion in the Congo and the mutiny that had occurred there in 1960. The fear was 
not simply of the prospect of a mutiny but of the potential financial cost of a mutiny.  
 The British government was concerned on many levels throughout this period 
over the economic burden posed by decolonization. While the Colonial Office was 
willing to support decolonization with limited funds and the Ministry of Defence  willing 
to provide the personnel, independent nations were required to pay for their own armies, 
and this would include the cost of any British officers seconded to them.  This cost was 
substantial as British officers salaries and allowances were significantly larger than those 
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of any African officer. The major concern of British policy makers, such as Profumo, 
was what this cost would lead new nations to do. He wrote: “We are apprehensive that 
because of this they may be tempted to turn elsewhere for their military assistance in this 
field [officer training]. I am sure that, if necessary, it is worth spending a certain amount 
of money in preventing this.”68  The prospect of former British colonies leaving the 
British sphere of influence to receive assistance from non-aligned nations, or worse the 
Soviet Union, was unthinkable. If the independent Kenyan government decided to look 
elsewhere for military training and material it would put the British strategic position in 
East Africa and the Middle East in jeopardy.  
 It was not simply the policy makers in London who were concerned about who 
would become involved in East Africa. As the East African colonies neared 
independence the concern over British influence filtered down to the local level. In 
December 1961 Tanganyika gained independence and was followed by Uganda in 
October 1962. However, in January 1962 the Governor of Uganda, HE Sir Walter 
Coutts, voiced his concerns to the GOC of EAC over the pace of officer production, “our 
aim would be to assist the KAR for as long as possible because other countries would be 
anxious to do so if we were not.”69 While the USSR is not mentioned by name in this 
passage, colonial officials were constantly suspicious of communist subversion in East 
Africa.  Most events, from the Mau Mau Emergency, the revolution in Zanzibar and later 
the East African mutinies, were initially thought to be caused by communist infiltration. 
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Even though Coutts highlighted the need to get this task done, he was not willing to 
compromise the mission of British training in East Africa: securing forces that were 
friendly to Britain, and divorced from domestic politics.  
 A 1962 report by the KAR Course Wing highlighted some of the difficulties 
British trainers were having in hastening the out put of officers and officer cadets. In 
1962 the KAR Course Wing held seven different programs, five of which were 
specifically designed to develop African leadership skills: the Administration Course, 
Platoon Command, Advanced Platoon Command, Pre-Officer Cadet Training Unit and 
Pre-Sandhurst Cadet Course. The Pre-OCTU course was the first of its kind and began 
with eleven students, all drawn from the KAR from non-infantry specialties. Of the 
eleven students, seven passed out of the course. In the 1962 KAR Course Wing Report 
students were considered to be woefully unprepared for the undertaking, “The standard 
of students was not high. All being non-inf personnel, their basic training varied from 6 
months down to NIL. In no case did this standard approach the standard expected from 
and inf recruit at the end of 6 months training.”70 The students were seen as being 
unprepared not only educationally but also militarily. This report certainly was not a 
ringing endorsement for the commissioning of African officers and creating an 
independent military force.  
 Nonetheless, the rate of commissioning had to improve if African officers were 
even to get the most basic orientation in staff duties in preparation for mid and high level 
command and staff duty.  The Colonial Office decided to grant some Effendis SSC in 
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October 1961, this program was then expanded and all Effendis serving in the EALF 
would be granted commissions by the end of 1962. As of July 1962 there were sixteen 
Effendis still serving in the Kenya battalions of the KAR. By December all sixteen were 
granted SSC without any additional training.  African officers who had been 
commissioned were not immediately given command positions beyond the platoon level. 
Those that were not serving as platoon commanders were placed in posts at brigade 
headquarters to familiarize them with staff duties. Others were placed in a specially 
created position, company assistant adjutant, to give them experience in the 
administrative tasks required to run a company.71  
 However the major issue for the Colonial Office and the War Office was not 
simply a lack of funds, there were not enough billets available for both African officers 
and British officers to be present in the same regiment.  The funding of the KAR was 
based on a table of organization that allocated a specific number of officer posts to each 
regiment.  The British plan for training African officers was focused on the experience 
of shadowing a British officer in a position that the African officer was designated to fill. 
Since the British Army had no additional billets available in the table of organization, 
the Colonial Office said that they could only fund the positions that were allowed by 
statute.72 The choice had to be made between halting the commissioning of African 
officers, reducing the number of British officers in the KAR, or finding a way to change 
the law. Both EAC and the Colonial Office realized that it was not in any way feasible to 
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slow the pace of commissioning Africans or reduce the number of British officers at that 
time.  They ended up agreeing to have the War Office fund the additional positions for 
the remainder of the fiscal year and the provisions for the next fiscal year (1963/1964) 
were amended to allow the additional officers.73 
 The bureaucratic battle for funds and supply allocations revealed a weakness in 
the British plan for training the Kenyan Army.  While a one-on-one trainer to trainee 
relationship was ideal for developing and molding new officers, it was extremely costly 
for the Colonial Office and took manpower away from the British Army at home. 
Previously the Colonial regiments had not been as much of a burden. By using National 
Servicemen in the colonies the Regular Army did not have to commit significant 
resources. Yet the last intakes of National Servicemen entered the British Army in 
November 1960 and left the Army in 1962 and 1963. The trainer-to-trainee ratio would 
have to be reduced in the future to make training missions that were both affordable and 
flexible.  
 
The Kenyan Army from the KAR 
 The Kenyan and the Ugandan colonial governments were intent on expanding the 
size of their forces on the eve of independence.  While Kenya had three KAR battalions, 
Uganda possessed only one, and neither force was of acceptable size for an army of an 
independent nation. At the same meeting in January 1962 that Sir Walter Coutts insisted 
that the training mission had to be successful to maintain British influence, he said: “the 
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present strength of 4KAR is not sufficient to enable Uganda to face the possible threats 
from Rwanda, Burundi, the Congo and the Sudan with any degree of confidence.”74 A 
similar belief was held in the Kenya administration that a nation the size of Kenya 
required a much larger military force to guarantee it independence. While the local 
authorities insisted upon an expansion of both the Kenyan and Ugandan armies, the 
Colonial Office fundamentally disagreed. Lieutenant Colonel W.M.L Alder of the 
Colonial Office Defence Department, pointed out that “We know that they are going to 
have a very difficult task in meeting all their [Kenya and Uganda] financial 
commitments and it is therefore clearly in their interests, as well as those of Her 
Majesty’s Government, to keep the cost of the K.A.R. as low as possible.”75 If the KAR 
was expanded it was likely that the units that were passed on to the new states would be 
a ruinous financial responsibility. The expansion of the local forces would have to wait 
until the onset of independence when the new nations could make their own missteps.  
 As Africanization programs moved through 1962, African officers had been 
posted to the majority of the KAR battalions. Yet it was at this point that EAC noticed a 
serious problem in their scheme. Almost all of the Africans who had been commissioned 
ended up serving as infantry officers; there were almost no Africans officers trained in 
the service or support branches.76 Additionally it proved difficult to find suitable 
candidates for these specialty branches. Previously, British trainers had looked to the 
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African senior NCOs first, but in these fields seconded British personnel occupied all of 
the senior NCO positions. In his July 1962 memo to the War Office, Sir Richard 
Goodwin, GOC EAC, made it clear that this needed to be a new priority for the War 
Office because of the long periods of training and apprenticeship that were required for 
these positions.77 Again, the issue that confronted the EAC was the cost of additional 
officers.  East Africa Command wanted to create eleven new officer positions that would 
all be devoted to service and technical branches.   
 Even though these positions were eventually approved, it was not until the 
1963/1964 fiscal year, which stunted the growth of the service and support component of 
the Kenya Army.  This was not simply a problem in Kenya, for both Uganda and 
Tanganyika relied on British Army personnel for medical and quartermaster services 
well into 1964.78 The War Office was frustrated with the lack of progress on the issue 
and wanted to revisit the idea of an East African Federation.  While the War Office and 
EAC had no delusions that they would be able to create a single nation out of the former 
East African territories, they did want to investigate the possibility of pooling defence 
resources for the region. The War Office and the Colonial Office would continue to 
suggest this option to East African governments well into 1965.  
 Once Uganda achieved independence in October 1962, the only remaining KAR 
units in EAC were the three Kenya Battalions. By the end of 1962, all of the Effendis in 
the KAR had had their appointments converted to commissions. In addition to these new 
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African officers, forty-nine other African soldiers had received commissions either 
through Mons or RMA.79 By December 1962, Compulsory Military Training for 
Europeans had ended in the colony and the Kenya Regiment was opened up to men of 
all races for voluntary territorial service.80 Progress was clearly being made in turning 
the army over to African officers; however, the process was not complete. MajGen. 
W.A. Dimoline had been GOC EAC from 1946-1948, and in his retirement continued to 
be an advocate for African soldiers. He had published letters to the editor in The Times 
and been outspoken on the need for more African officers since 1955.  Despite his 
enthusiasm he confessed to Brigadier M.F. Fitzalan-Howard, that: “I hope that you are 
right in your estimate that Kenya will retain its European officers for at least ten years 
otherwise, I am afraid of the future of the KAR does not look too good to me. However I 
may be wrong.”81  
MajGen. Dimoline’s concerns regarding the removal of European officers were 
not misplaced. As the complement of African officers grew during 1962 and 1963 the 
prospect of expanding the three KAR battalions into an actual army was revisited. 
However, this discussion was put on hold in July of 1963 when EAC identified another 
stumbling block in the Africanization program. During World War II EAC developed its 
own organic support units to include an ordnance company. In 1956 this ordnance 
company was disbanded, and British Army units provided these services. In 1963 305th 
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Ammunition Depot and 541st Ordnance Depot supplied ammunition and explosives not 
only KAR units but also British units stationed in Kenya. The issue was not simply that 
there were no African NCOs to promote to officer ranks but that no Africans at all had 
been trained at any rank to perform or supervise ordnance duties.  
MajGen. Goodwin asked the MOD for approval of the recruitment of fifty 
African soldiers to be trained locally at the ordnance depot. The timing of the request 
would mean that even if these men had been recruited immediately they would not be 
trained and available until at least mid-1964. However, at the time recruiting safaris were 
only made once a year, so if the requisite men were not found that year the entire 
program would be pushed back. In addition to the fifty other ranks required, the depot 
also needed four commissioned officers assigned for ordnance training. In order for 
ordnance services to be completely Africanized it would require sixteen officers 
including a lieutenant colonel as the Chief of Ordnance. This move further strained the 
already taxed African officer corps. MajGen Goodwin had by now accepted the large 
scale commitment that British forces had made a post-independence Kenya when he 
pointed out that “it can be seen that the Kenya Army Ordnance Units will require 
seconded officers and NCOs for several years to come.”82 
Once the proposal reached the ministerial level the perceived needs of the Kenya 
Army changed. LtCol. Adler of the Colonial Office felt that it was premature to submit 
the request to the treasury for only the costs to create one support unit for the Kenya 
Army. He suggested that the proposal for the entire expansion program be submitted to 
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the Treasury at one time to have a clear understanding of what the final cost would be.83 
It was at this point in the discussion that officials at the Colonial Office and the War 
Office admitted that they had been too ambitious in their Africanization scheme. LtCol. 
Adler made it clear in his letter to the War Office that the creation of supporting units 
and the expansion of the Kenya Army to a Brigade Group would be complete by the 
independence deadline in December 1963. This is yet another reason why Colonial 
Office officials such as Adler were hoping for a Federal Defence arrangement where 
supporting services such as the ordnance depot could be shared by the three countries.  
Major C.D.B. Troughton of the War Office raised the point to Adler that 
“Experience in Tanganyika and Uganda has shown that trained African ordnance 
personnel are an essential part of a newly formed independent army when War 
Department sources of supply and guidance are removed.”84 This warning came with the 
assertion that the longer the decision was put off, the longer seconded personnel would 
have to remain in Kenya. The cost difference was significant: British personnel cost 3.5 
times that of African personnel in the same positions. One of the important things that 
Maj. Troughton underscored was that all of their issues aside, it was extremely important 
for Africans to be in charge of their own affairs sooner rather than later. By October 17 
the War Office received an answer, the Colonial Office decided there would be no new 
supporting services until a plan had been made and approved for the expansion of the 
entire Kenya Army.  
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The expansion of the Kenya Army to a Brigade Group required the creation of a 
variety of new units in order to function on the modern battlefield. The new army needed 
to be able to confront armor threats, and be able to operate during conventional conflicts. 
Each infantry battalion needed an additional rifle company as well as an anti-tank (AT) 
platoon and a reconnaissance platoon. Like the ordnance depot, EAC had disbanded its 
organic artillery units shortly after the Second World War. The new Kenya Army 
therefore required the establishment of an artillery regiment, as well as an armored 
reconnaissance squadron and a field engineer squadron. All of these combat units also 
required a robust support organization to include a motor transport company, postal unit, 
provost unit, stores section and infantry weapons workshop.85 Before the Kenya Army 
would be able to operate without the direct support of British units, all of these new units 
would have to be established from nothing.  This required a multi-year commitment on 
the part of the British to provide support, trainers and equipment. While on the surface it 
seemed as though Kenya was the only beneficiary in the arrangement, as long as British 
forces were required to support the basic functioning of the Kenya Army they would 
have to maintain basing rights in Kenya.  
 Even though the Army was only composed of three infantry battalions still 
partially staffed by British officers, the outlook was not as poor as it seemed. Just prior 
to independence MajGen. Goodwin commented, “the crash programme of training 
African officers, which had been essential, was proving generally successful. There had 
been some weak spots but on the whole the programme had gone off rather 
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encouragingly.”86 By the time of the independence celebrations of December 12, 1963, 
the Kenya Army was made up of three infantry battalions with no supporting services 
and was partially staffed by British officers.87 The total size of the force was 2,500 
soldiers, with 165 serving officers, of which eighty were African.88 Seconded British 
officers would have to remain in Kenya for the foreseeable future, it was assumed, 
before the Army would be able to function on its own.  
 
The army is tested: The East African Mutinies 
 As noted previously, by the time Kenya reached independence, Tanganyika and 
Uganda had been independent since December 1961 and October 1962 respectivly.  At 
the time these two nations reached independence, the Africanization program was just 
getting started.  In Uganda only fourteen of the sixty-four officers in the army were 
African. In Tanganyika Africans filled but six of sixty-four officer billets. In both cases 
the percentages were far bellow the 48.5% rate that Kenya achieved upon independence. 
By January 1964, the situation in several East African armies was tense.  Police and civil 
servants were given priority in government funding for pay rate increases, and many 
rank and file soldiers felt that they were losing the privileged position they had enjoyed.  
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 In addition to complaints regarding pay, many soldiers, particularly in 
Tanganyika, felt that little had changed for them since independence.  The army seemed 
exactly the same to them: the officers were mostly British, the uniforms were the same, 
and one regiment even retained part of its British name 1st Tanganyika Rifles (6th King’s 
African Rifles). In addition to these issues African other ranks were frustrated by the 
lack of promotions that they had assumed would come with independence. Many junior 
NCOs, lance corporals and corporals, felt that the officer ranks should have been thrown 
open to Africans upon independence. As in the other colonies, one of the major issues 
was that Tanganyika was still sending all of its officer cadets to Britain for training, and 
many of the soldiers who were serving in the Tanganyika Rifles (TR) at the time did not 
have the requisite educational qualifications for officer training.  
 Tanganyika was the least prepared of the three African colonies for 
independence. The new leaders of the nation led by Julius Nyerere deeply distrusted the 
army and had debated the merits of simply disbanding it and replacing it with a 
paramilitary police force.89  Even though it was not disbanded the army was severely 
limited upon independence. The military establishment in Tanganyika was extremely 
expensive for the small nation. Nyerere allowed the British to keep so much influence 
after independence was so they would continue to provide funds to offset the costs of the 
Army. Due to the distrust between the government and the army and the shortage of 
available funds, Africanization of the army proceeded at a much slower pace in 
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Tanganyika. In the early 1960s, the nation sent only two cadets a year to Sandhurst. In 
January 1964 there were still only twenty-two African officers in the Tanganyika Rifles 
(TR).90  
 Britain however was not the only source of assistance for Nyerers’s government. 
Oscar Kambona, the Minister for External Affairs, had recommended numerous 
candidates to the officer selection board for commissioning in the TR.  However the 
board, half of which was composed of British officers, continued to refuse his candidates 
on the ground that they were not qualified.  Kambona therefore sent sixty men to Israel 
to undergo officer training. When these men returned to Tanganyika Kamabona insisted 
that they be commissioned into the army. Some of the Israeli trained officers were 
accepted into the army, but not all were. A divide was created between those officers 
trained in Israel and those trained in Britain.  The Israeli trained men had been through a 
shorter training course, were ignorant of British military traditions and hence, were 
viewed as unprofessional. The rank-and-file were also hostile to the Israeli trained 
officers, insisting that long serving NCO deserved commissioned more than these ‘new 
men.’91 Dissatisfaction with pay, promotions and the continued presence of British 
officers were the foundation of discontent the led to the breakdown of military discipline 
in the Tanganyika Rifles.  
 The mutiny itself did not actually start because of any event inside Tanganyika. 
Violence flared up in nearby Zanzibar on New Years Day 1964.  Zanzibar had achieved 
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independence separately from Tanganyika as a monarchy under the Sultan. Within 
weeks of achieving independence, Arab political parties and the Sultan passed 
legislation banning opposition political parties, censored the press and politicized the 
police. A group of 600 lightly armed Africans rose up on January 12, 1964 and took 
control of the government by force.  Nyerere decided to send 100 members of the 
paramilitary Police Field Force to assist containing the rioting that had followed the 
successful revolution.  
 The disenchanted soldiers of the TR saw how this small lightly armed force was 
able to take over the Zanzibar government relatively easily and used it as a model for 
action in Tanganyika. This realization combined with the absence of the Police Field 
Force meant there would be little opposition to a potential mutiny. This combination of 
factors proved far too temping for the soldiers of the TR, and on January 19th they 
mutinied.92  
 The 1st TR at Colito Barracks outside Dar es Salaam seized the weapons in the 
armory and turned on their officers, both British and African.  The British officers along 
with their families were taken to the Dar es Salaam airport and put on a plane to Nairobi. 
The soldiers seized key locations in the capital including the State House. Nyerere was 
not in Dar es Salaam at the time and remained in hiding so as not to be captured by the 
mutineers. The curious part of this mutiny is that it was not actually a coup, it was a 
military version of a strike. A dispatch from the British High Commission noted: “It is 
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conceivable that the mutinous troops took a simple syndicalist view of their position in 
the army, believing that, as regards to the right to strike for higher pay and accelerated 
Africanisation of higher positions, they were in much the same position as civil 
employees (except that the troops had no trade union of their own).”93 
 Once the troops were guaranteed a pay raise by the government many of them 
went back to their barracks. Even so some of the hardcore mutineers, mainly clerks and 
education instructors, maintained the mutiny. Out of a desire to restore control of his 
army and the government Nyerere asked the British for military assistance to put down 
the mutiny on January 24.  The British Government dispatched the aircraft carrier HMS 
Centaur and the Royal Marines 45 Commando. On the morning of 25 January the 
marines used the helicopters aboard the ship to conduct an air assault mission on Colito 
Barracks. They attempted to use a loudspeaker system to call the troops to surrender, 
however the Africans refused. The marines fired a rocket into the guardhouse and after a 
short firefight and the death of two African soldiers the mutinous soldiers surrendered to 
the marines. After the main force was arrested at the barracks 45 Royal Marine 
Commando Squadron (45RM) seized control of the airport and government buildings in 
Dar es Salaam.94 By the late afternoon the mutiny had been put down, order was restored 
and the men of 45RM patrolled the streets of Dar es Salaam.  
 Before the mutiny had been contained, news of the soldiers’ strike made it to 
troops in the Ugandan and Kenyan armies, themselves also dissatisfied with their pay 
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situation. Prior to the mutiny, government ministers in Uganda had assured the soldiers 
they would receive a pay raise, yet only enough funds were set aside to give senior 
NCOs raises. The men of the Uganda Rifles were inspired by the realization that the 
soldiers simply had to strike to bring about a pay raise. On 23 January, 150 men of the 
Uganda Rifles stationed at Jinja simply sat down and refused to obey the orders of their 
officers.  Jinja Barracks was the Depot for the 1st Battalion of the Uganda Rifles (UR) 
making it the largest concentration of armed strength in Uganda at the time.  
 The British officers in-charge of the battalion had feared such a move and made 
sure that the armory was secured. This meant that aside from the camp sentries most of 
the mutinous soldiers were unarmed. The Minister of Home Affairs, Felix Onama, 
arrived at the camp intending to negotiate with the soldiers, only to be imprisoned by 
them.  While held in the guardhouse, Onama was forced to agree to a pay raise from 
sh105 to sh265 a month. Only then was the minister allowed to leave the camp. 
Executive Prime Minister of Uganda Milton Obote, had no intention of allowing the 
mutiny of his army to reach the level of chaos in Tanganyika.  To prevent further 
disorder and to reassert control of the situation, on January 23 he requested assistance 
from the British government to put down the mutiny.95 Two companies of the 
Staffordshire Regiment (1STAFF) and a company of the Scots Guards (SCOTS) were 
dispatched by plane from Kenya and arrived at 10:45 PM that same night. While these 
troops secured the airport and other government buildings in Kampala, Obote’s 
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government was forced to certify the pay raises that the soldiers were promised to avoid 
making the crisis worse.  
 Even though the situation had not returned to normal, Obote announced to the 
nation that calm had been restored. However, by January 27th the men of 1UR still 
refused to obey the orders of their officers. Prime Minister Obote asked 1STAFF to take 
control of Jinja Barracks. Under cover of darkness the British soldiers infiltrated the 
barracks and took control without firing a shot.96 In an attempt to prevent future 
discontent in the army, Obote promoted a promising young officer, Maj. Idi Amin, to 
lieutenant colonel and appointed him Deputy Commander of the Army. After the 
barracks was taken back, the ringleaders of the mutiny were imprisoned and dismissed 
from the army.   
 While the events in Uganda were far less violent than those in Tanganyika, they 
were not necessarily more easily contained.  The East African armies still utilized the 
same radio network that they had during the colonial period so throughout the uprisings 
soldiers in each territory received news of the initial success of each strike. The 
authorities in Kenya were also closely monitoring the events in both Uganda and 
Tanganyika.  President Jomo Kenyatta took the loyalty of the army extremely seriously 
and was determined not to allow the same thing to happen in Kenya as had happened 
elsewhere in East Africa. By 1964 EAC had changed its name to British Land Forces – 
Kenya (BLF-K) and had a new GOC, Major General Ian Freeland, who concurrently 
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was commander of the Kenya Army.  President Kenyatta empowered Freeland to do 
what was necessary to ensure the stability and loyalty of the army. 
 For his part Kenyatta made a number of public statements to try to pacify the 
soldiers before anything happened. Kenyatta publicly expressed his confidence in the 
Kenya Army and released a statement on his plans to accelerate the rate of 
Africanization in the army. Additionally he promised that a committee would be formed 
to look into the conditions of service in the army.97 Despite these well-laid plans to keep 
the army happy Kenyatta was still concerned the army would revolt.  
The Kenya Police Special Branch had for some time been collecting intelligence 
on the state of political feelings in the army.  They provided Freeland with information 
that there was a significant amount of discontent in the 11th Kenya Rifles (11KR).  The 
discontent paired with the comparative success in both the other EA territories in 
achieving pay raises was expected to lead to trouble.  Freeland warned the British 
battalion commander of 11KR, Lieutenant Colonel G.W. Stead, that there was a good 
possibility of unrest from within his unit and that he should remove the weapons and 
ammunition from camp. However Stead was handicapped by the fact that his battalion 
was on alert for possible deployment to Tanganyika and would in that case require its 
weapons.  
In an attempt to address the concerns of the soldiers Stead met with his men and 
announced that they would receive a fifteen percent pay increase backdated to December 
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1963. Unfortunately, this did little to calm them since there had also been a recent 
increase in taxes that offset this raise in pay. By the end of the evening of January 24th, 
the men of 11KR broke into their own armory and took up arms against their officers, 
British and African alike.  Almost all of the conspirators were corporals and below. As a 
precautionary measure Freeland had dispatched a troop from 3rd Royal Horse Artillery 
(3RHA) to a position just outside of Lanet Barracks where 11KR was stationed. The 
British officers of 11KR called for support from 3RHA.  The British were able to seize 
control of the armory while under fire from the mutineers. Rather than put down the 
revolt using overpowering fire superiority, the African officers of 11KR were sent into 
the barracks to attempt to reason with the mutinying soldiers. The move was 
unsuccessful, and 3RHA called back to their higher headquarters for guidance. 
Kenyatta refused to allow the soldiers’ revolt to go on for any longer and 
instructed Freeland to take the camp by force. A battalion of Gordon Highlanders was 
trucked into Lanet equipped with armored cars. At 10:00AM on the 25th, after the 
mutineers refused to surrender, the British troops went in behind the armored cars.  The 
African soldiers knew that they would not be able to put up any sort of defence against 
armored vehicles and gave up rather than be killed. In his report posted right after the 
mutiny was put down, Freeland noted that the political influence of ministers in the other 
armies had contributed to the outbreak of the mutiny, “In Tanganyika and Uganda it 
became commonplace for politicians to enter the barracks and talk unofficially to the 
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Askaris, often without the knowledge of their officers, this must not be allowed to 
happen in Kenya.”98 
The aftermath of the mutiny varied in each nation. Both Uganda and Tanganyika 
turned away from British defence assistance after the events of January 1964.  They saw 
continued British involvement in their military forces as the impetus for the mutinies in 
the first place. Tanganyika merged with Zanzibar to form Tanzania and disbanded the 
entire army, replacing it with a new Tanzanian Peoples Defence Force. The new army 
was completely political, recruited almost exclusively from the Tanganyika African 
National Union youth wing.99 Nyerere decided that loyalty to the TANU and loyalty to 
the government were the same thing, eventually it was required for members of the army 
to be members of the TANU. By tying together party loyalty and national loyalty 
Nyerere cemented his place in power for the next two decades. Clearly, in Tanzania the 
military did not live up to the British hope for an force that would help exert British 
influence.  
Uganda did not entirely disband its army, but Obote did see to it that the 
ringleaders of the mutiny were prosecuted. British assistance in Uganda was minimized, 
while the Obote government conspired with Idi Amin to look elsewhere for military 
assistance. Obote also gave great power to the army and Amin after the mutinies. In 
1966 Obote used Amin and the Army to consolidate his power by destroying the internal 
kingdoms in Uganda. Amin himself led the assault on the Kabaka of Buganda’s palace. 
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The seizure of power in 1966 led Uganda down a road of increasing political 
involvement by the military. In 1968 the British Defence attaché in Uganda made a trip 
to the Uganda Army HQ where he saw a sign that said “No Politicians Beyond this 
Point.”100In 1971 Idi Amin used his power as the commander of the Army to seize 
power in Uganda and embark on his eight-year reign of terror in the country.  
Kenya was remarkably different in its reaction to the mutinies.  The Kenyatta 
government embraced British defence assistance in after 1964. While they did intend to 
increase the number of African officers, they were also grateful for the opportunity to 
build relationships with the British Army. In 1965 Kenyatta sent a company of soldiers 
to Britain to undergo parachute training, something much envied among African 
forces.101 The training of African officers in Britain continued at an increased pace, in 
1964 alone sixty-two Kenyan officers were commissioned out of Mons or RMA. 
Another seventy-six were trained in Britain between 1965 and 1967.  In 1966 Brigadier 
Joseph Ndolo, a former colonial soldier became the first Kenyan appointed commander 
of the Army. At the same time the position of Deputy Army Commander was filled by 
Col. Jackson Mulinge.102 By 1967 there were no longer any seconded British officers 
serving in line units in the Kenya Army. 103 In 1969, Brig. Ndolo took over from Major 
                                                
100 Clayton and Killingray, Khaki and Blue, 265. 
101 Lee, African Armies and Civil Order, 79. 
102 Kenya National Assembly Official Record, 4th ser., vol. X, cols. 2897-2898. While this can be seen as a 
significant improvement over the course of some of the other EA colonies Kenyatta got significant 
blowback from not appointing a Kenyan sooner.  
103 Ibid., 126. 
  88 
General R.B. Penfold as the Chief of the Defence Staff in Kenya, the last major post in 
the Kenyan Army to be occupied by a British officer.104  
 
Conclusion 
 Despite all of the problems that faced British planners and Kenyan authorities 
during the Africanization process, on the whole the program was successful. The delay 
in Kenyan independence provided the government with the necessary buffer to utilize 
British resources to Africanize the army as much as possible. Kenya had the highest rate 
of Africanization of any army in British Africa up to that point. At independence 48.5% 
of the officer corps was African, the next highest rate was Uganda with 21.9%.105  This 
is remarkable considering the size of the Kenya Army; at 2,500 soldiers it was much 
larger than the other East African forces.  
 The British Army, in concert with African officers, was able to identify the 
problem areas of establishing a new army. Support services and technical training 
plagued the British throughout the training process. It took almost a decade for British 
training technicians to leave Kenya and for the army to be able to provide its own 
logistical support and medical services. Additionally the navy and air force had to be 
established from nothing and were both extremely technical services. The former Royal 
East African Navy had been so small, only 200 sailors, that it was almost 
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inconsequential after it was divided among its former colonies. They also learned that 
the cost of maintaining influence in new nations was extremely high.  Parliamentary 
debates in Kenya frequently revolved around looking elsewhere for military 
assistance.106 It was only the relationships built by British forces with important power 
brokers such as Kenyatta that kept Britain as the sole suppliers of military training.  
Training through mentorship was an extremely costly and time intensive process. 
Yet it seemed to help maintain a continuum of culture and standards impressed upon 
officer cadets at RMA and Mons.  This is not to say that all British officers assigned to 
the KAR were consummate professionals, but they were able to identify with their new 
Kenyan officers because of a common training experience in Britain. The British officers 
charged with helping African soldiers learn how to be young officers knew the standard 
that they had been held to at Sandhurst and the Infantry Battle Course that followed.  
This common military culture helped British and Kenyan soldiers establish important 
personal and professional relationships. These relationships served as informal conduits 
to reinforce British influence in Kenya. 
The curriculum at Sandhurst and Mons both challenged and indoctrinated the 
officer cadets. At minimum, cadets who went to Mons spent a year training to become 
an officer, at maximum those who went to Sandhurst trained for two and a half years. 
During this time they were exposed to the camaraderie, pride and uniformity of the 
British professional officer corps. Additionally British trainers were often able to weed 
out those African officer cadets who did not meet the standard or were overly political. 
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When Kenyan officers returned home they often emulated the officer culture that they 
had experienced in training in Britain.  This professionalism was showcased in 1964 
during the containment of the mutinies when Kenyan officers attempted to quell the 
discontent among their soldiers. Additionally the military did not become politicized like 
the other forces in East Africa; mainly due to the efforts of Kenyan and British officer to 
keep politicians and political activists out of military cantonments. The two major 
military coup efforts that have occurred in Kenya since independence were unlike those 
in other parts of Africa. In many places the higher echelons of the officer corps 
conspired to replace the civilian government with a military one. In Kenya the uprising 
in 1964 and the attempted coup in 1982 were both led by low ranking enlisted men.107 
On both occasions Army officers leading forces loyal to the government put down the 
rebellion. 
While democracy in Kenya was far from perfect, the goal of the British training 
establishment was to create a military force that did not interfere in politics. The British 
have also used the military connection between the two countries to maintain a level of 
influence in Kenya. After the 1964 mutinies the Kenyan government eagerly increased 
the amount of military assistance they requested from Britain. The Defence Agreement 
of 1964 provided for a continued British military presence in Kenya for the rest of the 
decade.  There were of course the provisions for continued officer training schemes in 
Britain as well as provisions for the British government to supply equipment to the 
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Kenyans. However the most striking part of the agreement was the assurance that until 
1971 Britain would assist Kenya in maintaining both internal and external security. 
Kenyatta wanted to make sure that the British would help prevent a coup in Kenya, and 
the British wanted to ensure someone did not replace him who favored the Warsaw 
Pact.108 In exchange, the British were granted “over flight” rights, use of naval facilities, 
the use of Kenyan training areas and a secure signals intelligence facility. Even though 
the internal defence agreement lapsed in 1971, the Kenya Army remained close to the 
British military. It was not until the late 1970s that the Kenyans started buying some 
equipment from other sources, namely the United States.  Even so the British presence 
remains: British Army Training Unit –Kenya is a permanent unit outside Nairobi that 
helps run a training center in Kenya for British troops that cycles through three infantry 
battalions and an engineer squadron every year.109
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CHAPTER III  
NORTHERN RHODESIA BECOMES ZAMBIA: CREATING A DEFENCE FORCE 
OUT OF SCRAPS 
 
 The colony of Northern Rhodesia emerged from the same exploratory zeal that 
established Southern Rhodesia. Originally divided into two separate territories, North-
East Rhodesia and North-West Rhodesia, it was unified as Northern Rhodesia in 1911 
under the auspices of the British South Africa Company. Company rule in N. Rhodesia 
lasted only until 1923, when it passed to the administration of the Colonial Office as a 
protectorate.  Large mineral deposits were discovered in N. Rhodesia early in its 
settlement. It was particularly known for its rich copper mines in what became known as 
the Copperbelt. Northern Rhodesia was not initially settled as a “white man’s” colony, 
but as the copper industry grew a small and influential group of migrants settled in the 
area. This European community constantly advocated the union of the two Rhodesias, 
finally realized their dream as the Central African Federation. The union of these two 
colonies had long lasting effects on the security establishment in what became Zambia.1   
 The origins of the Northern Rhodesia Regiment, from which the Zambia Army 
would be drawn , lay in the Indian soldiers hired as a constabulary in the 1890s. This 
small, irregular force gave way with the enlistment of local Africans to what became 
                                                
1 Rosaleen Smyth, “War Propaganda during the Second World War in Northern Rhodesia,” African Affairs 
83 (July 1984), 345. Even though the colony was administered by the Colonial Office the settler 
community had an advisory role in the process in the form of a small legislative council. In 1954 shortly 
after the formation of the CAF the settler community was 60,000 compared to the African population of 
2,000,000.  
  93 
known as the Northern Rhodesia Police (NRP) in 1911. The force did not have a 
centralized system of training or standardization, and had a small unit of European 
policemen who patrolled the settler areas.2  
 During World War I, the entire Military Branch was put on active service, with 
the Civil Branch acting as a reserve. In 1933 the two branches of the NRP were 
permanently split when the Military Branch became the Northern Rhodesia Regiment 
(NRR). From 1933 until 1937, officers of the NRR were drawn from the local settler 
community, something remarkably different from most other colonial forces. In 1937, 
the choice was made to model the NRR on the Kings African Rifles (KAR), and from 
that point until the Federation period officers were seconded to the force from the British 
Army. The regiment’s enlistedmen were primarily recruited from the Ngoni people of 
the northeast of the colony. Like the KAR, the NRR was expanded during World War II, 
growing in size and adding support units. It used the newly-formed NRR European 
Reserve for its officers. Four of its eight battalions saw active service in East Africa, 
Madagascar and Burma.3  
 After the end of the war the NRR European Reserve was disbanded and the NRR 
reverted to a one-battalion regiment. It was not long though before the NRR saw active 
service again, this time in Palestine.4 After the return from Palestine in 1946, the 
regiment reverted to its previous internal security duties. However, like other colonies 
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the NRP had learned from the experiences of colonial police in Palestine and in West 
Africa. John Patrick Fforde took up the post of Commissioner of Police in N. Rhodesia 
in 1951. Fforde served in the Palestine Police from 1931 until 1948, and commanded the 
Criminal Investigation Division of the police. Upon his arrival in Northern Rhodesia he 
restored some of the former military nature to the NRP by modernizing the small Police 
Mobile Unit.  Established in 1949, this unit was designed to be deployed anywhere in the 
colony to put down riots and other internal unrest for which they were specially trained. 
Fforde expanded the Mobile Unit from one platoon to four, which were airmobile.5  
The most dramatic change for the military forces of the NRR in the 1950s was 
the establishment of the Federation of Rhodesia and Nyasaland, into the Central African 
Federation (CAF) in October 1953. The settler populations of both of the Rhodesias had 
advocated a merging of the two colonies since 1923, when they were set on separate 
courses. The CAF was not a straightforward merger of these territories, as each of the 
member states retained control of almost all of its own governance, ceding only defence 
and foreign affairs to the federal government.6 This system was complicated by the fact 
that neither Northern Rhodesia nor Nyasaland gave up their status as protectorates, and 
therefore were still required to report to the Colonial Office in London.  
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The creation of the CAF brought about the establishment of the Federation of 
Rhodesia and Nyasaland Army. The greater contributor to the organization was Southern 
Rhodesia.  Since it was granted responsible government in 1923 the colony retained a 
small military staff corps that was expanded in World War II into a small army. After 
World War II the Rhodesian African Rifles and the Royal Rhodesian Regiment 
(territorial) were retained along with the support branches. Two battalions of the KAR 
stationed in what became federal territories, the 1st in Nyasaland, and the 2nd in Northern 
Rhodesia, both became part of the new army.7  
 
The Federal Period  
 The Federal government was always extremely supportive of imperial ventures 
and endeavored to offer up units for commonwealth missions and defence whenever 
possible. Elements of the Rhodesian African Rifles (RAR) and the NRR both saw active 
service in Malaya during the 1954 emergency. This deployment was the only active 
service that the Federal Army saw outside of internal security operations. During the 
Malayan deployment, soldiers of the NRR distinguished themselves against the 
communist insurgents: one African soldier was awarded the Military Medal and another 
the Distinguished Conduct Medal.  
 The actual amalgamation of the forces of the three territories took place when the 
Federal Assembly passed the 1954 Defence Act forming the Ministry of Defence and 
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establishing the statutory authority to govern the defence forces. Prior to this 
reorganization, the military forces in Northern Rhodesia and Nyasaland had fallen under 
the authority of the British Army East Africa Command.8 
 The first step in creating a centralized command structure under the new 
Federation was the establishment of a defence Headquarters for the territories. The very 
location of the Federation capital in Southern Rhodesia confirmed the suspicions of 
many Africans that the CAF was a move closer to complete settler power.  The Defence 
HQ was established in Salisbury in 1954 as Central Africa Command. The actual 
Ministry of Defence was not formed until 1956, the same year that the Southern 
Rhodesian Air Force was established separately as, the Royal Rhodesian Air Force.   
Even as the Federal defence apparatus was established, some policy makers in 
London questioned the validity of the CAF. Lord Home, Prime Minister Anthony Eden’s 
Secretary for Commonwealth Relations, expressed the Cabinet’s concerns arguing that 
with all of CAF’s restrictions, particularly the two colonial territories, it did not qualify 
for full dominion status. However, he also conceded that the Newfoundland was granted 
Dominion status even though the UK was to control all external affairs.9 Home felt that 
this precedent could be used to force the British government to grant the CAF even 
greater freedoms. Eden worried that if the CAF did not get independent status, it would 
drift even closer to the Union of South Africa and further erode British influence in the 
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region. Perhaps, even, if the CAF did not feel accepted as a full member of the British 
community, “they might go their own way – cf. American Colonies.”10 While the 
comment was certainly made in jest at the time, it would be less than a decade before the 
Federation was dead, and Southern Rhodesia declared its independence.  
In the midst of such confused politics, the small Federal Army struggled to 
establish itself and create a balanced and capable force. The influence of Southern 
Rhodesia on the military establishment was clear. When the forces were finally 
combined, Southern Rhodesia’s Compulsory Military Training (CMT) program was 
extended throughout the CAF to whites, Asians and so-called coloured males between 
the ages of eighteen and forty. These young men were liable to undergo four and a half 
months of basic training, followed by four years of service in the Territorial Force (TF). 
The TF was often called upon to serve along side the regular forces in an internal 
security role.11  
While CMT service in Kenya had been confined to the Kenya Regiment, 
territorial soldiers in the CAF formed a large part of the supporting services of the 
Rhodesia & Nyasaland Army. The basic training period was divided into three phases: 
Basic soldiering (including weapons training, field craft and small unit tactics), Internal 
security, and finally, field problems. All CMT servicemen went through the first phase 
of training, .12 African infantry training had a syllabus similar to that of the CMT but 
was extended to six months in length to also accommodate additional education courses 
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in English. All soldiers in the R&N Army, both black and white, were required to 
undergo internal security training, as well as classical war training. One of the problems 
that often plagued this small force was that their training cycles were interrupted by call 
ups to support civilian authorities in internal security matters. While this was often 
excellent real world experience in internal security operations, the ability of the R&N 
Army to conduct conventional operations suffered.13  
 The R&N Army was given three particular missions: aid to civil authorities, 
internal security, and limited or classical warfare. As in other colonial examples two 
thirds of the duties of the military centered on maintaining control of the population. The 
major units of the army remained the same until 1960: 1NRR, 1KAR, 2KAR, 1RAR, 
and the Territorial Force, which consisted predominantly of the Royal Rhodesia 
Regiment (RRR). The major changes to the military did not come until 1960. When the 
CAF was formed in 1953 there was a statutory requirement that the constitutional 
arrangement be reviewed by the end of the decade. The Monckton Commission, which 
reviewed the constitution of the CAF, recommended that progress be made in a 
transition to majority African rule in Northern Rhodesia. The commission claimed that 
the federation could only survive if all of the territories consented to participation, which 
left the door open for any of the territories to secede.14  
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The release of the report in 1959 and mutiny of the Force Publique in the Congo, 
which shared a border with the Federation, sent shockwaves through the European 
community. A member of the Federal Assembly, Winston Field of Mwera, Southern 
Rhodesia, quickly brought up the matter of defence policy. Initially Field made the point 
that the N&R Army was woefully underfunded and underequipped, citing the report on 
defence from 1959, which said “whilst our existing weapons are satisfactory for internal 
purposes, they are obsolescent in the international sense.”15  Field worried that foreign 
intervention in Africa, particularly from communist forces, would easily out-gun and 
out-equip the N&R Army. He went on to call for an expansion of the federal army to 
deal with growing communist threats. He advocated the establishment of a new all-
European infantry regiment, which the Federal Assembly authorized. James Graham, the 
7th Duke of Montrose, expressed settler fears: “We no longer find when we read of chaos 
in the newspaper that it is in Korea or Cuba or even Kenya. It is right here at our 
frontiers.”16 In addition to a new infantry battalion, the federation created an armored car 
unit and its own special forces unit. All of these formations were composed solely of 
European soldiers.  
The new European units were established over the course of 1961. The new 
infantry battalion was known as the Rhodesian Light Infantry and was the first regular 
European infantry force in the history of any of the three territories. The new armored 
car unit, the Rhodesian Armored Car Regiment (also known as the Selous Scouts), 
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carried on the regimental heritage of a Southern Rhodesian unit raised during World War 
II.17 Finally the special operations capability of the federation came in the form of ‘C’ 
Squadron, Rhodesian SAS Regiment (RhSAS). The RhSAS was initially raised during 
the Malaya Emergency and was recruited exclusively from Southern Rhodesia.18 In 
addition to these regular units, new TF units were added to the order of battle, including 
artillery batteries.19  
The government launched a recruiting campaign in 1960; a significant portion of 
this effort was actually made outside of the Federation in the United Kingdom and South 
Africa. In 1960, only 752 of the 4,433 Regular Force’s “other ranks,” were European, 
most of these soldiers in support and specialist roles.  By the end of 1962, there was a 
78% increase in numbers of Europeans in the regular force.20 With this expansion of 
forces the total number of TF soldiers and regular Europeans outnumbered African 
soldiers for the first time. Not only did the total number of European-trained soldiers 
outnumber trained Africans, but Europeans also occupied all of the integral specialty 
services and supporting arms. Even though the Central African Federation was looking a 
bit broken after the Mockton Commission Report, European personnel had been made 
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instrumental to the functioning of the force. While African soldiers in other colonies saw 
more leadership opportunities open up for them, those who served in the CAF were still 
limited to the same colonial arrangement.  
Interestingly, the same year that the R&N Army began its large scale European 
recruiting campaign, the Federal Assembly removed the statutory bar to commissioning 
Africans.21 Mr. M.M Hove of Gwai, Southern Rhodesia made it clear that in the wake of 
the Force Publique mutiny that the Federation would look both illegitimate and racist if 
there continued to be only white officers in the army.22  During that session of the 
assembly the legal barrier against commissioning Africans was removed. However this 
did not mean that any African men were invited to serve as officers in the Army.  
The expansion of the army had ripple effects, as did its participation in internal 
security operations during this period. In 1961 the R&N Army reported a shortfall of 
fifty-two regular officers, despite a large influx of new officers. While the recruiting of 
Europeans proceeded quite well, the recruiting of Africans suffered for the first time in 
years. Up to this point, the Army had always met African recruiting goals for the 
Regular Force. In 1961 100 African soldiers left the army, while only five African men 
volunteer for service.23 Even though recruiting improved Army-wide in 1962, it was not 
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enough to make up the shortfall in African enlistments; there was wastage of 448 while 
660 new soldiers were attested, leaving a shortfall of 148.24 This was in part due to the 
few opportunities for advancement for African soldiers in the R&N Army. Even in 1960, 
prior to large scale European recruitment, out of the 3,681 African OR, only thirteen 
held the rank of Warrant Officer I (WOI); of the only 752 European OR, there were 
thirty-five WOI. 25  
The only development in these last years of the Federation that was a positive 
step for African servicemen was the establishment of a Junior Leaders Unit in Salisbury 
in 1962.  The unit was established for the sons of African soldiers who would join the 
Army as junior soldiers and were educated up to the General Certificate of Education 
level (GCE). The stated goal of the unit was to identify possible African candidates for 
admission to the Royal Military Academy, Sandhurst though none, in the end were 
afforded that opportunity. The unit was based near Salisbury, the most restrictive part of 
the Federation for Africans. Those Junior Soldiers who were not given the chance to go 
on to RMA were simply sent into the army as privates.26 The JLU was a short-lived 
experiment and by the end of 1962 there were large fissures forming in the CAF. By the 
end of 1963 the Federation would only be a memory.  
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The end of the Federation 
 The reevaluation of the constitution in 1959 and the results of the Mockton 
Commission from that same year made it clear that the Federation could not continue on 
its stated course.  While many in the British government saw the CAF as a way to 
counter the rising power of the Afrikaners in South Africa, most Africans saw it as way 
for Southern Rhodesian settlers to dominate the region.  Macmillan’s policy to accelerate 
decolonization had a dramatic impact on the CAF. The 1961 CAF Constitution removed 
many of the oversight functions that London had previously exercised over the 
Federation. In return, the franchise was to be extended to a wider portion of the African 
population in alignment with the recommendations of the Mockton Commission.  
 These policy changes were paired with increasing pro-independence activities by 
Zambian nationalists. African political parties grew in both Northern Rhodesia and 
Nyasaland during the Federation era and by the 1960s were serious players in Federation 
politics. Prior to the formation of the CAF, the African nationalist movements overall 
had not been able to achieve mass appeal to the African public. The first six years of the 
Federation experiment and the strict enforcement of the color bar led to increased 
enthusiasm for the movements among the African public.27  The Northern Rhodesia 
African National Congress (NRANC), formed in 1948, attacked the Federation political 
system. The NRANC attempted to work within the system during the early years of the 
Federation with the hope that Africans could achieve parity in the political system.  
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 In 1957, however, a new wave of militancy took over within the NRANC, in part 
as a reaction to the British failure in Suez.  In exchange for the support the Federation 
offered to the British in the Suez operation, the British government gave Federal 
authorities a free hand in dealing with African aspirations. That same year Alan Lennox-
Boyd, then Secretary of State for the Colonies, told Africans that the Federation “is good 
for you…and you must accept it.”28 The NRANC concluded that they could no longer 
look to Britain as an honest broker in their struggle with the Federal government and felt 
that there was no chance of achieving independence by working from within the political 
system to achieve independence. Divisions also grew within NRANC as Kenneth 
Kaunda, a rising star in the NRANC in the late 1950s, had come to disagree with one of 
the other major party leaders, Harry Nkumbula, over the best strategy to reach 
independence. As a result Kaunda broke away from the NRANC and formed the 
Zambian African National Congress (ZANC) in 1958.  
 Kaunda and the ZANC stepped up their protests and opposition to the Federal 
government. In his speeches he became increasingly militant, encouraging Africans to 
“begin to hate everything white which had two legs.“29 However, Kaunda himself never 
advocated violence and intended to stop short of any sort of violent revolution. By 
February 1959 the settler government was fed up with ZANC agitation: Kaunda was 
arrested, and ZANC banned. At the same time Dr. Hastings Banda, the leader of the 
Nyasaland African Congress, was arrested and his organization was banned, too. For 
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these nationalist leaders imprisonment was a rite of passage that they hoped would lead 
to political legitimacy in independence.  In response to the ban on activities of the 
ZANC, its members formed the United National Independence Party (UNIP) in August 
1959. When Kaunda was released from prison in January 1960 he was quickly made 
president of the UNIP.  
 The 1959 General Election in the Britain gave the Conservative Party a 100-seat 
majority in the Commons. The victory was accompanied by a ministerial shake up that 
brought Iain Macleod to the office of Secretary of State for the Colonies. Macleod was 
slightly more sympathetic to the ambitions of Africans within the CAF than his 
predecessors had been. After a series of failed review conferences on the state of the 
Federation, Macleod announced a change in the constitution of Northern Rhodesia, 
which would divide the territorial assembly into fifteen seats each for Africans, 
Europeans, and members mutually agreed upon by both communities. . The UNIP and 
the main settler group, the United Federal Party (UFP), were unsure of the arrangement. 
Yet, in June of 1960 Macleod released details of the franchise qualifications that limited 
the possibility of an African majority government.  This news was greeted by 
widespread disorder in Northern Rhodesia. In the Copperbelt twenty-seven Africans 
were killed and 3,000 were arrested in the riots that followed. The British government 
recognized that the only way that African ambitions could be contained was through 
large-scale force. Rather than take the CAF down this path the franchise details were 
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revised for the 1962 elections. These elections provided the basis of the transfer of 
power to the African majority.30  
 By 1962 it was clear that the territories of the CAF were moving in separate 
directions. Nyasaland and Northern Rhodesia were on the fast track to independence 
while Southern Rhodesia was even more entrenched in the idea of independence on its 
own terms. The UFP fell apart, and another more radical party took its place. In early 
1962 a young Rhodesian Farmer and former RAF pilot named Ian Smith formed a small 
new party called the Rhodesia Reform Party. Smith and a wealthy rancher from 
Southern Rhodesia, D.C. “Boss” Lilford began negotiations with Winston Field and 
what remained of his small Dominion Party. They all three agreed to join forces to form 
a new political party, The Rhodesian Front (RF).31 The RF was founded on the 
principles of preserving settler power in the territories, both financially and politically. 
The RF did not contest the last Federal elections since they acknowledged that the CAF 
was coming to an end. Instead, they concentrated all of their efforts on the 1962 
elections for the Southern Rhodesia Assembly. In a dramatic and unexpected turn of 
events the RF won thirty-five of the sixty-four seats in the assembly, placing the RF 
firmly in power in Southern Rhodesia.  
 By May 1962 it was clear that Nyasaland would secede from the Federation. In 
March 1963 delegations from all of the territories traveled to London to discuss the 
future of the region. The British cabinet decided on March 28th that Northern Rhodesia 
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would be allowed to secede, and the Federation would be dissolved. In June all of the 
governments concerned were scheduled to meet at the Victoria Falls Hotel to divide up 
the assets of the soon to be defunct Federation.32  The division of assets shaped the 
security situation in the region for decades. At the time of the dissolution of the 
Federation, it possessed one of the largest and most advanced air forces in Africa. In the 
post-1960 military build up the RRAF had acquired an impressive fleet of around sixty 
combat aircraft, including modern jets and helicopters.33 In addition to the robust air 
power capability the Army had built itself up to a two-brigade organization, with 
armored forces and airborne capability. The only larger military force in the region was 
the South Africa Defence Force.  
 
Dividing the assets  
 The earlier expansion of the R&N Army and the RRAF made the division of the 
forces the territories more difficult. In addition to all of the forces that had not existed in 
1953, the British were left with the task of ensuring that each territory received enough 
of the Federation’s forces to form complete defence forces of their own. For African 
units, this was relatively simple. They remained in the territories they had been recruited. 
However 1KAR and 2KAR posed a bit of a problem. Both of the KAR battalions were 
raised and stationed in Nyasaland, yet the British government did not wish to encourage 
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the small Nyasa government to retain a two-battalion army that it could not afford.34 The 
Ministry of Defence proposed that 2KAR go to NR and form the second battalion of the 
NRR.  
Prior to the Victoria Falls Conference, Sir Roy Welensky communicated to the 
British government in a top-secret cable the defence implications of the end of the 
Federation. Welensky and the settler community saw Angola, Mozambique, and the 
Federation as a line of defence against Communist influence in Southern Africa. 
Welensky and the Federal authorities made it clear that if the northern territories became 
independent they would become a base of operations for dissident elements to infiltrate 
Southern Rhodesia.35 He also communicated to the British government that if the 
Federation fell apart, Southern Rhodesia would require the same military and air services 
that the Federation had utilized. Additionally this would require a closer relationship 
between the Rhodesians and South Africa, both politically and militarily.36   
The MOD in London thought that Southern Rhodesia would attempt to retain as 
much of the force as possible.  The Southern Rhodesians were keen on retaining the 
entirety of the RRAF with all of its modern equipment. In addition to the forces, the 
MOD suspected that the Rhodesians would simply try and take over the Federation 
MOD and Forces HQ that were already in Salisbury.”37 The British government was 
concerned about how the distribution of forces and talent would end up.  Of particular 
concern was the prospect of white flight from the northern territories if and when the 
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Federation was dissolved. There were no African officers in the R&N Army, so if 
European officers and NCOs in the North chose instead to serve in Southern Rhodesia 
there would be serious manpower problems. Yet the most important goal that the British 
set for themselves in NR was the same goal they set in Kenya; “We should like to cast 
the armed forces of Northern Rhodesia and Nyasaland in as British a mold as possible in 
the short period left before independence.”38 
 While the main concern of the British government was the distribution of the 
European personnel in the new defence arrangement, they also had questions about 
African soldiers.  The unit that they felt was the cause for trepidation was 2KAR. In 
April 1963 the unit was stationed in NR, however it was recruited exclusively from 
Nyasaland. Under the Federal arrangement this was not an issue, but once Nyasaland 
withdrew from the Federation, the British government was not confident that 2KAR 
would be able to recruit enough new soldiers. Additionally, Dr. Banda had made it clear 
that he did want to retain the two battalions to form the basis of the new Malawian 
Army. He even offered the British the use of 2KAR as part of the commonwealth 
defence scheme.39 The British government had no intention of accepting the offer; the 
likelihood of the troops remaining reliably trained and ready for deployment outside the 
country after independence was quite slim.40  
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  The Federal government wanted to punish Nyasaland for leaving.  Initially the 
Federal government claimed that Nyasaland had no claim on any of the R&N Army 
since the forces belonged to the Federal government. They even wanted to go so far as to 
disband both KAR 41 The British government was able to convince the Federal 
government that since the War Office had handed over fully manned and equipped units 
to them in 1954 that they were obligated to do the same with regard to the KAR 
Battalions. The Nyasaland government was eventually dissuaded from retaining 2KAR 
in their order of battle due to the cost of the additional battalion. The British government 
helped this along by refusing additional financial and personnel assistance to support a 
second battalion in the Nyasaland Army.  
The main squabble over forces ended up being between the two Rhodesias. 
While the disposition of the units of the Army was settled with relative ease, the 
partition of the RRAF was particularly contentious. The Victoria Falls Conference ended 
up having very little African input. An all-European committee outside of the conference 
itself decided the actual disposition of the forces. The Central Africa Office simply 
reported that after the dismantling of the Federation the situation would revert to the pre-
1953 arrangement, Southern Rhodesia would control her own forces, and until 
independence the British government would retain operational control of the forces in 
the North.42  
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There were objections to this both in Britain and in Northern Rhodesia. The 
Labour Party insisted that it was a mistake to allow Southern Rhodesia to be so well 
armed considering their opposition to racial equality.43 J. Z. Savanhu, the member from 
Angwa/Sabi, attempted to pass a motion condemning the actions of the Defence 
Working Committee. He claimed that the Committee was “either misled or hoodwinked 
by the clever manipulations of the settler elements . . . which now seem to have agreed 
to the permanency of a European-dominated Government in Southern Rhodesia.”44 His 
assertion was pretty accurate: the working committee consisted of officials from the 
Southern Rhodesia government, the British government and a select group of officials 
from the Northern territories invited by the British.45 The European members of the 
Federal Assembly put forth a variety of reasons for the form the division of resources 
took, most if not all of them weak.  However, the objections of Labour, local Africans 
and the UN fell on deaf ears, and the partition of the forces occurred along the lines set 
up by the Settler dominated working committee.  
In his speech on the division of the defence forces the Honorable Mr. Savanhu 
argued that most of the Europeans in the Northern territories intended to flee south after 
the dissolution of the Federation. While this seemed like an ideal arrangement for 
African nationalists, it was a nightmare scenario for the British government. The entire 
civil and military administrative organization in the northern territories was composed of 
Europeans of the settler communities, many of whom were experienced civil servants. If 
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they left without training African replacements, the colony would likely descend rapidly 
into administrative chaos.  
The British government had neither the available manpower nor the resources to 
replace all of the officers in the Northern regiments with seconded British officers. The 
MOD hoped that they would be able to entice enough officers from the Federal Army to 
stay on in Northern Rhodesia after the disillusionment to train and create an independent 
force. Officers and European OR in the Federal Forces were given six possible options 
for the future of their military careers: sign on to serve in the proposed Southern 
Rhodesia Army; retire or be discharged; apply to serve on a Short Service Commission 
(SSC) in the Northern Rhodesia Army (NRA); apply to serve in the NRA on a two-year 
(extendable) British Army SSC; apply to serve in the Nyasaland Army on a two-year 
(extendable) British Army SSC; or join the British Army with a Permanent Regular 
Army Commission, on the condition that the first two-years after transferring be spent 
on secondment to the forces of either of the Northern Territories.46  
While the British government knew that it could not absorb all of the officers of 
the R&N Army, they strove to keep as many Federal officers as possible in the Northern 
territories after independence. Members of the Southern Rhodesia Army who opted to 
serve on secondment in the northern territories were offered additional pay.47 Even 
though the British offered the chance for some to take up a Regular Army Commission 
in the British Army, the prospects of acceptance were slim. The average age of officers 
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in the R&N Army was somewhat older than in the British Army, and there were very 
few opportunities for older men.48 
Even though settlers had limited career prospects in the British Army, both the 
British government and the African members of the Northern Rhodesia government 
wanted to make it clear that there was a future for Europeans in the country. In fact the 
British government made sure to highlight the opportunities available in the NR Army. 
The MOD and the Federal authorities made it clear in their advice to Federal offices that 
the NR Army was going to expand to brigade strength with the requisite support units.49 
The MOD knew that there were simply not enough available junior officers in the 
British Army to fill the slots. Additionally there was no prospect of quickly promoting 
WO and NCOs as had been done in Kenya. In July 1963 the R&N Army had only 
identified three Africans who had the potential and the requisite educational 
requirements for commissioning in the forces.50 European officers would be needed for 
the foreseeable future in Northern Rhodesia not only to train the army but also to hold it 
together.  
Since the sympathies of the majority of the senior offices in the R&N Army were 
with Southern Rhodesia, the MOD decided that a British officer would be placed in 
command of the Northern Rhodesia Army. As early as July 1963 it was understood that 
a British officer would retain the command until at least 1970. Major General George 
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Lea was the first officer selected for the assignment.  Lea’s long service, and vast 
experience in both conventional and special operations, including commanding a 
battalion of paratroopers during World War II, made him an excellent choice to train a 
new army from the remnants of the R&N Army. Above all else the British authorities 
wanted to keep a lasting defence relationship between Northern Rhodesia and Britain. 
The MOD recognized that it would be very tempting for the new African government of 
Northern Rhodesia to look elsewhere for assistance; it was Lea’s job to prevent this.51  
Independence  
 The Federation of Rhodesia and Nyasaland was dissolved on 31 December 1963, 
bringing an end to settler domination in the two northern territories. Nyasaland was 
granted self-governing status, and achieved independence in July 1964 as Malawi, under 
the leadership of Dr. Banda. Similarly, in January 1964 Northern Rhodesia was slated to 
hold new elections and was scheduled to become independent in October 1964. The 
elections were preceded by a period of violence between the youth wings of the major 
African parties. Both sides claimed they were targeting Africans who they believed had 
supported the Europeans.52 The elections themselves went relatively smoothly, aside 
from settler claims that they were being marginalized. The UNIP swept to power, and on 
23 January an all African UNIP cabinet was announced under Kenneth Kuanda as Prime 
Minister. The UNIP party and Kaunda agreed that the military needed to represent the 
racial makeup of the country. In the end Kaunda said he wanted a multi-racial officer 
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corps that included Europeans, Africans and Asians and insisted that the military be 
insulated from political interference.53 
 As elections were being held in what from this point became Zambia, mutinies 
broke out in the armies of East Africa. When the mutinies began MajGen Lea reported to 
the Central Africa Office that they would only have an “unsettling effect” in Zambia if 
they were handled in such a way that showed “that mutiny pays we may, repeat, may be 
in trouble here in the future.”54 While the virus spread throughout East Africa the mood 
was calm in Northern Rhodesia. Special Branch reported some feelings of sympathy for 
the mutineers in the lower ranks, particularly with regard to the continued presence of 
British officers, but the NCOs were reportedly disgusted with the behavior of the East 
African troops.55  
 There was no evidence that there was any drop in loyalty or reliability of the 
Northern Rhodesia forces after the East African incidents. A planned pay raise that took 
effect in June 1964 prevented the short-term problems that might have occurred in the 
Army. However the Central African Office (CAO) did make it clear that the possibility 
of unrest in the future could not be ruled out.  The CAO pointed out three scenarios that 
might have an impact on the loyalty and stability of the military: first, if Kuanda were 
overthrown by a more extremist leader; second, if Kuanda were forced to reward UNIP 
officials with positions in the Army; and thirdly, if the UNIP was successful in 
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disbanding the Police Mobile Unit.56 Any one of these situations had the potential to 
throw off the balance of power in the country. For example, the Police Mobile Unit 
handled most of the internal security duties in Northern Rhodesia. If it were disbanded 
the military would have a monopoly on the use of force in the country.  
 On January 31st the Governor of Northern Rhodesia, Sir Evelyn Hone, discussed 
the situation in East Africa with Kuanda, who understood that British action in the 
region only occurred at the request of the local governments, not out of a desire to 
reestablish control. Kuanda also assured Hone that he wanted the military to be an 
apolitical force, and only subscribed to the idea of promotion by virtue of merit. Along 
these same lines Hone wanted to make sure that Kuanda understood that due to financial 
constraints the British military was only able to produce a limited number of African 
officers every year.  Any attempt to speed up the rate of production would almost 
assuredly dilute the quality of training and preparation that the officer cadets received.57  
 While there were soldiers in Northern Rhodesia who sympathized with their 
comrades in East Africa the fact that they had been disconnected from the culture of the 
KAR since 1953 created ideological distance between the units. The regiments in 
Northern Rhodesia did not experience the period of increased African responsibility that 
those in the KAR had.  When the East African regiments revived the effendi rank and 
gave some Africans responsibility for the command of platoons, soldiers in Northern 
Rhodesia saw an increase in the number of officers from the settler community. The 
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incidents in East Africa reinforced the belief among British officers and policy makers 
that the future Zambia Army needed to be aloof from domestic politics and British in 
nature if it was going to succeed. 
 The War Office asked the Governor of Northern Rhodesia and Major General 
Lea to consider the possibility of an accelerated rate of Africanization, whether mass 
commissioning of warrant officers was feasible, and if a crash cadet program there or 
even in Britain was necessary. Looking back at their experience in Kenya, the British 
government thought that commissioning a large batch of the most senior African warrant 
officers might work; African WO and NCOs in NR had never been groomed for 
advancement. Lea warned that mass-promoting warrant officers would give 
commissions to many illiterate soldiers. 58 There was simply not a suitable group 
available as there had been in Kenya within the Army to begin a large-scale direct 
commissioning program.  
 Major General Lea’s intention was to commission thirty-five Northern Rhodesian 
officers by 1966. These new officers were supposed to be representative of the 
demographic makeup of the nation at a ratio of five Africans to one non-African. 
However, when Kaunda’s government revaluated their position after the mutinies they 
abandoned the idea of a multi-racial officer corps until after rapid Africanization had 
occurred. Under pressure from the UNIP government Lea was forced to double the 
officer production goal to seventy by 1966. While there were a large number of 
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vacancies for African cadets at both Mons and Sandhurst, Lea was doubtful that the 
government would be able to attract enough qualified applicants.  Educated Africans 
were more likely to take private sector jobs, and the British government was not 
forthcoming with places at either academy for Africans. 59 
 All of these recommendations came with a warning in light of the events in East 
Africa. The Governors and Major General Lea made it clear that Pan-Africanism was 
becoming a potent force in influencing the ideas and behaviors of African leaders in 
emerging nations. Concurrently both Ghana and the Soviet Bloc were putting pressure 
on Britain and the West to end white rule in Southern Africa. The British government 
could only count on Kaunda to resist this pressure for so long before he would be forced 
to take an active role in challenging white rule elsewhere in Africa. The most pressing 
concern of the British government was maintaining military influence, “Failure to move 
fast enough even at the risk of substantial loss of military efficiency, may therefore cause 
extremist pressures to grow so fast that all control over ordered progress and the 
retention of the British alignment in the military sphere will be lost.”60 The experience in 
Kenya and in East Africa had demonstrated to British policy makers that African 
soldiers and politicians were no longer wiling to follow the British down a slow more 
hesitant road toward decolonization.  
 Major General Lea and the British military staff in Northern Rhodesia were left 
with a less than ideal situation prior to independence.  The effort to retain as many 
                                                
59 Ibid., 3. 
60 Ibid., 4. 
  119 
Federation personnel as possible did not fare as well as the British government had 
hoped. The Northern Rhodesia Army had billets for forty-five European officers and 
twenty-three European OR in the two battalions of the Northern Rhodesia Regiment. 
However they only filled seventeen officers billets and eight OR. 61 Similarly the 
Northern Rhodesia Air Force had a full compliment of sixteen European officers but 
only nineteen of the eighty required enlisted personnel.  
The MOD felt it was in British interests to remain engaged in the country for 
three reasons: to help maintain a British presence, to reduce the likelihood of assistance 
being sought from nations unfriendly to Britain, and to facilitate the ability of British 
forces to re-enter Northern Rhodesia if necessary.62 In the consideration of British 
interests in Northern Rhodesia the MOD felt that it would be best if the training mission 
were to attempt to create a multi-racial officer corps rather than a solely African one.63 
The British intention to retain some European officers in the army indefinitely would 
eventually put them at odds with the Kaunda government and the UNIP.  
The actual independence ceremonies occurred on 24 October 1964. When the 
Union Jack was lowered in Lusaka, the Republic of Zambia was born. While many in 
the new nation had united under the banner of the UNIP to fight against settler power 
they were far from a united group. After independence was achieved the UNIP had to 
work out what its new political objectives and interests were. Kaunda and the UNIP 
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were attracted to Tom Mboya’s ideas on East African unity and federation.64  The 
problem was that the UNIP did not grasp the finer points of Mboya’s proposals. He 
made it clear that simply being black was not enough to get Africans to cooperate 
politically and economically. The traditional relationships inside Zambia came to the 
surface, and the simple unity in opposition to colonialism began to fade away. British 
policy makers had to consider the declining level of goodwill for direct involvement in 
the affairs of these newly independent states in future assistance programs.  
The first batch of officers in the Zambia Army began training prior to 
independence. In February 1964 twenty-three officer cadets were in training at Mons, 
RMA or the School of Military Training, Ndola. The eight warrant officers selected for 
training were sent to Ndola to go through a special commissioning course.65 Due to the 
lack of qualified personnel in the Army, the Zambian government shifted its focus to 
recruiting African school leavers to train as officers. . The Zambians mirrored the 
process of accessions in Britain; an Officer Selection Board (OSB) put applicants 
through a series of written and physical exams to determine their leadership potential.  
After passing through the OSB the potential officers were sent to a preparatory course at 
Kalewa Barracks in Ndola. During the 1965, OSB fourteen applicants were selected to 
attend the prep course at Kalewa. The three-month course consisted of basic military 
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instruction, drill and ceremonies, and a period of training at the Outward Bound School 
in Mbala. This school included courses in rock climbing, sailing, backpacking, and free-
fall parachuting, and was designed to challenge the officer cadets both mentally and 
physically in rough terrain.66  
After officer cadets returned to Kalewa from their time at the Outward Bound 
School they were informed of their overseas training assignments. By 1965 these were 
not limited to simply RMA and Mons. Other Commonwealth countries, including 
Canada, India, and Pakistan, offered military training assistance to the Zambian 
government. These institutions were acceptable to the British government because they 
followed the British military tradition.  
The course of instruction at RMA involved significant university-level academic 
study. The subject areas included: Math, Current Affairs, Military History, and the 
Sciences. It took two years to complete the course. It was not until the reorganization of 
the officer training programs in 1972 that the course was reduced to one year and 
focused more on practical military training. In addition to academic subjects, the officer 
cadets learned basic infantry rifle platoon tactics, skill at arms training and field craft in 
the training areas around the academy. Overseas field training exercises augmented the 
on-campus training. Francis Sibamba was one of three officer cadets from the 1965 OSB 
selected to attend RMA. During his time at RMA he went on training missions to 
Cyprus, Germany and France. Participation in exercises with NATO forces while 
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attached to the British Army exposed Zambian officer cadets to the professionalism of 
Western armies.  Those Zambian cadets who attended RMA returned to Zambia with 
certain expectations about levels of training and professionalism.67 
From 1964 until the establishment of the Zambian Military Academy in 1971, 
three Zambian cadets were sent on to every Sandhurst intake. Even though Zambian 
cadets were in every RMA intake, the amount of time required for the course was just 
too much to shoulder the burden for the new army.  After selection at the OSB, it took 
almost two and a half years to produce a lieutenant ready for service in a line infantry 
battalion. Due to the long period of training required by RMA, the majority of Zambian 
officers received their training and commissions through Mons Officer Cadet School. 
The six-month course at Mons reduced the time required to nine months.68  
Even while the military was making a significant effort to become a completely 
Africanized force, it was far from a respected institution in Zambia. Sibamba 
commented that the Army had a poor reputation among Zambians because of the 
‘colonial hang-over.’ The Zambian people still saw the military as a reflection of 
colonialism and thought that soldiers were uneducated and ill-disciplined. The new 
Zambian government hoped to change this impression through the Africanization of the 
officer corps and promotion of Africans to high-level command.69   
UDI 
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The events of 1965 complicated Zambia’s security situation. Prior to November 
of that year the greatest security concerns that the country faced were conflicts in Angola 
or Mozambique spilling across their borders. In November 1965 the disagreement 
between Rhodesia and the British government over the prospect of independence came 
to an impasse. In October talks between Harold Wilson’s government and the Rhodesian 
Front cabinet broke down over the principle of equal voting rights for African citizens.70 
On November 11, 1965 the Rhodesian government led by Ian Smith unilaterally 
declared independence (UDI) announcing:  
We Rhodesians have rejected the doctrinaire philosophy of appeasement and 
surrender. The decision which we have taken today is a refusal by Rhodesians to sell 
their birthright. And, even if we were to surrender, does anyone believe that Rhodesia 
would be the last target of the Communists in the Afro-Asian block? We have struck a 
blow for the preservation of justice, civilization, and Christianity; and in the spirit of this 
belief we have this day assumed our sovereign independence. God bless you all.71 
While Smith also assured Rhodesia’s African neighbors that they had nothing to fear, he 
also warned them not to meddle in Rhodesian affairs. Both Zambia and Britain were put 
in an awkward position. The British government had ruled out the possibility of using 
force to bring the Rhodesian government back in line, and the Zambia government 
depended on rail lines from Victoria Falls to Beria to export copper and import petrol.72  
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 Initially the Zambian government encouraged Britain to use force to end the 
rebellion in Rhodesia, as Britain had done in British Guyana.73 Kaunda insisted that if 
the British government did not dispatch troops to Zambia to deal with the Rhodesian 
problem, then he would appeal to other nations to do so.74  The OAU put enormous 
pressure on Kaunda to host an all-African force to invade Rhodesia. Even though 
Kaunda was sympathetic to the goals of the OAU, he was a pragmatic leader and knew 
that an invasion of Rhodesia by African forces could end in disaster for him and 
Zambia’s small army.  
 Harold Wilson was concerned about what the reaction of the British public might 
be to using military force in Rhodesia, fighting ‘kith and kin.’ Even so plans were 
underway to deploy a battalion to Zambia. A warning order was published for Operation 
Amberley, as it was titled, with Royal Marines earmarked to spearhead the effort.75 
However, the Wilson government concluded that dispatching a battalion would be too 
much provocation and scrapped the plan. To pacify the Zambian insistence on British 
military forces, Wilson agreed to send a squadron of RAF fighter aircraft to protect 
Zambian airspace. 76  
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 With the British unwilling to reinforce Zambia with ground forces, Kaunda 
decided that the military needed to be built up at a swifter pace than had previously been 
planned. When the expansion was announced on December 9th 1965 it came as a 
complete surprise to British officers in the Zambian defence establishment.77 When UDI 
was announced, the Zambian Army included only 2,200 regular soldiers. The major 
concern of Zambian policy makers was that the Rhodesian government would interfere 
with common services in Zambia River, specifically electricity from the Kariba Dam on 
the Zambezi.78 The establishment of the third battalion of the Zambia Regiment 
accelerated; it was activated in 1966. Lieutenant Francis Sibamba was posted to the 
newly established 3rd battalion, Zambia Regiment (3ZR) after he passed out from RMA. 
He made it clear that the possibility of facing the Rhodesian Army also posed moral 
problems for African officers in the Zambia Army. In his own case, he had befriended a 
Rhodesian cadet during his Sandhurst days, Andrew Blaine. When 3ZR was deployed to 
the Zambezi to guard the border, he was faced with a vexing moral problem, “facing 
Rhodesian soldiers, you can imagine my conscience playing havoc at the thought of 
shooting Andrew, taking him captive, or vice versa!”79  
European officers serving in the Zambia Army were also faced with the prospect 
of fighting their Rhodesian counterparts. In some cases these were men with whom they 
had served in the Federal Army. While this certainly caused sleepless nights for some of 
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these officers, the British government was concerned about the prospect of seconded 
officers being caught in an engagement with Rhodesian troops. While in 1966 this only 
seemed like an unfortunate possibility, the seriousness of such an incident mounted as 
the Rhodesian situation worsened.  Harold Wilson and Ian Smith met for negotiations on 
board HMS Tiger in December 1966. The negotiations revolved around the British 
position of no independence before majority rule (NIBMR). Smith refused the British 
proposal of independence based on the 1961 constitution, with amendments made to 
give Africans more seats in the assembly immediately.80  
The failure of the Tiger talks and the ineffective economic sanctions made the 
situation worse. In 1967 the British government was to the point that they were planning 
a coup of the Rhodesian Front government.  However such a scheme was simply too 
politically risky, and the Wilson government dropped the idea. In 1967 and 1968 the 
Zambian government became increasingly concerned by the activities of liberation 
movements in Mozambique, Angola and Rhodesia. Some of the liberation fighters had 
infiltrated their respective target countries through Zambian territory. In August 1967 a 
group of ninety guerilla fighters from the Zimbabwe African Peoples Union (ZAPU) and 
the South African ANC slipped into Rhodesia in the vicinity of Victoria Falls from 
Zambia. The ZAPU fighters had hoped to start a Maoist insurgent movement in the 
Tjolotjo Tribal Trust Land (TTL), while the ANC fighters planned on infiltrating South 
Africa through Botswana. Rhodesian intelligence soon had information on the size and 
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whereabouts of the group and destroyed them.81 This incident upped the ante for 
Zambia: not only had these men come from their territory, the participation of the ANC 
in the operation brought South Africa into the stewing conflict. Concerned by the 
possible infiltration of guerilla fighters from Zambia into South Africa the Pretoria 
government deployed a force of 3,000 militarized South African Police officers to patrol 
the Zambezi in cooperation with Rhodesian forces.82  
In this episode, the Zambian government faced off with two unfriendly forces 
across the Zambezi whose combined military power dwarfed the small Zambia Army. In 
response to these emerging threats on their border Kaunda’s government pleaded with 
the Britain for more modern heavy equipment.  Kaunda also sent representatives to the 
United States to try and secure American arms for Zambia. These efforts failed, and the 
Zambian government simply had to make due with the arms and training the British 
were willing to provide; fortunately, this did include the sale of British surface-to-air 
missile systems.  The Zambian defence staff resolved that it was necessary to form a 
fourth battalion of the Zambia Regiment to meet all of the nations security demands. In 
addition to the new infantry battalion the Zambian government intended to expand the 
                                                
81 Paul Moorcraft and Peter McLaughlin, The Rhodesian War: A Military history  (Johannesburg: Jonathan 
Ball , 2008), 32. For a first hand account of this mission from the perspective of an ANC fighter see Thula 
Bopela and Daluxolo Luthuli, Umkhonto we Sizwe: Fighting for a Divided People  (Alberton, SA: Galago 
Books, 2005).  
82 These police officers were put through a counter-insurgency course prior to deployment and were more 
soldiers than policemen. The South African government also sent aviation support with their forces adding 
to the formidable helicopter fleet the Rhodesian Air Forces already possessed.  
  128 
ground based air defence system by creating an anti-aircraft (AA) missile battery and an 
AA battery armed with 20mm AA guns.83  
The rapid expansion of the Zambian defence forces and the deteriorating 
situation on almost all of Zambia’s borders led the British government to request a 
renegotiation of the defence assistance scheme. On February 21, 1968 the Zambian 
Minister of Foreign Affairs signed a new status of forces agreement (SOFA) for the 
British training mission. The occasion was marked with appropriate ceremony, but with 
warm champagne, according to Colonel J.S. Bade, the Defence Advisor to the British 
High Commission.84 The most notable aspect of the agreement was the series of 
limitations put on British officers serving in the Zambia Army. The British government 
had been working throughout 1967 to prevent the possibility of its officers ending up in 
a combat situation.  When Zambia became independent, Major General Lea had noted 
that a Training Team arrangement was not useful in Zambia. However allowing troops 
to remain part of the indigenous command structure reduced the control that senior 
British officers had over their actions and movements. This same issue had become a 
problem in Kenya in 1967. The British government hoped to avoid being put in a similar 
situation in Zambia.85  
In order to prevent the possibility of a British officer ending up commanding 
troops against Rhodesian, Portuguese or South African forces, the SOFA prohibited 
British officers from commanding Zambian units that were on operational service on the 
                                                
83 TNA, PRO, DEFE 11/619, ‘Central Africa,’ ‘Defence Advisor Zambia, Quarterly Report 1 August 
1968.’  
84 TNA, PRO, DEFE 11/619, ‘Central Africa,’ ‘Defence Advisor Zambia, Quarterly Report 3 May 1968.’ 
85 TNA, PRO, WO 32/21128, E29, ‘Service Personnel on Loan to Zambian Armed Forces 1967.’   
  129 
Rhodesian border.86 By the end of 1967, all officers who occupied combat positions in 
the Zambia Army were transferred into advising and training positions. Also, starting in 
1967, those British officers whose terms of service in Zambia expired were not replaced.  
Even though British the training mission grew smaller each year the Zambian 
government admitted in 1967 that immediate “Zambianization” was impossible and that 
there was a need to continue recruiting expatriate contracted officers from both the UK 
and Ireland. In a letter to Harold Wilson, Kenneth Kaunda wrote “In spite of various 
communications which have passed between our two governments regarding the 
Defence Force, I am alive to the necessity of maintaining a loyal and efficient Defence 
Force, and to this end I intend to continue to recruit a certain category of expatriate 
officers from the United Kingdom and the Republic of Ireland.”87  
While this scheme did contain certain advantages for the British government, it 
was eventually disapproved by the FCO. The British did recognize that if they did 
approve the scheme to subsidize this recruitment that they would commit the Zambia 
Army to continuing to seek services from British and Commonwealth sources. However, 
the focus of the British government at the time was simply to get the Zambian 
government to agree to signing the SOFA that would remove British troops from combat 
roles and provide legal protections for them and their families.88 Even before the 
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agreement was signed there was a Memorandum of Discussion signed in the summer of 
1967 that agree to most of the provisions of the draft until the final agreement was 
signed.  
These tenets were tested in November 1967 when trouble on the Congo border 
with members of the Lumpa Church required the deployment of two companies of 1ZR, 
both commanded by British officers. Even though this was the type of thing that the 
British were trying to avoid, they approved the deployment of these two officers. Since 
the operation did not involve a situation where the enemy might be Rhodesian or South 
African that this type of use of British personnel was acceptable.89 This demonstrated 
publicly that the British were willing to use force against Africans, but not against settler 
communities.  
 In actuality, the British were growing impatient with their own training mission. 
Not only were the constant costs of the mission a source of irritation, but the personnel 
requirements were becoming a burden to the British Army. In London the MOD hoped 
to run down the Army component of training mission sooner rather than later.90 In the 
same memo the Defence Staff made it clear that the other major concern was that British 
forces would be engaged in operations against the South Africans, Rhodesians or 
Portuguese inside Zambia’s borders.   
Part of the issue facing the Zambia Army was an over-reliance on British and 
contracted expatriate officers. Colonel Bade, the defence advisor, noted that the Zambia 
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Army was also having a difficult time retaining and recruiting these contracted 
expatriate officers due to poor rates of pay and terms of service. In 1966 the Zambian 
government had gone to great effort to reduce the cost of expatriate personnel by 
normalizing their pay scales with other local Zambian officers.91 He made clear in the 
end of a letter to the Special Projects Office of the MOD: “Whatever happens in the end 
will be a mess, and no doubt the blame will be laid at our doorstep.”92 From the British 
perspective the training mission in Zambia was winding down, by December 1968 there 
were only expected to be twenty British officers in country, whose tours were scheduled 
to end by July 1969, completing the Army component of the mission.93  
The Zambia Army, like the Kenya Army, was quickly filling its officer ranks 
with qualified African infantry officers. However the greatest need for officers was in 
the supporting arms and specialized combat arms units. One British captain detailed 
from the Royal Artillery to command the Zambian Light Battery was filling multiple 
positions in 1967. Not only was he serving as the commander of the battery but also 
Director of Signals for the entire army simply because the Zambians could not find 
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anyone to replace him.94 The problem seemed to be two fold: the Zambian government 
refused to offer terms that were attractive to European expatriate officers, and Zambia 
seemed to be having enormous administrative issues bogging down their government. 
Even though the SOFA had been agreed and was ready for execution in early December 
1967, it was not actually signed until several months latter. The British High 
Commission in Lusaka learned that the Zambian Ministry of Foreign Affairs was in a 
state of administrative disarray, often losing paperwork and correspondence.95 
Nonetheless, the Zambian government finally signed the agreement, and the British 
Army hoped that the end of their training mission was in sight.  
As the British training team officers left Zambia, there was still a need for 
expatriates to fill the gaps in capabilities. In 1967 Kaunda had visited India and explored 
the possibility of establishing a military-to-military relationship.  The Indian government 
insisted that if the Zambians were to accept military assistance, they would have to agree 
to India being the sole provider or receive no assistance at all. The British government 
first got word of the Zambian overtures when a recruiting mission was planned to depart 
for both India and Pakistan in 1968.  The Zambian government intended to send two 
British training team officers to attempt to recruit Indian and Pakistani officers to serve 
on a contract basis in the Zambia Army.96 Initially the proposed recruiting mission 
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caught the British government off guard, particularly since the entire trip had been 
planned with the intent of sending British personnel without informing the High 
Commission. However, once both the Commonwealth Office and the MOD had a 
chance to weigh in on the matter they agreed that any measures that the Zambian 
government took to improve the state of their forces within certain boundaries should be 
encouraged.97  
In February 1968 the Zambia Army was still struggling to build up its officer 
corps. Of the 228 officers in the Army thirty-two were on loan from the British Army; 
ninety-four were expatriates serving on contracts; and the remaining 102 were Zambian. 
Of the Zambian officers two had attained the rank of major, with six more expected to 
do so by April 1968. Additionally, from February 1968 on no more Europeans were to 
be appointed to command infantry companies. The NCO corps was actually further 
behind in the Zambianization process than the officer corps. Of the 474 senior NCOs in 
the army; only 168 were Zambian—the rest were British, European expatriates, or 
Malawian.98 There were problems emerging in the army by this point. On orders from 
President Kaunda the Army commander started an investigation into political activity 
within the Army. The investigation did uncover an active United Party cell in Arakan 
Barracks. While this was a point of concern for the government, particularly because it 
was an opposition party, it signaled the need to ensure that the army remained apolitical. 
Factionalism within the military was also beginning to be a concern for both British 
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officers and Zambian policy makers. As the number of Zambian officers and NCOs 
increased, so did concerns about their ethnic background. Initially the Zambia Army had 
instituted a quota policy for officer selection. This was followed in 1968 by an order that 
required that the allocation of overseas training courses be representative of the ethnic 
diversity of the country.99  
The training of officers in counter-insurgency operations took main stage during 
the early part of 1968. Expatriate and African officers were required to attend three 
officer study periods on the subject between January and March. Colonel Bade attended 
one of the sessions and noted: “I was surprised to see how very bad were the expatriate 
officers at tactical appreciations and orders. The African officers made little contribution 
and did not take criticism easily.”100 This made it very clear to the MOD that even 
though the training mission was rapidly coming to a close the Zambia Army was far 
from being capable of operating on its own, even with the help of expatriates.  The 
problem was not only the capabilities of the officers in the Zambia Army, but was also 
related to the lack of specialty officers. As of May 1968 the Brigade Workshop and 
Army Workshops were critically short of qualified technicians. The Zambian 
government counted on the upcoming recruiting mission to India and Pakistan to help 
alleviate these shortfalls.101 The shortfalls were compounded by the fact that in 
December 1968 fifty expatriate officers and NCOs left the army.  
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The British and the Zambians were growing impatient with the progress of the 
training mission. In March 1968 a second ‘Wings’ parade was held for another batch of 
Zambian Air Force officers who had qualified as pilots. Colonel Bade was in attendance 
and commented: “In his address the President, who was the reviewing officer, 
characteristically omitted the passage which the drafter had included praising the RAF 
for it’s part in building the ZAF. Gratitude it seems is not a Zambian trait.”102 Even 
though patience was running thin on both sides building up the army into a self-
sustaining organization was a long process. In order to help alleviate the lack of 
technical personnel several Zambians were sent that year to specialty courses in Britain: 
two to an automobile engineering course, one for training in nursing, and one to train in 
ordnance. It would be the early 1970s before very many Zambian officers had undergone 
specialist training to take up these positions within their own army.  
As the activities of guerillas increased on Zambian borders so did the tensions 
with their neighbors. In April 1968 Portuguese aircraft bombed three Zambian villages 
where guerillas had allegedly been based prior to infiltrating into Angola. The Zambian 
Air Force did not have any sort of attack or fighter capability at the time and was 
essentially useless. The Zambian government did actively try to prevent guerillas from 
using their country as a base. Zambia Army units that found armed guerillas inside the 
country would arrest them, but unless they actually carried weapons, Zambian law 
prevented authorities from taking any action. At the same time, the army developed a 
friendly relationship with a battalion of the Movimento Popular de Libertação de Angola 
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- Partido do Trabalho (MPLA) that occupied a camp directly across the Zambian 
border. The MPLA Battalion commander even invited an expatriate officer to come and 
tour his facilities and observe his battalion training.103  
The political chatter and ethnic divisions in the army also continued to be a 
problem. One of the major political divisions among troops was based on ethnic identity. 
As the December 1968 elections grew closer, discussion of politics in the officers mess 
became more common. The political division between UNIP and UP supporters largely 
occurred along ethnic lines; the Bemba officers tended to support the UNIP and the Lozi 
officers supported the UP. This type of vocal support of an opposition party did not last 
long in Zambia. The UNIP was attempting to create a one-party state and was making 
policies to help facilitate the process. In April 1968 Kaunda announced economic 
reforms that made it advantageous to be a member of the UNIP.104  That same month 
some Zambian officers even went as far to discuss the possibility of a military coup in 
the mess. While they all agreed that a coup was not in the interests of Zambia, one 
Zambian company commander boasted that he was in a position to organize one. 
Unbeknownst to these officers the Zambian Intelligence Service kept a close watch for 
this type of activity and cataloged all such discussion no matter how inconsequential.105  
It seems that even though these officers discussed politics and joked about coup 
attempts, for the most part they limited their political activity to the officer’s mess.  
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The Zambianization process was moving along at a quick pace. In February 1968 
five Zambian officers passed the examination for promotion from captain to major, and 
it was expected that an additional thirty-eight would be eligible to take the exam in 
December 1968. The most senior Zambian officer in the Army, Maj. Patrick 
Kafumukache, took up the post of military secretary to the President of Zambia in May 
1968. This was the first of a number of high-level advisor positions to be awarded to 
Zambian officers.106 Part of the difficulty in placing Zambians in these positions was that 
it was necessary for the men in these posts to have Staff College training. Since Zambia 
did not have the capacity at the time to support a Staff College, as in almost all other 
cases men had to be sent overseas. There were plans in place to send five men to staff 
colleges in 1969, in Britain, Canada, and Pakistan. 107 The difficulty in sending men on 
these courses lay in making sure that by the time they were sent they had accrued 
enough field and operational experience to be able to learn and understand staff level 
functions.  
The June 1968 recruiting mission to India turned out to be a resounding success. 
They were able to recruit ten officers and sixty NCOs for service in the Army and 
another fifty-two for the Air Force. While the mission was successful in recruiting 
trained personnel, the British advisors were unsure how African troops would react to 
the influx of Asian officers and NCOs. As it turns out these fears proved unfounded, 
particularly as the Zambian government built up its defence relationship with both India 
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and Pakistan. This partnership proved to be increasingly important to the Zambia Army. 
Even though the SOFA was only signed in February 1968, by December the Zambian 
government had given its required twelve-month notice to terminate the agreement 
early.108 This initially came as a shock to both the military and diplomatic planners in the 
British government. The Zambianization of the army was incomplete, as was the training 
of the technical arms, and the Zambia Air Force was in no way ready to operate on its 
own, it did not even have a full compliment of Zambian pilots.109  
It came to light that the lack of Zambian pilots and the delayed delivery of jet 
aircraft to the Zambia Air Force was a major reason the agreement was terminated. The 
continued violations of Zambian airspace by both Portuguese and Rhodesian aircraft had 
become the most pressing defence concern for Kaunda and his cabinet. British 
instructors in the RAF component of the training team insisted on thorough and lengthy 
training courses for Zambian pilots by 1968 had produced only 12 fully qualified pilots. 
.110 The training team had also participated in running the ZAF. The government of 
Zambia had secretly entered into negotiations with the Italian government to provide jet 
aircraft and a training team to the ZAF. The Zambian Vice-President Simon Kapwepwe, 
boasted in an article in the Zambia Mail that where the British were only able to train 
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twelve personnel a year, the Italian training team would train 400 a year. Interestingly, 
the ZAF numbered only 500 personnel at the time.111  
The Zambian government was under pressure from all sides to reduce Britain’s 
role in their defence forces. The planning had already begun for the Non-Aligned 
Conference to take place in Lusaka in 1970, that same year Kenneth Kaunda was elected 
chair of the Organization of African Unity. All of these organizations were staunchly 
opposed to the British relationship with the Republic of South Africa and the lack of 
action on the Rhodesian issue. The Italian defence industry did well in this deal. In 
addition to training the ZAF, they were also secretly supplying aircraft to the Rhodesian 
Air Force.112  
Until 1969, British influence in shaping the Zambian Defence Forces had been 
almost total. However the Zambian decision to terminate the SOFA led to the departure 
of the remaining Army training team components in 1969. However there was not even 
an agreement in place regarding the end of the RAF portion of the training team until 
September 1969.113  RAF personnel finally departed Zambia in December 1969.  The 
impact on the Army was blunted by the fact that expatriate officers serving on contracts 
remained in Zambian service and far outnumbered the seconded British officers. 
Command of the Zambia Army remained in the hands of a contracted expatriate Briton, 
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Major General Tom Reid, yet his contract was due to expire in 1970, and a renewal was 
uncertain. However, the departure of British officers was not without its consequences. 
During the course of the year in 1969 the number of expatriate officers continued to fall 
and Zambians filled many of the posts vacated. According to the number of Zambian 
officers trained, the army was prepared for the departure of the British and expatriates, 
but in actuality it could not afford to lose the assistance that the training team provided. 
By the beginning of 1970 the number of expatriate officers and NCOs dwindled to sixty. 
Of the expatriates who remained in Zambian service many were of mediocre quality, 
disillusioned and/or simply waiting for their contracts to end.114  
Once British officers departed, many in the Zambia Army realized that they were 
not prepared to stand on their own. The most senior Zambian officers in the Army had 
only five years of service. The British High Commissioner to Zambia, Sir John Laurence 
Pumphrey, thought that the outlook for the Army was grim: “there is little doubt that 
Zambianization is moving too fast. The Zambian officers and NCOs are young and 
largely inexperienced in military matters. Above all, with a very few exceptions, they 
lack the power of leadership.”115  This lack of leadership combined with a playboy 
culture popular in the officer corps, made the focus for many Zambian officers social 
obligations rather than the more serious task of soldiering. A lack of discipline among 
officers, of course led to a discipline problem among the other ranks. Even though 
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British officers had not been serving as operational commanders for at least six months 
prior to their departure, their presence as training officers and staff officers within units 
allowed them to exercise a measure of oversight over such issues among the officers.  
The discipline and training problems in the Army did not improve in 1970 and 
1971.  When Major General Reid’s contract expired in December 1970 a Zambian 
officer was appointed to command the Army. Colonel Kingsley Chinkuli was promoted 
to the rank of Major General and became the first Zambian general officer.116 LtCol. 
Patrick Kafumukache, who had served as the Aide-de-Camp (ADC) to President 
Kaunda, was seen as a frontrunner for the position until he got drunk at a state dinner 
during a visit to the Caribbean.117 Chinkuli was one of the first three Zambian graduates 
of Sandhurst in 1965 and had rotated through company, battalion, and brigade 
commander billets prior to becoming army commander.  
It was at this same point in time that Kaunda summarily dismissed most of the 
European expatriate officers still serving in the Army. His decision to immediately 
Zambianize the entire army was a response to the return of a Conservative government 
to Britain and the possibility of British arms sales to South Africa. It seems, however, 
that the army was not completely Zambian---Indian officers were allowed to remain, as 
were technical specialists and medical officers.118  
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The Zambians also moved away from British equipment and weapons. The 
Yugoslavian government had grown quite interested in Zambia as a market for both 
construction materials and military hardware. Kaunda also was an admirer of Marshal 
Josip Tito. President Kaunda had expressly stated that Zambia could no longer buy arms 
from nations that supported racist regimes. This combined with the pressures of having 
been elected chairman of both the OAU and the Non-Aligned Movement led the 
Zambians to look east for arms suppliers.119 While the Zambian government was 
successful in changing arms suppliers to non-aligned nations, training assistance was a 
much more difficult task.   
When the Italian Air Force training team replaced the RAF, the language barrier 
immediately arose. Only three of the Italian trainers spoke English.  This problem was 
only compounded when Yugoslav Air Force officers came to Zambia to assist in the 
training effort.120 The quality of these trainers was questionable; in the first month that 
the Italian team was there an Italian instructor crashed one of the Beaver trainer aircraft. 
When the Zambian government figured out that the language issue was a significant 
barrier to progress they turned again to English speaking nations for assistance.  
The Zambian government did not intend to turn to communism; in fact they had 
a frosty relationship with both the Soviet Union and East Germany. Since the Zambians 
were not moving wholesale into the Eastern Bloc, Christopher Diggines, the Deputy 
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High Commissioner in Zambia, still thought HMG had an opportunity to preserve some 
level of influence in the military through training assistance in the United Kingdom. 
Zambian authorities, while eager for the British to leave Zambia, were not eager to give 
up the courses the British allowed them to attend in Britain. Diggines proposed that 
allowing Zambians to continue attending courses in Britain with few obligations 
attached to their attendance would help expose the strings that were attached to military 
aid from the Eastern Bloc. In doing so Diggines thought that the British might even be 
able to recover some orders for military hardware that they had lost to Yugoslavia.121  
Colonel Alexander R. Kettles, now Defence Advisor to the High Commissioner, 
noted that continued aid to Zambia would not be wasted “What is important to us,” he 
said, was that Zambia remain closely tied to the UK in terms of equipment and training, 
and that Zambia be “predisposed” to look to the UK for “support in all fields.”122The 
Zambia Army had been allocated three spots at RMA and nine spots at Mons in 1971. In 
addition to these they had been granted forty-two spots for officers in both staff- and line 
officers’ courses. Other ranks were also allocated fifty-one spots. The Zambian 
government on one hand wanted to pull away from Britain but from a practical 
standpoint could not seem to find any other provider of such quality and diverse training 
taught in English.  
Zambia confirmed this dependence in their bids for course allocations for 1972. 
They asked for 66 slots at various British schools. The British were keenly aware that 
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the Zambia Army was well under establishment. The situation had been worsened by the 
Zambian desire to form a new Anti-Aircraft battery and a fourth infantry battalion. In 
1971 the Army had also been designated to take over the administration of the Zambian 
Youth Service and a new National Service scheme.123 The push in the creation of 
officers was not simply to equip the expanding army but also to commission a large 
batch of officers before Zambia was forced to train officers on her own. By 1971 the 
Zambians had established an officer cadet school and began training the first intake. 
British analysis of the school, and the Zambian Army generally, led them to conclude 
these officers would probably be poor.124 
With these factors to consider the MOD was still only able to offer Zambia a 
fraction of the 1972 training allocations that she had requested. Zambia was offered 
eight for 1972, one less than had been allocated in 1971. While this seemed about like a 
diplomatic slap in the face from the British government based on the twenty-four the 
Zambians had requested, there were only three nations that received more spaces at 
Mons that year (Uganda, Nigeria, and Saudi Arabia). There were only fifteen Sandhurst 
slots available for cadets from Sub-Saharan Africa, and of those Zambia was given three 
for 1972.125  
William Wilson of the Central and Southern Africa Department of the Foreign 
and Commonwealth Office (FCO) made the case that training Zambian officers in 
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British institutions could counter communist influence, should the British be completely 
supplanted in Africa. Britain had important economic interests in both black and white 
governed countries in southern Africa and wanted to encourage détente between them. If 
the level of communist influence in the military of a frontline state became too great, the 
British felt that the region would become more polarized and violent. The suspicion was 
that the involvement of Cuban and Soviet forces in the area could escalate from financial 
and logistical support to the introduction of forces into the region.126  
The turn to the East for military assistance was beginning to cause a great deal of 
damage to the efficiency of the Zambia Army. Up until 1969 the Zambia Army had 
exclusively British military hardware; what they were trained on in Britain was what 
they were to use when they returned to Zambia. However, with the introduction of 
Eastern Bloc equipment, very few soldiers were properly trained to employ and maintain 
all of the various types of hardware that a Zambian unit possessed. The Zambia 
government was attempting to turn away from the British so quickly that they were not 
exercising any future logistical planning at all. They collected various pieces of 
equipment from a multitude of suppliers with little thought given to the ease of ordering 
replacement parts or integrating the hardware into their current order of battle.127  
By 1971, the Zambia Army was also much occupied dealing with security threats 
on every part of the border. The majority of the infantry companies in the Army were 
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deployed to border areas either to prevent incursions from the Rhodesians or the 
Portuguese. These rotations did not end on the border with Mozambique until 1975, 
Rhodesia in 1980, and Angola in 1990. With such a large percentage of the army 
actively engaged in operations, it made it nearly impossible to train or undertake a large 
brigade exercise.  
In addition to the lack of opportunities to train as large units, the Zambia Army 
was not impressed by the training teams brought in after the British. For example, in 
1971 a Chinese military training team secretly arrived in country and also sold the 
Zambians weapons such as the Chinese made version of the AKM assault rifle and other 
light infantry weapons. According to the 2IC of 2nd Battalion, Zambia Regiment, Francis 
Sibamba, the training was not very beneficial as the Chinese approached the issue as if 
the soldiers were untrained and could be molded from scratch. Their training syllabus 
was not prepared to deal with soldiers who had already been trained along western lines. 
According to Sibamba, “I am convinced that these foreign instructors also learnt a thing 
or two from their students on the conventional tactics of modern warfare in which the 
Zambia Army was well vested.”128 
 
Conclusion 
In spite of British military assistance, the turn by Zambia to the Non-aligned 
Powers was complete by 1972. Soviet style military hardware quickly replaced British 
supplied equipment, as the AKM became the standard issue rifle of the army. They 
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purchased BRDM Armored Reconnaissance Vehicles, and T-34 tanks from the 
Yugoslavia and China and the USSR sold Zambia the BM 122mm Rocket System.129 
While military suppliers from 1972 on were almost exclusively Eastern-Bloc nations, the 
Zambia government did not allow the military to become politicized. They continued to 
count on the Pakistani and Indian governments for training assistance. Indian officers 
that had been recruited in 1968 were not dismissed when the European expatriate 
officers were in 1970 and served out their contracts. A large number of Zambian officers 
attended higher-level courses in one of the two countries, and this type of English 
language instruction continued to be preferred to other training institutions.  
The Zambia Military Academy was officially established in 1972 as the primary 
commissioning sources for Zambian officers. The initial academy cadre had been posted 
to military schools around the world, including India, in preparation for the assignment.  
It was not until 1996 that Zambia was able to establish its own staff college. Eastern-
bloc training teams sent to Zambia from time to time trained special units of the army, 
for example a North Korean team trained the Zambian Commandos.130 
The British training mission in Zambia left the country in a poor set of 
circumstances. The dissatisfaction with the military assistance program was not the 
result of a poor relationship with the Zambian government but due to British policies on 
South Africa and Rhodesia. The army component of the British Joint Services Training 
Team acquitted themselves well according to both the British and Zambian 
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governments. Training in Zambia had begun after the independence of the East African 
nations, and at the very moment that weaknesses in those missions were identified. The 
British government had initially anticipated a long-term training mission in Zambia that 
would require a British presence in the country well into the 1970s. The East African 
mutinies of 1964 changed the way the British looked at their training plan. Prior to 1964 
they had emphasized quality training that was extremely time intensive. This type of 
arrangement kept white British officers serving in colonial armies for years after 
independence was achieved. The mutinies in East Africa made them reconsider this 
approach. They decided that timeliness had to be traded for quality military training.  
The military mission in Zambia was given a shorter time frame than others in East 
Africa, with the hope that the Zambia Army would be more loyal to the government if 
they felt they benefited from independence.  
The British mission in Zambia was not completely successful, was it a complete 
failure? While the new army was not nearly as professional as the British had hoped it 
would be, it was able to defend Zambia. There were numerous cases throughout the 
1970s where Rhodesian and South African forces inserted special operations units into 
Zambia, but at no point were they bold enough to send conventional troops against the 
Zambian forces. The Zambian military also remained relatively aloof from domestic 
politics, in comparison to some of its neighbors. Military officials in Zambia often are 
involved in politics after their retirement. While in service, however, such behavior was 
frowned upon by the majority of the officer corps. In 1973 the UNIP declared Zambia to 
be a one-party state, and even after this point military officers discouraged political 
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participation among their fellow officers.  In Africa, an indicator of military involvement 
in politics is generally the number and frequency of coups and coup attempts that occur. 
In Zambia, military coup attempts were made in 1980, 1989, 1990 and 1997. However 
all of these attempts were made by small factions in the military and put down by the 
Army at large before they were able to come close to taking power.131 By comparison to 
the role of the military in places like Uganda, this is an excellent record of civilian 
control of the army in a young nation.  
The British were not able to retain Zambia within their sphere of influence. The 
politics of the era in Southern Africa and the economic interests that were at stake made 
South Africa a divisive issue between the UK and Zambia.  Yet it is also important to 
note that the British left such a professional impression on the military that the Zambian 
officer corps saw itself as a part of the Western military tradition. This went further than 
simply a style of marching or uniform design but manifested itself in their approach to 
training and professionalism and how the Army saw itself in society. Technical 
knowledge from Communist and Non-aligned powers was happily accepted but 
Anglophone military norms and culture had been embraced and ingrained in the Zambia 
Army
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CHAPTER IV  
THE BUILDING BLOCKS OF THE ZIMBABWE NATIONAL ARMY: THE 
RHODESIAN ARMY AND THE LIBERATION FORCES 
 
Westerners have an idealized perception of the Rhodesian Army. Throughout the 
late 1970s, Soldier of Fortune Magazine published several sensational articles about the 
Rhodesian Army's special units, highlighting their elite nature and their supposed 
victories against “communism.” The magazine implied that the Rhodesian Army was 
made up of a small number of very professional white soldiers who nearly single-
handedly were able to hold back the threat of communism and protect Western values in 
Africa. This portrayal in such sensationalistic American publications seems to have 
mirrored how the Rhodesian settlers saw themselves. However, the reality of their army 
differed greatly from this popular perception.  
Since its establishment as a permanent force, the Rhodesian Army relied on a 
combination of European National Servicemen and professional African soldiers to fill 
its ranks.  While the Rhodesian government mandated that some young Europeans serve 
in the army, the government had to rely on volunteers from the African population to 
meet its recruiting goals.  In 1973, a time when the Zimbabwe War for Independence 
was escalating in intensity, the Rhodesian Army had already established itself as a 
Western-trained force with experience in both conventional and counter-insurgency 
operations.  At the same time, the forces of the liberation movements were attempting to 
create their own cohesive military units. Portions of the liberation movement were 
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training to fight a conventional war with the Rhodesians, whereas others were attempting 
to instigate a Maoist revolutionary spirit among the peasants. In order to understand the 
dynamic that was created in 1980 when all of these forces were combined, each of the 
contributing armies' war experiences must be taken into account. While there were other 
minor contributors to the military conflict in Rhodesia (such as the South African ANC 
and FRELIMO in Mozambique, the South African Defence Force, and the Portuguese 
Army), this chapter will focus only on the experiences of those organizations that 
eventually became a parts of the Zimbabwe National Army.  
 
Rhodesian Security Forces  
The Rhodesian military was a direct consequence of the spirit of conquest in 
Southern Africa that created the colony of Rhodesia. The British South Africa Company 
formed the British South Africa Company Police in 1893, shortly after they crushed the 
Ndebele regime, the main power in that region. This paramilitary organization took part 
in the ill-fated Jameson raid in 1895, and was the primary force used to put down the 
1896-97 Ndebele Rebellion. This rebellion, now known as the First Chimurenga (or 
liberation struggle) shaped the perception of the security policy in that colony. The 
European population became extremely concerned about the possibility and related 
expense of another uprising amoung the native African population. They ensured that the 
settler state had a monopoly on military training and organized violence in an attempt to 
avoid any similar incidents.  
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At this time, there were only a small number of Africans who were in the service 
of the colony, and these men were employed in a separate, segregated division of the 
British South Africa Native Police (the BSANP).  When the First World War came to 
Africa, the Rhodesians were eager to serve. The Rhodesian government formed the all-
European Rhodesia Regiment as its contribution to the war effort; however, the small 
European population in the colony was not able to provide replacements for the losses 
sustained by the regiment.  It was in response to this need that the Rhodesian authorities 
established the first large unit of armed Africans in Rhodesian history: the Rhodesian 
Native Regiment (the RNR).1 From 1916 until 1918 the RNR served the British Empire 
well in the East African campaign. However, upon the war's end, the regiment was 
quickly demobilized. From 1918 until 1940 the only armed African force in Rhodesia 
was the BSAP’s Askari Platoon. This small unit guarded Government House in 
Salisbury and provided instructors to the African Constable Training Depot of the 
BSAP.  
World War II brought with it a revival of the regular African infantry regiment in 
Rhodesia. The Rhodesia African Rifles unit was formed in 1940, and was a direct 
ideological descendent of the RNR. This all-African regiment saw active service in 
North Africa, Madagascar, and later in Burma. At the end of the war the regiment was 
demobilized, but it was reestablished once again in 1947.2 It went on to serve as the 
Rhodesian contribution to the Malayan Emergency, as well as in other Imperial defence 
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missions. When Southern Rhodesia entered the Federation of Rhodesia and Nyasaland, 
the RAR was the only regular infantry regiment in the small Southern Rhodesia Army.  
In the 1950s the European community continued to be compelled by the nation's 
Defence Acts to perform peacetime National Service in the Royal Rhodesia Regiment. 
This created a balancing act within the defence apparatus in Rhodesia; armed power was 
given to a small number of African military professionals, but steps were taken to ensure 
that every male member of the European community in Rhodesia was trained and ready 
for military service, should the need arise. The RAR was a one-battalion regiment, and 
would continue to be so until after the Unilateral Declaration of Independence (UDI) and 
the beginning of the liberation war.  
The Federation period ushered in a great deal of military expansion in Southern 
Rhodesia.  As has been mentioned above, the RRAF both expanded and modernized its 
equipment during this period. The R&N Army followed suit, establishing the Armored 
Car Squadron and adopting the modern FN FAL rifle as the standard issue battle rifle. In 
1950, many of the Southern Rhodesian special territorial units (such as engineers, 
artillery, and signals) suffered from a lack of supplies and qualified staff.3  The creation 
of the R&N Army allowed these units to be expanded into joint regular/territorial units 
in which regular officers staffed a portion of the unit and the unit was supplemented by 
the territorial component. This increased the level of technical skill of the army and gave 
it the opportunity to use weapons that had not previously been available.  
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The 1960s brought changes for both Africa and the army. The mutiny in the 
Congo of the Force Publique led to the establishment of the first all-European regular 
infantry regiment in the R&N Army, the Rhodesian Light Infantry (RLI). In addition to 
the RLI, the R&N Army also reestablished the “C” Squadron, the Rhodesian SAS, a unit 
that previously had been recruited from Rhodesia for service in Malaya. The RhSAS 
replaced the RAR as the Federation's contribution to imperial defence. In 1962, the “C” 
Squadron participated in military exercises in Aden with the 22nd SAS (the Artist Rifles). 
While the Rhodesians were enthusiastic about the training operation, their British 
counterparts were not impressed with their performance and declined to include them in 
the Middle East Command order of battle. The British Army required that the RhSAS 
undergo an additional year of training before they could be considered an operational 
unit by British standards.4 
The operational experience of the Rhodesian Army during the Federal period 
generally was limited to internal security operations. Due to the demands of internal 
security operations (and the fact that the small R&N Army was spread out across the 
Federation), it was extremely difficult for these forces to conduct anything larger than 
battalion training exercises. The focus of both the training exercises and official 
operations at the time was internal security and the provision of support to the civil 
authorities; however, the Chief of the Imperial General Staff made it clear that the 
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Army's lack of preparedness for limited war conflicts had to change.5 In 1962 the R&N 
Army reorganized itself from a regional command structure to a brigade structure. The 
two brigades were located in Southern Rhodesia and Northern Rhodesia, with the forces 
in Nyasaland falling under the North Rhodesian brigade's HQ.  The plan was that this 
would make it easier for units in the Brigade areas to conduct joint training; however, it 
actually made it much easier for the R&N Army to be divided up because operational 
control of the units in each territory was granted to their respective brigade HQs.  
The Federal era gave the army access to a level of funding not previously 
available to them. The prosperous copper industry in North Rhodesia provided tax 
revenue that allowed for the expansion and modernization of the army. It also allowed 
for a renewed emphasis on the Territorial Force.  While the concept of a Territorial 
Force is similar to that of the British Territorial Army or the U.S. Army National Guard, 
British defence advisors made sure to note that the Territorial Force in Rhodesia was 
very different. “It is misleading to make too close a comparison between the TF and the 
British TA. Although the system of drill halls and training are very similar the RN Army 
is kept to a much higher state of readiness for internal security operations. It is possible 
to call up units of the TF at very short notice by proclamation of the Governor General.”6  
Participation in the Rhodesian Federation TF was not limited to Europeans.  Mandatory 
service was also required from the Asian and native African populations. The Rhodesian 
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government continued this practice of mandatory service even after the Federation was 
dissolved.  
The Federation government was able generously to fund the Army Cadet 
program in Rhodesian schools catering to European students. Participation in these 
schools was mandatory for all boys ages fourteen to eighteen.  Generally, Cadet 
companies would meet one day a week for four hours of training. The training consisted 
of weapons training, rifle range shooting, some field craft, battle drills using blank 
ammunition, and tactics up to the platoon level.7 In addition to their normal training on 
campus, students were expected to attend a seven-day battalion camp each year in the 
summer. Prior to the creation of the Federation Cadet program, summer camps often 
were abandoned due to lack of funds; however, between 1953 and 1963 a Cadet Camp 
was held every summer. When these boys left secondary school, they generally went 
directly into their National Service training. In 1962, for example roughly 1,800 
Europeans were presented for service.  Of these, 540 were granted deferments, 237 were 
rejected on medical grounds, and 1,083 became effective soldiers.8 From the time these 
European boys were twelve years old they were prepared by the Rhodesian government 
to enter the Army either as a territorial or as a professional. All Rhodesian men who 
were fit for service were required to undergo some sort of military training.  The time for 
this training was when the boys were aged twelve to twenty; their obligation was 
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satisfied when they finished their four years service with the RRR. After UDI and as the 
Liberation War escalated, this obligation to the Rhodesian government was repeatedly 
extended.  
When the Federation was dissolved, the armed forces divided up the territory.  
Southern Rhodesia (now simply referred to Rhodesia) received the largest share. The 
RLI and RAR formed the core of the Rhodesian Army and were backed up by support 
provided by the old R&N Army.  Since the TF was composed primarily of Europeans, it 
also was transferred to Rhodesia. Even though the equipment allocated to the armored 
car squadron of the R&N Army was divided equally between Rhodesia and Zambia, 
most of the soldiers from the unit transferred into the Rhodesian Army. From this group 
of transferees, the Rhodesian Army formed a new Rhodesian Armored Car Regiment. In 
the early part of 1963, the Chiefs of Staff Committee suggested that the RAR be 
abandoned in favor of the establishment of two long-service (twelve month National 
Service periods) TFs. The thought was that the “Askari must therefore be regarded as an 
unacceptable security risk in the [combat arms] units, which can only be replaced by 
Europeans. We recognize however, that Africans will continue to be employed in 
administrative units.”9 With the reestablishment of the Rhodesian Army, however, 
nothing was prohibited.  
The British were concerned that, upon the dissolution of the Federation, 
European members of the Federal Army would flock south leaving the Northern 
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territories undefended. Even though the Rhodesian Army did attract more former 
Federal officers than the Northern territories, it still had trouble recruiting enough 
European personnel to meet operational requirements. According to the first post-
Federation defence report, the Chief of the General Staff, MajGen. R.R.J. Putterill, 
noted, “Filling the establishment of the new Army has presented many problems. Due to 
the attractive terminal benefits offered, many members elected to be released from the 
Rhodesia and Nyasaland Army, and the Southern Rhodesia Army started well below its 
authorized establishment in both European and African personnel.”10 Due to this 
apparent lack of enthusiasm for service in Rhodesia, the Defence Staff believed that they 
would not be able to man the RLI properly until 1966. This recruiting challenge was 
compounded by the RLI’s transition from a regular infantry battalion to a commando 
unit with airborne capabilities. This expansion required higher physical standards and 
soldiers willing to volunteer for airborne duty.11  
The RhSAS Squadron also suffered from personnel shortages between 1963 and 
1965. The squadron had only become operational in 1963, and by 1964 the number of 
soldiers serving in the unit had dropped to twenty.12 The difficulties with finding 
European manpower made the disbandment of the RAR impossible. Rhodesian 
authorities had no problem recruiting African soldiers; the manpower pool seemed 
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limitless and was significantly cheaper. The Rhodesian Ministry of Defence went so far 
as to suggest that the Army form another battalion of the RAR. Even though the 
suggestion was being made as early as 1963, the 2nd Battalion of the RAR was not 
formed until 1975, specifically due to a lack of funds.13  
The Rhodesian Army did not rely as heavily upon commissioning sources in 
Britain as some other British colonies did. The larger settler community in Rhodesia, as 
compared to Kenya, allowed for the establishment of an officer cadet school at the 
School of Infantry in Gwelo. This school produced the majority of the officers needed by 
Rhodesian Army; even so, the Rhodesians did send a handful of cadets to Sandhurst 
each year. Once Rhodesia separated from the Federation, the government made no effort 
whatsoever to recruit Africans into the officer corps. As was the case in other 
Commonwealth countries, European men 18 years of age and with a GSE were eligible 
to apply for officer training.  
The regular officer course at Gwelo was one year in length, and mirrored the 
curriculum at Mons and RMA. There were three phases in the course, each putting an 
increasing amount of leadership responsibility on the individual officer cadet. Phase One 
was roughly two months long and consisted of the normal basic training given to all 
soldiers in the Army. In addition to the field craft and weapons training in Phase One, 
officer cadets were required to take classes in current events, leadership, and military 
history. These included visits to RRAF bases, the BSAP HQ in Salisbury, and factories 
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in Gwelo. This phase ended with a series of written exams, followed by a weeklong 
escape and evasion (E&E) exercise.14  
The second phase of the officer course was four months long and addressed 
duties more specific to the role of officer. This military training included platoon-level 
battle drills, the use of crew-served weapons, and riot control procedures. At this point in 
the course cadets were rotated in and out of platoon and company commander positions 
and had their performances evaluated. The focus of the classroom and field training 
during this phase was classic conventional warfare. Leadership training included courses 
on administration, military law, and additional instruction on military history. At the end 
of the phase, written examinations were held on all of these subjects; there also was an 
oral exam on classical war tactics. The final exam for this phase was a major classical 
war exercise in which each student was graded on his performance as a platoon leader, 
company commander, or company second in command. 15  
The first two phases were very similar to the officer training offered in most 
Western armies, with a focus on classical military operations.  The third phase was 
centered on training officers to perform in counter-insurgency operations (COIN). This 
third phase lasted four months and covered subjects such as joint operations, civil-action 
programs, combat tracking, and the use of close support aircraft. The field training 
during this phase required cadets to plan company-level COIN operations leading 
regular troops. The students also continued to receive courses on military law, staff 
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duties, and military history. The cadets were given a weeklong bush survival course 
where they were required to live off the land without shooting any game. The cumulative 
field exercise was a ten day COIN exercise where African soldiers posed as enemy 
guerilla fighters.  All of the branches of the Rhodesian security forces participated in this 
exercise, and efforts were made to impress upon the cadets the joint nature of this type of 
warfare. After the final field training exercise the cadets were sent on a ten day visit to 
South Africa to become familiar with the South African Defence Force (SADF). It was 
explained to cadets that the Rhodesian Army did not have the capacity to fight a large 
scale conventional conflict on its own, and they would need the support of South Africa 
if they were to do so. During the visit the cadets toured the Army, Navy, and Air Force 
facilities and became familiar with the organizational structure and deployment system 
of the SADF.  
Once the cadets graduated from the School of Infantry, they were commissioned 
as second lieutenants and posted to their respective units. Those graduates who went to 
infantry units were considered fully trained (except for those officers who were posted to 
the RLI and thus required parachute training).  The new officers posted to engineering, 
artillery, or other support units were required to undergo further training at other Army 
installations; if the training was extremely specialized they were sent on to courses in the 
UK prior to 1965, and to South Africa thereafter.16 For example, in 1965 there were two 
junior officers who attended technical courses in the UK: one at the Ammunition 
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Technical Officers course, and the other at the Signal Officers Qualifying course.17 
Officer training in Rhodesia was comparable to most military courses of instruction in 
the Western armies, and held officer cadets to a high standard of professionalism. As a 
point of comparison, in the 1960s Officer Candidate School in the US Army was only 
five and a half months long.  
The events of 1965 ended up taxing the resources of the Rhodesian military. The 
Unilateral Declaration of Independence severed all military and political ties with the 
UK. Officers and cadets who were training in Britain were forced to declare their 
allegiance, either to the crown or to the Rhodesian cause.  Commanders of training 
institutions were instructed to withdraw all personnel in training who were members of 
the Rhodesian forces or who held Rhodesian citizenship. They were allowed to choose 
between repatriation to Rhodesia, or to file an application to transition into the British 
Army. There were five Rhodesian individuals training in UK military institutions at the 
time of UDI.  Of these five, only two asked to transfer to the British Army. There also 
were two men from the RRAF in the UK at the time; only one opted to remain in the UK 
and transfer to the RAF.18  
British personnel who were filling training or technical positions in Rhodesia 
were withdrawn from the now renegade colony. Interestingly, a small defence 
relationship remained between Britain and Rhodesia. Since the foundation of the British 
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Land Forces Kenya (BLFK), some men from that command were sent to take courses in 
Rhodesia.  This procedure was perceived as more convenient than sending men back to 
the UK. For a short time after UDI the BLFK continued to send British soldiers to attend 
schools in Rhodesia.19 With the end of the defence relationship between Rhodesia and 
the UK, the Rhodesian government was forced to search for new suppliers of weapons 
and training. The sanctions placed on Rhodesia by the UK and the UN made this 
somewhat difficult. During the course of the rebellion against the United Kingdom, no 
nation officially recognized Rhodesia. However, both the Portuguese and South African 
governments were sympathetic to Rhodesia's position and were willing to assist them. 
The Portuguese hoped to prop up the Rhodesian government so that territory would not 
become another potential safe haven for guerillas. The South Africans hoped to maintain 
the buffer zone to the north against the infiltration of nationalist forces.  
The South African government became Rhodesia’s main supplier of defence 
materials, as well as other products banned by the sanctions. The British government 
sent warships to the coast of Mozambique to enforce the sanctions and prevent 
petroleum products from being offloaded in Beria. The Beria Patrol, as it was known, 
was successful in preventing some tankers from docking in Beria, yet it was not effective 
in blocking the supply of petroleum products to landlocked Rhodesia. Rather than 
receiving their supply from Beria, the Rhodesians began importing oil (and almost 
everything else) from South Africa. Pretoria was not alone in ignoring the sanctions.  
The United States continued to buy chromium from Rhodesia until the late 1970s, and 
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governments throughout Europe were willing to set up "back door" deals with the 
Rhodesians.20  
In the first several years after UDI, the insurgency was limited and the Rhodesian 
authorities considered it a police problem. The BSAP viewed the issue as one of small-
scale terrorism; they took the lead and the military provided assistance on a case by case 
basis. At this point in the war, operations were small enough that the regular Army was 
able to handle almost all of the operational duties, with limited help from specialist units 
in the TF. The first incident of the liberation war actually occurred prior to UDI. In July 
of 1964, a group of five ZANU members crossed into Rhodesia from Zambia and killed 
a Rhodesian of Afrikaner descent, Pieter Oberholzer. The group that claimed 
responsibility called themselves the Crocodile Gang. The killing was part of a series of 
acts of sabotage and arson directed against the Rhodesian government. While the event 
did not achieve iconic status in the story of Zimbabwean independence, it was extremely 
important to the European community.21 Author and former member of the Rhodesian 
Security Forces, Peter Godwin, witnessed the aftermath of the event and remarked that 
seeing the body lying with the knife still in it brought an end to his childhood sense of 
security.22 Again, this matter was treated as an isolated incident and as a matter for the 
police. 
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A significant percentage of the Rhodesian military were dedicated Rhodesian 
Front supporters. In 1967 LtCol. R. Wilson, head of the School of Infantry, resigned 
from the Rhodesian Army and fled to London.  He claimed he no longer sympathized 
with the Rhodesian cause and decided to take advantage of the generous terms offered 
by HMG to Rhodesian Army officers and civil servants who were fired or felt compelled 
to resign on political grounds.23 He was debriefed by both the FCO and the MOD when 
he arrived in London and gave the British government a detailed description of the 
politics at work inside the Rhodesian Army.   
He identified three groups of officers within the Rhodesian Army: those who 
were fiercely loyal to the regime, a middle group who generally tried only to ensure 
continued employment and eventual retirement for themselves, and an anti-regime 
group. Most of the officers who commanded major units were also thought to be loyal to 
the RF regime. The short list of officers who were against the regime included the GOC 
at the time, MajGen. Sam Putterill, as well as the commander of the First Brigade, 
Brigadier Robert Prentice. These were the only two notable opponents to the regime on 
the list; the rest of the men were minor staff officers.  Even MajGen. Putterill was quiet 
about his opposition to the regime, because he knew that the Army, as a whole, would 
not support him against the government.24 Putterill rebuffed the attempts of the British 
representative stationed in Rhodesia to contact him. He made it clear that unless the 
British government had something specific to say to him he did not wish to meet, 
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regardless of how well concealed the meeting might be.  During his time in service, 
Putterill confined his acts of resistance to the regime to butting heads with Clifford 
DuPont, the Officer Administrating the Government.25  
 The British considered the junior officers and other ranks in the Army to be avid 
supporters of the Rhodesian Front government.  This is particularly true of those 
individuals who joined the regular forces after UDI; few doubted that their loyalties were 
to Rhodesia first and the British crown second, if at all. In 1967 the operational demands 
on the military increased to a point where the large-scale involvement of the TF was 
required. The peacetime National Service scheme, set in place by the Federal Defence 
Act of 1955, had continued under the federal model. However, the way in which training 
and territorial service were carried out had changed dramatically over the years.  
The Depot of the Royal Rhodesia Regiment handled all initial entry training for 
National Servicemen entering the Army. By 1967, the Depot averaged eight intakes of 
150 trainees per year. The training period was four and a half months long; however, at 
the beginning of each intake twelve trainees were selected for special training. Of this 
group three were selected to attend officer training and three NCO training. The other six 
were placed in engineer, artillery, medical, or signals training. Those trainees selected to 
become officers and NCOs were put through their respective training courses 
concurrently with their intake work.  At the end of the four and a half month cycle, the 
                                                
25 TNA, PRO, FCO 36/24, 3, ‘Rhodesian Armed Forces Loyalty.’ Since the Governor of Rhodesia, Sir 
Humphrey Gibbs, refused to leave his post and remained loyal to the crown, Ian Smith created a position 
to supplant him. Deputy Prime Minister Clifford DuPont was appointed Officer Administrating the 
Government and performed and served as de facto Governor until 1970 when Rhodesia declared itself a 
republic. At this point DuPont was appointed to the post of President of Rhodesia.  
  167 
newly minted 2nd lieutenants and sergeants returned to the intake groups with which they 
started, in order to serve as those groups' leadership cadre. The other change from the 
previous system was that these men were sent directly to their operational duties. At the 
end of their training period the intake group, now reformed as a company, was sent 
either to Wankie or Kariba where they served in the field for fourteen weeks before 
being released to their respective TF battalions.26 
Admittedly, during this period of the war of liberation there were few 
confrontations between Rhodesian forces and the guerilla fighters.  Most of the time that 
these young men spent out in the field was filled with hours of uneventful patrolling 
through the bush. One former National Serviceman commented that his first period of 
operational service was defined by long days and night of endless walking, followed by 
several days of rugby matches and drinking at the local pub.27 Even though many 
soldiers grew bored with their duties, there was enough guerilla infiltration on the border 
to cause the government some concern. There was another unexpected turn in 1967.  
Instead of holding their annual battle camps, active TF units were ordered to perform 
operational service in Tribal Trust lands and on the Rhodesian border.  
The increasing dependence on the TF for operational duties meant that there was 
a continuous shortage of regular instructors for the training courses. The South Africans 
agreed to send the Rhodesians two Warrant Officers to serve as instructors at the School 
of Infantry: one at the School of Engineering and one at the School of Signals. They also 
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allowed an increasing number of Rhodesian officers to attend the South African Defence 
College, since Camberly was no longer an option.28 In exchange for their services, South 
African special operations soldiers were allowed to utilize Rhodesian parachute training 
facilities and drop zones.29 In 1967, the dependence on the SADF was not all-
encompassing, but it was rapidly growing. This was the same year that ANC guerillas 
were caught infiltrating Rhodesia in an attempt to reach South Africa. The response from 
Pretoria was to send 2,000 paramilitary South Africa Police to patrol the northern border 
of Rhodesia. While the Rhodesian government readily accepted this assistance for both 
the security and political benefits, Rhodesian soldiers were less than enthusiastic about 
their presence.  
At the time some groups like the Anti-Apartheid Movement claimed that the 
South African Police committed to Rhodesia were simply soldiers who had been given 
police uniforms. In some cases, this was true.  For instance, the South African pilots who 
flew the “police” helicopters sent to Rhodesia were almost always South African Air 
Force pilots.30 However, these units were of questionable quality.  LtCol. Ron Marillier 
noted:  
These men had been given basic training in drill and weapons via their own training 
programmes, but had had no training in tactics, and certainly not in counter insurgency. 
So we had to give them crash courses in additional weapons training, field craft, section 
and platoon battle drills, counter insurgency patrols techniques, air to ground 
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cooperation etc. We had a very short period in which to train these men to take their 
place in the field, under Rhodesian Army command.31 
 
Early on, these units were sent to quiet areas to patrol.  However, as the intensity of the 
war picked up they were required to patrol active combat zones. While some of these 
SAP companies did do their jobs well, many were considered poor quality units and 
given little responsibility.  
Throughout 1967 and 1968, the liberation movements had some success in 
sending large infiltration units into Rhodesia. Even though some units were able to make 
it into the country undetected, they did not perform well fighting against the Rhodesian 
Army in terms of platoon or company strength. By the end of 1968, 160 liberation 
fighters and twelve members of the security forces had been killed. Sending large 
military units into Rhodesia was not producing the kind of results that the liberation 
movements desired. Furthermore, they could not continue to sacrifice so many trained 
men. The military arm of ZANU, the Zimbabwe African National Liberation Army 
(ZANLA), turned to the Chinese for both aid and inspiration. ZANLA decided that 
rather than using a Che Guevara style “Foco” approach to the liberation war, a Maoist 
insurgency might be better suited to liberate their country.32  Subsequently, ZANLA 
would transition into a period where they repeatedly tried to insert small armed groups 
into the country to mobilize the peasantry. In 1969 and 1970, when the liberation armies 
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began changing their approach to the war, guerilla activity slackened, giving the 
Rhodesian government the sense that they were winning the war. 
The Rhodesian Army continued to train despite the operational constraints under 
which it operated. Overseas recruiting continued to be an important source of manpower 
for the regular Army. Young men with no prior military experience were recruited from 
countries as close as Botswana, where two eighteen year olds from the European 
community there volunteered for officer training.33 Recruits came from all over the 
world, but with widely varying amounts of military training. Peter McAleese was a 
British subject who had previously served with the Parachute Regiment in Cyprus, the 
SAS in Aden and Indonesia, and later as a mercenary in Angola. He applied to join the 
Rhodesian Army in 1976.  Even though he had an extensive military record and was 
extremely qualified, he was almost turned away because he had been a mercenary. He 
was allowed to join the Army, but was required to undergo the Rhodesian SAS selection 
process as a private in spite of his having been an NCO in the British SAS.  
The group with whom he went through selection was quite multi-national: there 
were South Africans, Australians, and one of the instructors was an American. After he 
passed selection and became part of an operational team in the regiment, he noticed that 
many of the Rhodesian NCOs were immature and, at times, arbitrary with the use of 
their authority. He did not resent having to serve as a private, but recalled on one 
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occasion that a Rhodesian sergeant had asked him to shoot a civilian.  Deliberately, he 
missed.  
According to McAleese the pay in the Rhodesian Army was quite poor.  Even 
though he reached the rank of staff sergeant his lifestyle remained very modest. By 
1978, the Rhodesian SAS had a large number of expatriates serving in the regiment.  
McAleese said that of the forty men in A Squadron, thirty-three were expatriates.34  
McAleese’s comments on the Rhodesian NCOs were not without merit. Those 
soldiers who were selected at the beginning of their National Service period for service 
as NCOs did not receive much more in the way of additional training. They were taught 
how to give battle orders for patrols, general leadership principles, and the duties of 
platoon and section leaders. Their initial training course ended with an evaluation of the 
NCO candidates which determined what rank they would be given, between lance 
corporal and sergeant. The regular Army system of promotion was much different. The 
RAR, RLI, and RhSAS selected men with extensive experience who they thought had 
leadership potential, and sent these men to attend regimental Junior NCO courses. These 
courses were two months long.  Upon graduation, the graduating soldier was promoted 
to lance corporal. The regular courses were more in-depth than the National Service 
course and held the men to a higher standard (since they were already experienced 
soldiers). After reaching the rank of corporal, the Army required those interested in 
promotion to senior NCO ranks to take a promotion exam and attend further courses.  
These courses included the Junior and Senior NCO Drill, and the Junior and Senior NCO 
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Weapons/Tactics Course. If a soldier was able to pass the promotion exam and attend the 
requisite courses, they were promoted (based on the needs of the Army).35 Since soldiers 
were able to volunteer for service in the regular Army from the TF, the standard of 
training among NCOs varied from highly experienced to "wet behind the ears."  
In 1970, Rhodesia completely severed her relationship with the crown when the 
unrecognized state declared itself a republic. The move was a reaction to the failure of 
another round of talks with the British government. Ken Flower, the head of the 
Rhodesian Central Intelligence Organization, said that the “government propaganda 
sought to convince the electorate that if Rhodesia could afford to reject the best terms 
Britain could offer, then why not sever all links?”36 The chiefs of both the Rhodesian 
Army and the RRAF opposed the move.  Major General Putterill sent a letter to Prime 
Minister Ian Smith detailing his opposition: “There is a worthy tradition of keeping our 
Forces non-political. A Republic declared in existing circumstances would be a political 
act, and our acceptance of it would commit our forces politically.”37 The declaration of a 
republic was the breaking point for Putterill, and he retired from the Army to become a 
vocal opponent of the government until the end of the Smith regime.  
Although this was a significant political development, it did not have a dramatic 
impact on the course of the military conflict. Only a handful of officers resigned or 
retired after the declaration of the republic, demonstrating that the Rhodesian Front had a 
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much higher level of support in the armed forces in 1970 than it did in 1967.38 There 
were still a number of attempts by the British government to bring a peaceful end to the 
Rhodesian standoff. In 1970, when Edward Heath’s government was elected, the 
Rhodesians reached out to the British to see if some deal could be made. Since 1964, 
Smith had been trying to get the British to agree to grant Rhodesia independence on the 
basis of the 1961 Rhodesian Constitution. This document gave enormous power to the 
European population and set an extremely slow pace for the implementation of majority 
rule. The Smith government insisted that this was a fair and equitable way to solve the 
situation; he also claimed that the African population of Rhodesia would accept the 1961 
Constitution. Heath’s government agreed that if the African population truly did want 
independence on these terms, then it would acquiesce.  
A royal commission headed by Lord Pearce was dispatched to Rhodesia in 1972 
to take the pulse of the African and European population on this issue. The commission 
was able to poll about six percent of the population, and determined that an 
overwhelming majority of Africans would not accept independence under the 1961 
Constitution.39 While the Pearce Commission was touring Rhodesia, there was an 
increase in urban violence and unrest. African students, for example, expressed their 
discontent by stoning police vehicles or rioting. Ken Flower assured both the Rhodesian 
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and British governments that the BSAP had things well in hand.40 However, neither he 
nor Ian Smith anticipated that the war was about to escalate. 
 During 1970 and 1971, ZANLA began infiltrating Rhodesia from Mozambique 
and establishing a guerilla network in the eastern region of the country. It was not until 
November 1972, when the Army intercepted a large ZANLA column in Mzarabani 
Tribal Trust Land, that the government in Salisbury realized how much progress the 
guerillas had made.41 After this point in the war, the military knew that additional 
manpower was required.  The period of National Service was increased from nine to 
twelve months in 1972.42 Call-ups of the TF units also increased after 1972. The military 
could not sustain itself through an expansion of National Service alone. In 1973, the 
RAR formed a second battalion to meet the dramatic increase in operational tempo. The 
added advantage for the government was that African troops were significantly cheaper 
to field than European soldiers. In May of 1973, the government established the first "no 
go" area in the country along the Mozambique border. This area was barred to civilians 
in an attempt to create a free-fire zone for the security forces. Anyone who was not part 
of the Rhodesian Security Forces found inside the "no go" area was considered a 
guerilla.43  
One of the most successful aspects of the British counterinsurgency campaign in 
Malaya was the separating of the populace from the guerilla forces. In 1973, the 
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Rhodesian government embarked on a similar effort to prevent a Maoist insurgency 
from receiving assistance from the peasant population.  Wickus de Kock, the Minister 
for Security, announced the beginning of a pilot-protected villages scheme at the end of 
the year. Africans in newly established "no go" zones were forcibly removed from their 
homes and resettled in the new protected villages (PV). The PVs were fenced in and a 
strict curfew was in place. Administration and defence of the PVs was the responsibility 
of the Ministry of Internal Affairs (IA). Prior to the escalation of the war in 1972, IA 
personnel did not receive military training because their primary duty was administration 
of the African TTLs.  As the war spread throughout the country, however, the IA service 
became a paramilitary force.44  
A training depot was established at Chikurubi Prison for both white and black IA 
personnel. Trainers from the RLI were seconded to the depot until a sufficient number of 
IA men were sent through the Army Infantry Training Officer course.  In this course, 
training focused completely on counterinsurgency and was mostly defensive in nature. 
The course itself was only four weeks long, and the training was plagued by a severe 
lack of equipment and accommodations. During the first year the training staff had to 
share accommodations with the trainees because there were no available separate 
quarters on the prison grounds.45 The responsibility for military operations was spread 
across the government, from the Air Force to the Internal Affairs department.  This 
meant that once the conflict was over, the British government overlooked men who had 
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significant amounts of both military training and experience, but who were not 
recognized as being in the Army and potential training assets. Men with this kind of 
experience could have been utilized to train the new Zimbabwean Army, however 
paramilitary forces were demobilized before they could be made a part of the training 
mission.  
By the end of 1973, 8,000 people had been moved from the "no go" areas. The 
transit camps and protected villages became well known for their poor conditions and 
inadequate security. Public health crises were common, and the guerilla element often 
infiltrated the lightly-defended villages. Over the course of the conflict, almost 250,000 
Africans were resettled in either consolidated or protected villages.46 The scheme cleared 
of citizens many parts of the country so that the security forces could operate freely, but 
this redistribution of the population did not prove to be the solution the government 
hoped it would be. This tactic gave security forces an advantage on a local level. 
However, it proved to be the beginning of larger strategic problems that began to 
confront the Rhodesians in the late 1970s.  
 
Tactical success, strategic failure 
The Rhodesian Army invested a great deal of effort into what they called Fire 
Force tactics. Developed in 1974, this was their major tactical innovation of the war. 
When ground units located a guerilla element, they would radio back to the regional 
headquarters for reinforcement. The Fire Force element, which was always on standby, 
                                                
46 Weinrich, “Strategic Resettlement in Rhodesia,” 207. 
  177 
was flown into the area via helicopters and deployed as a blocking force that allowed the 
ground-based units to push the guerillas out of the designated areas. While these 
elements maneuvered into place, a helicopter gunship would circle above and harass the 
guerillas, and a command helicopter would direct the movements of the ground forces.  
As the war progressed, the Rhodesians transitioned from using helicopter insertions of 
the blocking forces, to airborne insertions of the forces. This tactic allowed the 
Rhodesians to make the most of their resources because they did not have enough 
manpower to completely cover the terrain.47  
The Rhodesians also experimented extensively with pseudo-operations. These 
tactics were pioneered in Kenya during the emergency. Former Mau Mau fighters were 
convinced to work with British forces.  They were retrained and equipped and put back 
in the field with soldiers from the KAR and white officers. These units were known as 
"pseudo-gang;" they patrolled through the countryside posturing as Mau Mau gangs and 
attempted to gather intelligence. Rhodesian Special Branch experimented with using 
“turned” guerilla fighters as pseudo-gangs, to some success. In 1973 the Central 
Intelligence Organization (CIO), in partnership with the security forces, formed a multi-
racial Army unit specifically tasked with pseudo-operations: the Selous Scouts.48 This 
unit was partially funded by South African Security Branch and occasionally had South 
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African Police personnel attached to their operations.49 Interestingly, this was the first 
unit in which African and European men served in the ranks together. It was also the 
first unit in which African NCOs were given power over European soldiers.50 Even 
though this unit seemed very progressive by Rhodesian standards, the officers were still 
all white until 1979.  
The Rhodesian government did not eschew conducting what were called 
"external operations." These were missions that crossed over national borders and 
attacked guerilla bases inside other countries; Zambia, Botswana, and Mozambique were 
the most frequent targets.  These operations generally were spearheaded by the special 
operations formations within the Rhodesian Army, with support provided by other 
elements. Between 1973 and 1976, these raids were conducted clandestinely. They were 
small in scale and generally targeted groups of a dozen or so guerillas.  These small 
missions into bordering countries often could be denied by the Rhodesian government 
because little evidence was left behind.  However, as the war escalated so did the need to 
make a larger impact on the guerilla forces. The RhSAS and the Selous Scouts led these 
operations, at times with assistance from the RLI. These units generally did not work 
together for these operations. In 1976, the Selous Scouts launched Operation Eland.  
This raid on a large ZANLA camp in Nyadzoya, Mozambique resulted in over 1,000 
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killed by the Selous Scouts.51 The RhSAS commanders were not informed about the 
operation and were irritated that they had not been asked to contribute.  
The RhSAS launched an extensive operation in early 1977 against Chimoio, 
Mozambique, another large ZANLA base. This operation included dropping 
paratroopers from the RhSAS and the RLI while planes from the Rhodesian Air Force 
bombarded the camp. The Rhodesian planner estimated that there were as many as 9,000 
guerillas and trainees in the area. After the operation ended, they estimated that over 
1,200 were killed and countless others wounded.52 By 1976, these highly publicized 
raids gave way to a policy of "hot pursuit" by regular forces. Rhodesian Army units 
followed guerillas beyond Rhodesian borders if they were actively engaged in a fight 
with the enemy. These policies worried both the frontline states and South Africa.53  
The political situation grew worse as the war escalated. One of Rhodesia’s few 
allies, Portugal, gave up the fight in 1975 to retain her own colonies. The Carnation 
Revolution, a military coup by junior Army officers, brought down the Estado Novo and 
returned Portugal to democracy.54 The Portuguese people were tired of war; 11,000 
metropolitan Portuguese soldiers had been killed and another 30,000 wounded. By June 
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of 1975, the Portuguese had withdrawn from Mozambique and FRELIMO took control 
of the government.  With the Portuguese gone, FRELIMO was able to assist actively the 
Zimbabwean liberation movements by providing a safe haven of operation and a port to 
receive equipment.   
Around this same time, the commitment of South Africa to Rhodesia was starting 
to wane. B.J. Vorster’s attempt at détente with the African frontline states had significant 
consequences for Rhodesia. The South African Police force that had been deployed 
along the Zambezi was withdrawn in 1975 as an act of good faith on South Africa’s part.  
The South Africans left most of their equipment for the Rhodesians to use, and their 
helicopter pilots remained.  This was, however, a significant blow to the Rhodesian 
defence system. Even though many of the South African companies were of marginal 
quality, they still provided a measure of protection simply by their presence.  
With the majority of the South African forces gone, the Rhodesians had to find 
some way to meet their manpower shortfalls. One of the immediately apparent ways of 
doing that was to change the required National Service period. A new National Service 
Act was passed in 1976, and the initial service period was extended from twelve to 
eighteen months. The opportunities for service were expanded as well, from only the 
Army and the Air Force to include the BSAP and IA. The period of three years of 
service in the TF, following the initial service period, remained unchanged. However, it 
was not simply Rhodesian citizens who were liable for service now; it was all European, 
Asian, and Coloured residents between the ages of eighteen and twenty-five. The Act 
defined "resident" as any male inhabitant who had lived in the country continuously for 
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six months or more.55 There also were significant safeguards put in place to keep young 
men and families from fleeing Rhodesia. Limits were placed on the amount of money 
that could be taken out of the country, and European men between the ages of sixteen 
and twenty-five who had not completed the first phase of service were not allowed to 
leave the country without government permission.  
 
Volunteers from abroad 
The extended period of National Service and the increasing use of the TF in an 
operational role began to take a significant toll on the country's economy. The effects of 
sanctions also were becoming more noticeable by the late 1970s, and continuous TF 
call-ups taxed the civilian workforce.  After 1973, the Rhodesian government was able 
to tap into new sources of recruits for their regular forces. The attention brought to 
Rhodesia by the international press, as well as the US withdrawal from the Vietnam 
War, left a pool of trained soldiers with combat experience seeking victory against 
communism that they missed in Vietnam. Not only were some Americans attracted to 
the ongoing fight in Rhodesia, but former servicemen from Britain, Australia, and South 
Africa immigrated to Rhodesia to join the regular Army. Opponents of the Rhodesian 
effort often accused the government of recruiting and employing mercenaries who were 
unstable and who did not care about the safety of civilians.  A ZANU publication 
published an interview with an anonymous Frenchman who claimed to have been in a 
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mercenary unit in the Rhodesian Army. The unnamed Frenchman claimed, “the officer 
corps was made up of former mercenaries. The majority of the staff, at least a dozen, had 
seen action in Angola.”56  
While there were indeed foreigners in the Rhodesian Army, these foreigners 
certainly did not dominate the organization.  The categorization of these men as 
mercenaries has also been a source of debate; foreigners who joined the Army were 
required to serve on the same terms as a Rhodesian-born man who joined the Army. 
These so-called mercenaries were not given any extra pay and were required to undergo 
Rhodesian Army training, and they had to abide by the Army’s rules and regulations. 
What can be said of these men is that their reasons for joining the settlers cause were as 
wide-ranging as the countries from which they came. Peter McAleese, a former member 
of the British SAS, joined the Rhodesian Army in 1977. Even though he had been 
through the British SAS training pipeline and was a combat veteran, he was required to 
attend basic training and, subsequently, the Rhodesian SAS selection course.57 McAleese 
was one who could have been accused of being a mercenary; he had worked as a 
mercenary in the Congo prior to coming to Rhodesia. His motivation for serving in 
Rhodesia, however, was not based on monetary gain; he claims he was just a fighting 
man looking for another war in which he could serve.58 McAleese was one adventurer of 
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many that migrated from conflict to conflict in an attempt to satisfy his addiction to 
combat.  
There were other men who came to Rhodesia because of their intense belief that 
Rhodesia was the next battleground against communism. Joseph Columbus Smith served 
in the US Army Special Forces in Vietnam. After he left the Army and returned to 
civilian life in the US, he was disappointed by the lack of concern expressed by the US 
government with regard to, what he felt was, the spread of communism in Africa. In 
1977, he traveled to Rhodesia and joined the Army.  He served for the next two years as 
an officer in the Rhodesian African Rifles.59 Smith noted that he was one of about 150 
Americans in the Rhodesian forces. They served in a variety of units from the RAR to 
the Rhodesian SAS, the RLI and Grey’s Scouts.  Americans were one of the smaller 
groups of foreign nationals in the Rhodesian Army; by far the largest group serving was 
from South Africa. The Rhodesian government openly praised the inclusion of South 
Africans in the Army. They even produced a publication called The South African 
Rhodesian: A Special Breed, to highlight the contribution of South Africans who came 
north.60 Not only did the publication highlight the military contributions of the South 
Africans to the war effort in Rhodesia, but it also pointed out their contributions within 
the Rhodesian government. Rowan Cronje served as a member of parliament and as 
Minister of Manpower.  He claimed, “We are fighting against the most insidious forces 
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the greatest Imperial power of the 20th Century, namely Marxist communism.”61 This 
sentiment appealed to the white civilian populace in both Rhodesia and South Africa.  
The publication characterized the Eastern Bloc as the next imperial power in Africa.  
The recruitment of British nationals continued throughout the course of the 
conflict. The British government did not encourage the practice; however, they did not 
go to great lengths to discourage it. The FCO was concerned about the impression of the 
public with regards to the problem. “The fact that some might go there to help go defend 
close relatives i.e. not for financial gain and therefore not strictly as ‘mercenaries’ would 
be regarded in this country, politically, as a distinguishing feature. But in black Africa, 
of course, kith and kin arguments only make matters.”62 In the past the British 
government had rescinded the passport rights of any person who took up a mercenary 
engagement in places like the Congo, Angola, or Nigeria. However, there seemed to be a 
point where, for political reasons, they only criminalized recruiting activities in Britain 
as a violation of sanctions. Those who signed up to serve in the Rhodesian forces were 
not, then, breaking any laws.  
The matter of mercenary service in Rhodesia became an obsession for those 
opposed to the settler regime. It was also something of an obsession for self-described 
anti-communist groups in the West. The American magazine Soldier of Fortune (SOF) 
began publication in 1975. Between 1975 and the end of the Rhodesian conflict in 1980, 
there was no single issue than did not mention Rhodesia or the service of foreigners in 
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the Rhodesian military. The magazine had unusual access to the Rhodesian security 
forces; in the fall of 1976, SOF published an interview with LtGen. Peter Walls, the 
commander of the Rhodesian Army. In the spring 1977 issue, SOF published an 
interview with the Rhodesian Army Recruiting Officer, Maj. Nick Lamprecht. The 
magazine acted as an unofficial recruiting hub for the Rhodesian forces. While the 
magazine staff did not handle inquiries, they did publish the contact information of the 
appropriate recruiting officers in Rhodesia. Soldier of Fortune did not simply publish 
positive pieces on the Rhodesian military; often they tried to highlight stories of 
Americans who were serving there.   
Mike Williams was a former US Army officer who served in Vietnam and as a 
"gun for hire" in other parts of the world. He entered the Rhodesian Army in 1975 as a 
Captain, and went on to command a company of Coloured troops, as well as the 
mounted infantry unit called Grey’s Scouts.63 Mike Williams was later forced out of the 
Rhodesian Army after the Associated Press published pictures of his troops abusing 
prisoners. A three-part series on him and his combat exploits was published in SOF in 
1978.64 Like the propaganda pieces published by the Rhodesian government, articles 
published in SOF portrayed Rhodesia as a bastion of Western democracy, fighting 
against the savage forces of international communism. Highlighting the number of 
African civilians killed by guerilla fighters served to deflect questions regarding the 
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plight of Africans living under the Rhodesian regime. These were the very same themes 
found in Rhodesian propaganda products released in the US and UK at the time.65  
The security situation only got worse as the 1970s continued. While the 
Rhodesian Army retained the tactical advantage in firefights with guerilla forces, the 
liberation armies had overall numbers on their side. The Rhodesian Army needed more 
soldiers; National Service and TF call-ups were so frequent that the economy suffered 
from a severe labor shortage. In 1977, a 3rd Battalion of the RAR (3RAR) was 
established and the initial training period for regular Army African soldiers was cut from 
six months to three.66 The 3rd Battalion never operated as cohesive a force as did the 
other two battalions. It mainly was used as a training unit to supply the independent 
companies with African troops. The independent companies were mixed units of both 
white National Servicemen and African regular soldiers. The presence of the African 
soldiers was supposed to make up for the inexperience of the National Service soldiers. 
Incidentally, young white soldiers posted to the independent companies were given 
authority over African troops even when they were brand new with the rank of private.  
Coloured and Asian soldiers held curious positions in the Rhodesian Army. Ever 
since the onset of National Service during the Federal period, they were liable for 
conscription on the same terms as European men. However, even though they were 
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required to serve in the Army, they were not trained alongside European men. They also 
were required to serve in segregated units under white officers. They often were 
employed as clerks, drivers, or in other non-combat service positions. Unlike Africans 
and Europeans, Coloured and Asian soldiers were not permitted to serve in the regular 
Army. If they wanted to serve fulltime in the Army after their service term expired, they 
were kept on as “continuously embodied volunteers” who signed yearlong contracts and 
were paid significantly less than European soldiers.67  The Rhodesian Army placed most 
of these men into Protection Companies and Reinforcement Holding Units. These 
formations generally were charged with guarding static locations or protecting road-
building crews. In 1978, these units were combined into one unit: the Rhodesian 
Defence Regiment. These units often were considered to be sub-par by the rest of the 
Rhodesian Army, partially because these units were given only five weeks of infantry 
training.  
H.A. Berriff was a young European National Serviceman in 1973 who was 
posted as the Mess NCO to a mostly Coloured. Even though he had just finished basic 
training, he was made a Corporal.  As such, he was set apart from the Coloured soldiers. 
He recalled that these conscripts did not care about fighting and often left their weapons 
lying around the camp. They also were very jumpy soldiers and would start firing at the 
slightest provocation; this can be attributed to the poor quality of their short training. 
Overall, the Coloured soldiers earned their reputation as poor soldier because they did 
not want to be in the Army.  One Indian soldier commented to Berriff, “What are we 
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fighting for? We can even buy houses in the European areas of town even though we are 
born here in Rhodesia.”68 
Even though Coloured soldiers generally did not want to take part in this military 
conflict into which they had been forced, they still wanted to be treated equally. In 1974, 
Coloured and Asian soldiers went on strike in an attempt to force desegregation in the 
Army.  They claimed, “a bullet knows no colour!”69 They also were not afraid to protest 
their position within Rhodesian society.  In 1977, 500 Coloured soldiers signed a petition 
expressing their objection to the racialized conscription system, and to their being forced 
to participate in the war. They wanted an end to the conscription of Coloured and Asian 
men. However, since both of these groups were allowed to vote on the same terms as 
European Rhodesians, the RF government insisted that they had to perform all of the 
same obligations as Europeans.70 In protest, the highest-ranking Coloured soldier in the 
Army, a WOI, resigned.71  
 
The end is near 
The security situation in Rhodesia was spiraling downwards by 1978. The cost of 
the war had increased to £500,000 a day, and tax hikes on the white population were 
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required to accommodate the increases in the defence budget.72 Even though the South 
African troops were gone, monetary assistance from South Africa continued.  By this 
time, the South African government was funding up to fifty percent of the Rhodesian 
defence budget.73  However, this still was not enough money to replace the losses in 
manpower, both in the field and due to emigration. In 1978, TF soldiers were serving 
around 190 days a year on operations: six weeks on operations, followed by six weeks at 
home. The strain on the white community was becoming unbearable.  As a result, Ian 
Smith decided to negotiate with those whom he considered to be the moderate African 
nationalist leaders.  
Smith portrayed the negotiations as a "Rhodesian solution" to the issue of 
majority rule. Smith approached the three African leaders who still remained in 
Rhodesia, and who were not in prison. Abel Muzorewa was a Bishop of the United 
Methodist Church, as well as the leader of the United African National Council. Senior 
Chief Chirau was the Chief of Mashonaland and the head of the Zimbabwe United 
People’s Organization (ZUPO). Interestingly, Chirau was a paid servant of the 
government; the Rhodesian government secretly financed ZUPO. Reverend Ndabaningi 
Sithole previously had been the leader of ZANU but was forced out of power by Robert 
Mugabe in 1975. These three men together represented the political parties in Rhodesia 
that lacked an armed wing, and thus had sat out the liberation conflict. Smith believed 
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that if he entered into a power-sharing agreement with the parties led by these men, he 
might be able to win international recognition for Rhodesia.74 
Ken Flower, the head of the CIO, made it clear to Ian Smith and the rest of the 
cabinet that guerilla forces were spreading throughout the country; it was imperative to 
secure African allies against the militant liberation movements.75 Smith’s government 
was encouraged via the cautious enthusiasm of Western nations over the possibility of a 
settlement. The three African leaders agreed to enter into a government with the 
Rhodesian Front in March of 1978. Even though the country's name was changed to 
Zimbabwe-Rhodesia and Abel Muzorewa became the first African prime minister, 
power remained firmly in the hands of the settler community. Whites were assured a 
minimum of twenty-eight seats in the parliament; the remaining seventy-two were open 
to Africans. Whites also retained control of the Security Forces, Internal Affairs, the 
judiciary, and were guaranteed their privileged property rights.76 
The Internal Settlement did not live up to the hopes of the Western powers, and 
Zimbabwe-Rhodesia remained unrecognized. The military conflict escalated as the 
guerilla forces began to make use of more sophisticated weapons. In September of 1978, 
ZIPRA guerillas used a shoulder-fired surface-to-air missile to shoot down a civilian Air 
Rhodesia flight from Kariba. Eighteen of the fifty-six people on board survived the 
crash.  However, fourteen of those eighteen were killed by guerillas who found the crash 
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site.77 In retaliation, the Rhodesian government launched further raids on the frontline 
states. In October of 1978, the Rhodesian Air Force attacked ZIPRA’s "Freedom Camp" 
at Westland Farms in Zambia. The large Rhodesian formation took over Zambian 
airspace and warned the airbase at Lusaka that if any Zambian aircraft attempted to 
intervene, they would be shot down. The strike was extremely successful in military 
terms; it also provided excellent victory propaganda for the settler community.  A 
recording was made of a Rhodesian Air Force officer, so called "Green Leader," talking 
to Lusaka Tower. The recording was repeatedly replayed on the Rhodesian Broadcasting 
Network during the next several weeks.78  
Even though the Rhodesians occasionally scored major tactical victories, the 
security situation was still grim. The culture of the Rhodesian Army was changing; in 
May of 1978, the first Asian officer was commissioned into the Rhodesian Army. Rev. 
Val Rajah was an Anglican priest who was commissioned into the Rhodesian Corps of 
Chaplains as a Captain. His duties were confined to ministering to the spiritual needs of 
Coloured trainees at Llewellin Barracks in Bulawayo, but this was a dramatic jump 
forward for non-whites in the Rhodesian forces. After the Internal Settlement, 
conscription was extended to include young African men. The British government was 
caught completely off guard by this development. They concluded in October of 1978 
that the Rhodesian Forces would not eventually choose to introduce the conscription of 
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Africans because of the potential drawbacks.79 The official decision occurred on 8 
January 1979; it was shortly thereafter followed by the first multi-racial National Service 
intake in February of 1979.80 Intake 183 was also the first time that a multi-racial 
instructor cadre was used in the conventional Army.81 The size of the Army would, after 
this point, continue to expand through the use of African troops. Although they were 
subject to National Service, they still were not paid the same rate as whites and still were 
required to serve in separate units. Africans who were conscripted were sent to the RAR, 
whereas whites were sent to the RR or the independent companies.  
The first African officers were commissioned only a short time prior to the 
integration of National Service training. In 1977, the first group of African officer cadets 
passed out of officer training and into service in the Rhodesian Army. In July of 1977, 
three African officers were commissioned into the RAR: Lt. Tumbare, Lt. Mutero, and 
Lt. Choruma. All three were long-serving NCOs in the RAR. Tumbare had accrued 
twenty-nine years in the Army at the time he was commissioned.82 General Peter Walls, 
the Commander of the Rhodesian Army, said with regard to this occasion: “The Army 
has always been prepared to accept black men on commissioning courses if they 
measured up, potentially, to the standards required of leaders.”83 Interestingly, this was 
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the same line used by white members of the Federal Assembly when questioned about 
the lack of African officers in the Federal Army. Rhodesian authorities embarked upon a 
publicity campaign to highlight the "shoulder to shoulder" nature of the war, often 
showing African and white troops fighting together in the field.84  
The cover of the September 1977 Assegai showed Lt. Tumbare, a member of one 
of the first groups of Africans to be commissioned, accepting an officer's sword from the 
widow of LtCol. Kim Rule. In his will, LtCol. Rule asked that his sword be presented to 
the first African officer commissioned into the Rhodesian Army.85  The article and cover 
were used to further the impression that the Rhodesian Army truly was integrated.86 The 
December of 1977, issue of that same publication had a white and an African soldier on 
the cover, loading up ammunition together. One of the features inside the magazine was 
a story on joint training between the RR and the RAR.  Again, the magazine attempted 
to highlight the single week of joint training between the two units and marginalize the 
unequal pay, unequal accommodations, and unequal treatment of African soldiers.87  
After the first class of African officers was commissioned in late 1977, the 
second group started training. The following year, seven more African officers were 
commissioned. None of the seven were commissioned into line units in the Army; four 
were commissioned into the “administrative stream” of the Army, one was 
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commissioned into the Army Educational Corps, and the final two were commissioned 
into the Administrative Branch of the Rhodesian Air Force.88 Even after African officers 
had officially been commissioned, there were members of the Rhodesian government 
who viewed the program with suspicion. During a parliamentary session in July of 1977, 
Mr. R. W. McGee, the member representing Matobo, questioned the legitimacy of the 
commissioning process when he asked the government how many African officers had 
been granted their commissions after failing their written exams. He also inquired as to 
why some officers were separated in their training if such training was supposed to be 
equal in standard. The government responded to these inquiries by saying that the 
commissioning standards remained high, and that no officers had failed their written 
exams; the only reason for the separation was to accommodate those for whom English 
was a second language.89  The white community clearly was still extremely 
uncomfortable with the idea of African officers. By the end of 1978, there were ten 
African officers in the Rhodesian Army. While Africans soon were brought into the 
National Service scheme, they were not permitted to undergo NS officer training.  
Strangely, when the first African chaplain was admitted into the Rhodesian 
Corps of Chaplains, he was not commissioned like his Asian counterpart. Gideon Dete 
Takaruza was a long-serving African soldier who had become an African Catechist in 
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1962, and who had subsequently been appointed a WO2. Even after his ordination and 
appointment in the Corps of Chaplains in 1979, he remained WO until he had completed 
a probationary period in the chaplaincy.90 Although Africans were, at this time, being 
commissioned in the Army, the pace was extremely slow and their treatment clearly did 
not parallel that of Europeans.  
 
The expansion and decline of the security forces 
The expansion of the conflict in the latter 1970s necessitated a further expansion 
of Rhodesian forces beyond the inclusion of Africans in the officer corps and the 
conscription of Africans and, these were not the only measures taken by the government 
to expand the security forces. An altogether new organization was established by the 
followers of Bishop Muzorewa’s party, called Pfumo Revanhu or “spear of the people.”  
Often times they simply were called the Security Force Auxiliaries (SFA). This 
organization was formed not only from Muzorewa’s followers, but also from the Sithole 
political party, as well as from the surrendered personnel of ZANLA and ZIPRA.91 The 
extremely high unemployment rate among Africans in Rhodesia made recruiting very 
easy. These men were given short (six or eight week) training courses before being sent 
out on operations in a zone that the rest of the security forces were barred from. Often a 
single white officer, NCO, or Special Branch agent commanded these patrols.  
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The training scheme for the SFA was haphazard, at best.  The BSAP, Special 
Branch, and the Army were all involved in training these units and, there was no uniform 
training program in place.92  Capt. Joseph Smith, an officer in the RAR, remembered 
about eighty men being dropped off at his company’s camp, with instructions for him to 
train them. He and his African Sergeant Major sat down at a picnic table and spent two 
hours putting together a training program for the next six weeks. They were able to 
cover drill and ceremonies, basic rifle marksmanship, basic patrolling, immediate action 
drills, and some unit morale-building activities.93  The officers training the SFA were 
given no indication of what their duties might be, or even exactly to whom they were to 
report. As quickly and as unceremoniously as they arrived, upon the completion of their 
training they were ordered to another location.  
The training was not limited to military skills; there also was a certain amount of 
political indoctrination that occurred in the SFA training.  Each auxiliary was issued a 
booklet that outlined the beliefs and goals of the organization. The members were 
required to swear an oath written on the first page of the booklet, attesting to their belief 
in the tenets contained in the book.  In part, the oath read: “Our goal is to get Majority 
Rule through free and fair one-man, one-vote elections. After that our goal will be to 
work and fight for peace.”94 The booklet laid out in detail how the African people of 
Rhodesia were ignorant and did not know the virtues of the voting process. According to 
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the pamphlet, the job of the SFA was to educate the African population on the value of 
participating in the democratic process. In a sense, the SFA were supposed to play the 
role of a well-armed civic organizer. As is often the case, nothing is able to better inspire 
people to vote out in a less than democratic state than armed encouragement. The 
booklet suggests that SFA members were to emphasize to the local communities that the 
SFA were the “Armed Bearers of Good News.”95  
While the Rhodesian regime advertised the SFA as an illustration of the unified 
nature of the fight in Rhodesia, some international observers insisted that the 
organization was nothing more than a criminal organization. The Anti-Apartheid 
Movement insisted that while initially the force was recruited from a broad base of 
moderate African organizations, the regime eventually limited membership to those who 
were loyal to Bishop Muzorewa. At one point, Special Branch and the CIO arranged for 
guerillas who were being trained in Uganda to be returned to Rhodesia to be integrated 
into the SFA organization. However, once the men were returned they proved to be too 
unpredictable for Special Branch to handle, and were summarily executed by the 
Security Forces.96 On two occasions the Rhodesian Army eliminated 500 SFA personnel 
who were supporters of another nationalist leader, Rev. Ndabaningi Sithole, so that by 
July 1979 the SFA was composed entirely of UANC supporters.97  
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The SFA did not generally operate in the field with the regular Security Forces.  
The only connection between the defence establishment and the SFA were the Selous 
Scouts and the Special Branch liaison officers who served with the Auxiliaries. The 
Security Force Auxiliary units did not even operate in the same parts of the country as 
the regular forces. They were relegated to the “frozen zones” that by January of 1979 
covered about fifteen percent of the country. It was not until June of 1979 that the SFA 
were integrated into the combined operations structure. These forces operated with little 
or no supervision and, at times, were guilty of stealing from and terrorizing the African 
population.98 
The Auxiliaries, loyalty was never assured; there was a widespread problem with 
desertion after they received their training and weapons. The closer the country came to 
a settlement, the more discipline in the SFA weakened. By the end of the summer of 
1979, only the most disciplined professional units in the Rhodesian Army were operating 
efficiently. As early as January of 1978, the British government had received 
intelligence that led them to believe that Africans in rural communities lived in genuine 
fear of the auxiliaries; over time, the problem simply got worse.99 Organizations like the 
SFA became much more difficult to control, particularly as sympathies for the liberation 
organizations began to materialize. By the time the December 1979 Lancaster House 
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agreement was reached, many SFA units had to be disbanded because they were no 
longer effective in the field.100 
In January of 1977, the Rhodesian government attempted to use the maximum 
possible number of white personnel. Previously, the military service commitment for 
white men ended at age thirty-eight. However, changes to the security manpower 
regulations made white men between the ages of thirty-eight and fifty years old liable for 
continued service. Men in this age group were required to serve ten weeks a year and 
were supposed only to be used for static defence operations with the BSAP, Guard 
Force, or Internal Affairs. However, those who were in the top fitness category were 
posted automatically to the Army. After the 1977 changes to conscription, there were 
very few deferments available for National Service; deferments for university students 
were abolished in September of 1977. Even clergymen, judges, MPs, and civil servants 
were required at least to register themselves with the Ministry of Security Manpower.101 
Even with this expansion, the entire security establishment would only have been able to 
field roughly 60,000 men if all the reserve forces were called out for active service.102  
Even with the addition of African conscription and the extension of call-up 
periods, the Zimbabwe-Rhodesia government was stretched too thin and could not 
sustain itself indefinitely. The security forces were losing control of large swaths of land 
to the liberation armies, because they did not have the personnel necessary to provide 
adequate ground coverage. In rural areas, European farmers resorted to hiring private 
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security guards to protect their land and livestock from theft and damage.103 While these 
hired men were simply called "security guards," in modern terms they would be labeled 
private military contractors. These security men worked in four or five man teams, lived 
in fortified compounds, and were heavily armed. While mercenary units were not 
allowed to work for the military, these farm security units were not bound by any such 
restrictions. In 1979, Rhodesia was swarmed by armed groups, both African and 
European.  With the Army regularly engaging in operations against the liberation armies, 
the SFA moving about the country with little supervision, and private armies of farm 
security guards operating with impunity, mass chaos in the country was only a short step 
away.  
In August of 1979, the Commonwealth Heads of Government met in Lusaka.  
The conference concluded with an invitation by the British government to host a 
constitutional conference. The idea was that both the liberation organizations and the 
Rhodesian government might come together to negotiate an end to the conflict and set 
up the basis for an independent Zimbabwe. The conference was held at Lancaster House 
in London and chaired by Peter Lord Carrington, the Foreign Secretary.  Both ZANU 
and ZAPU attended the conference under the banner of a united Patriotic Front. The 
Patriotic Front (PF) initially was hesitant to attend the conference due to their 
increasingly successful campaign within the country. However, the governments of 
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Mozambique and Zambia were just as war-weary as the Rhodesians and insisted that the 
Patriotic Front attend the conference.104 
The conference ended on December 21, 1979 with the signing of the Lancaster 
House Agreement. All sides declared an official cease-fire; they also agreed to hold free 
elections in 1980 to create a new Zimbabwean government. The armed groups in the 
country were supposed to disarm and the political parties engage in peaceful 
campaigning during the run-up to the election. Until the election results were finalized 
and the new government in place, the country was to return to British control. Only a 
few days after the agreement was signed, the Commonwealth Monitoring Force (CMF) 
began to arrive in Rhodesia. It was a peacekeeping force made up of soldiers from 
throughout the Commonwealth.  The largest contributing nation was the United 
Kingdom. These soldiers and a force of British policemen flown in specifically to 
monitor the election in March were supposed to ensure the free and fair nature of the 
proceedings.   However, all three sides in the conflict engaged in some form of 
intimidation; but in the end, Robert Mugabe and ZANU achieved electoral victory.  
 
The liberation armies 
At the end of the conflict in Zimbabwe, 37,000 liberation fighters reported to 
assembly points in accordance with the provisions of the cease-fire agreement. Of this 
number, 17,000 were members of ZANU’s military wing, the Zimbabwe African 
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National Liberation Army (ZANLA), and 20,000 were members of ZAPU’s military 
wing, the Zimbabwe Peoples' Revolutionary Army (ZIPRA). While these forces served 
different political parties, they had the same strategic goal of bringing majority rule to 
Zimbabwe. The soldiers in these armies ranged from highly trained infiltration 
specialists to young boys pressed into service with little or no training.  
It is difficult to present an overview of the training pipeline of the liberation 
armies because of their ad hoc supply system and training structure. While training 
sometimes occurred inside Rhodesian borders, the threat from security forces was often 
too great to train any more than a handful of fighters in any one place. Both ZANLA and 
ZIPRA were forced to look outside Rhodesia for training bases. By 1979, both groups 
had bases in Tanzania, Botswana, Mozambique, and Zambia (to name only the major 
training areas). In 1965, ZANLA established a training base in Itumbi, Tanzania. 
Initially, only Tanzanian Army instructors staffed the base; ZANLA cadres only took 
part in the political indoctrination of recruits because they lacked the military skills to 
contribute in any other way.105 In the 1960s, this training concentrated on commando 
tactics: infiltration, sabotage, demolitions, small unit tactics, and some marksmanship 
training.  
However, in actuality, the training in Tanzania left much to be desired. The 
recruits were left to their own devices much of the time. They were expected to cook 
their own meals and lead their own physical training sessions without any supervision; 
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the training cadres often did not show up to the camp until 9:00AM. Marksmanship 
training was almost nonexistent; the recruits were given extensive lectures on the use of 
firearms, but they had little hands-on experience with any weapon.106 There were 
chronic shortages both of weapons and ammunition in these training camps. Even when 
supplies were available, training followed the Russian model which concentrates on 
promoting area fire rather than actual marksmanship.107 After being given instruction on 
the way a weapon should operate, the trainees were allowed to fire five rounds with the 
weapon.  Often, this would mark the last time a trainee handled a weapon until they 
arrived in Rhodesia to fight.108 Some guerilla fighters were never even given the 
opportunity to train with a gun before they arrived to fight with the Rhodesian Army. 
ZIPRA alluded to this problem in 1977 in their official publication The Zimbabwe 
Review.  Prior to the meeting of the Organization of African Unity’s Liberation 
Committee, ZIPRA pointed out that most of their fighters had to train with wooden 
replicas rather than actual weapons.109 
However, by the late 1960s ZANLA replaced their commando-style training with 
an increased emphasis on revolutionary warfare. Robert Mugabe commented on this 
change in strategy in a 1978 interview. “When we began the armed struggle in 1966 all 
we had were some small commando groups…There was no preparation work carried out 
among the people so when our groups arrived in the villages, the people were suspicious 
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of them.” He went on to say that “there was a complete revision of our manner of 
carrying out the armed struggle. We began to realize that the armed struggle must be 
based on the support of the people.”110 The two liberation armies received support from 
different parts of the communist world. Their supporters influenced the development of 
the liberation armies’ military strategy through the types of training and equipment they 
provided. ZANLA's major supplier was China.  Prior to 1969, cadres were sent to China 
to undergo military training. These “train the trainer” courses were designed to produce 
instructors who would be able to train the everyday ZANLA fighters.  However, in 1969 
the Chinese changed their model of support, and rather than bringing ZANLA members 
to China the Chinese sent instructors to ZANLA camps in Tanzania.111 Chairman Mao’s 
three phases of revolutionary warfare appealed to the ZANLA cadres: (1) Phase One: 
organization, consolidation, and preservation of base areas; (2) Phase Two: progressive 
expansion by terror and attacks on isolated enemy units to obtain arms, supplies, and 
political support; and (3) Phase Three: destruction of the enemy in battle.112 ZANLA 
never matured beyond the second phase of warfare before the actual conflict.  
From the early 1960s to 1979, the recruiting patterns of both liberation armies 
went through three phases: voluntary recruitment, press-ganging, and finally back to 
voluntary recruitment.  Initially, both forces targeted expatriate communities in Zambia. 
When it became clear that they were not achieving their recruiting goals, they resorted to 
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press gang tactics. They struggled with high desertion rates both during training and in 
the field. A large number of impressed fighters turned themselves over to the Rhodesians 
and some ended up as members of the Selous Scouts. From time to time, one of the 
liberation armies would attempt to steal recruits from the other. In 1967, ZANLA 
recruiting officers launched an armed assault on a ZIPRA training camp with the 
intention of scattering the ZIPRA recruits and then impressing them into ZANLA 
service. The Rhodesian authorities often cited guerilla abductions of students from 
mission schools for service in their armies.113 After 1973, the large number of refugees 
that were flowing into both Zambia and Mozambique made impressments unnecessary.  
After ZIPRA refused to participate in training under Chinese instructors they 
became more involved in the training abroad in both Russia and East Germany. The 
training in these countries focused less on the specific problems with regards to fighting 
as a guerilla among the Zimbabwean people, and more on how to conduct a conventional 
war against Rhodesian Forces. Unlike ZANLA, ZIPRA was provided with heavy 
weapons, tanks, and armored personnel carriers. ZIPRA ended up being divided into two 
separate organizations, the guerilla unit and the conventional brigade. The conventional 
brigade was task organized like a Red Army combat unit with armor, infantry, artillery, 
and even engineering and signal support.  The guerilla unit continued to send fighters 
into Rhodesia in small groups throughout the conflict. However, after ZANLA relocated 
most of its forces to Mozambique in 1975, ZIPRA could not keep pace with the number 
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of fighters sent into Rhodesia. In 1977, ZANLA had 3,000 guerilla fighters in Rhodesia, 
whereas ZIPRA had only 200.114  At this point, ZIPRA was planning for Operation Zero 
Hour, the moment when their conventional forces would roll across the Rhodesian 
border and engage in a full-scale assault on the Rhodesian Army. In 1979, ZIPRA had 
fighter pilots in training in Russia in preparation for Operation Zero Hour. When the 
conflict ended, ZIPRA had 20,000 fighters in various stages of training around the 
world.115  
The conventional brigade was the only part of the liberation movement that had 
any training in conventional warfare or experience in leading units larger than a handful 
of men. Yet once the war ended, a large number of liberation fighters marketed 
themselves as guerilla commanders. Since the rank structure of the liberation movement 
was less rigid than that of the Rhodesian Army, it is sometimes difficult to grasp where, 
exactly, specific men fell in the organization. The term "commander" was applied much 
more broadly in ZIPRA and ZANLA than it was in Rhodesia. A man who was charged 
with leading a group of four or five men was labeled a commander in the same way that 
Robert Mugabe was Commander in Chief of ZANLA. Some commanders were sent to 
command courses abroad.  However, this was the exception to the rule. Preparation of 
new commanders was limited to on-the-job training.  Some men were extremely 
successful and were both tactically and technically proficient. Others failed both 
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themselves and their men and terrorized their own people, using their status as freedom 
fighters to protect them from retaliation.  
From 1975 until 1978, ZANLA and ZIPRA attempted to combine their efforts 
under the umbrella of the Zimbabwe Peoples' Army (ZIPA). The experiment 
demonstrated the weaknesses in the command structures of each organization. The 
spokesman for ZANU, Eddison Zvobgo, commented that one of the problems that both 
of the organizations suffered from was that they “had little experience coordinating 
military programs.”116 The leaders of the liberation movements also made it clear that 
their weakest point was their logistical structure. Even though the ZIPA experiment 
lasted almost four years, the combined military council never managed to coordinate 
logistics or operations between the two forces. Some of the lack of cooperation was due 
to a genuine mistrust that existed between the parties. However, two organizations that 
already possessed severe limitations in their command and logistical capabilities could 
hardly have been expected to coordinate the efforts of a combined Army at a more 
proficient level.  
The ZIPA experiment never really worked in practice, no matter how much the 
liberation parties pushed the idea in the public eye.  Both armies continued to suffer 
from endemic command problems. One of the most problematic for both groups was a 
lack of discipline amoung the guerilla forces, once they were inserted into Rhodesia. 
One ZIPRA detachment in Rhodesia simply refused to work with their own High 
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Command from 1976 until the cease-fire at the end of the war.117 ZIPRA leadership 
attributed this breakdown in the command structure to heavy casualties, as well as anger 
that the leaders in Zambia were leading a comfortable lifestyle while the guerillas 
suffered from a severe lack of supplies. However, the Rhodesian Selous Scouts believed 
that the actions of this rebel detachment (and others like it) were the result of tension 
between the guerillas and the ZIPRA Conventional Brigade, which remained outside of 
the country.118 The relationship between the guerilla fighters and their leadership was 
fragile.  When on operations, the guerillas had little supervision and at times operated in 
direct contravention of what their commanders envisioned.  
ZANLA also experienced dramatic showdowns between their guerilla fighters 
and the chain of command. In 1974, a group of ZANLA fighters led by Thomas Nhari, a 
senior ZANLA commander, mutinied against the ZANU Supreme Military Council. 
Nhari and his followers claimed that ZANU had grown too close to the Chinese and that 
because of this relationship ZANLA was cut off from Russian weapons suppliers. The 
mutineers called for the replacement of the entire council and access to Russian weapons 
and training. ZANLA's commander, Josiah Tongogara, was able to marshal enough 
freshly trained troops to put down the mutiny.119  Internal conflicts persisted in 
ZANU/ZANLA. In March of 1976, Robert Mugabe was able to centralize authority in 
his position on a new central committee. He abolished the political commissar training 
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academy and focused all political training on ZANU history;  with this move, he began 
building his cult of personality.120 In January of 1978, another group of ZANLA cadres 
was accused of conspiring to engage in a coup from within the party. Mugabe personally 
oversaw a contrived courtroom drama that convicted the men of conspiring to engage in 
mutiny, after which they were thrown in pit cells for several months.121 
Even though the guerilla forces were constantly plagued by internal political 
problems, they were able to insert enough fighters into Rhodesia to stretch the security 
forces to their limit. Direct confrontation with Rhodesian Security Forces often ended 
poorly for the guerillas. Even many low-quality Police Reserve units were able to repel 
guerilla attacks. The Rhodesians felt that their Fire Force tactics were the answer to 
winning the war. However after 1976, there were just too many fighters coming into the 
country for Fire Force units to be able to respond to all reports of insurgent activity.  
Tactically, the Rhodesians were superior.  When they met liberation forces in 
combat they often out performed them; the Rhodesian African Rifles was actually the 
most effective unit in the Army. However, the Rhodesians failed strategically. They 
could not match the liberation armies’ mobilization of the masses. While Rhodesian 
Army units might only occasionally encounter guerilla fighters on patrol, there was an 
overwhelming landmine and ambush threat throughout the country. This limited the 
mobility of Rhodesian forces and hampered the Rhodesian economy. The consequences 
of economic sanctions, a limited white workforce, and security threats throughout the 
                                                
120 Zvakanyorwa Wilbert Sadomba, War Veterans in Zimbabwe’s Revolution: Challenging Neo-
Colonialism & Settler & International Capital (Suffolk: James Currey, 2011), 36. 
121 Kriger, Guerrilla Veterans in Post-War Zimbabwe, 27. 
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country crippled Rhodesia. They were unable to overcome the strategic obstacles that the 
liberation armies put in their path. Even though the conflict never matured into Mao’s 
Third Phase of warfare, the Rhodesian regime was weak enough by the late 1970s to be 
forced to admit defeat and accept an agreement implementing majority rule.  
 
Conclusion  
The Lancaster House Agreement provided the basis for the creation of the 
Zimbabwe National Army out of the collected forces of the combatants (ZANLA, 
ZIPRA and the Rhodesian Army).  These three organizations brought to the bargaining 
table completely different levels of military training. The Rhodesian Army had well 
established, but race based, systems for training their officers, NCOs, and enlisted men. 
Additionally, it maintained a competent administrative and logistical structure that the 
liberation armies both lacked. One of the major questions that remained unanswered at 
the time of the Lancaster House Agreement was whether European soldiers would 
remain in the Army and be available to help integrate the forces. Even though there were 
African officers in the Rhodesian Army with years of military experience, many had 
only been serving in officer roles since 1977 or later.  As in the previous two examples 
of Kenya and Zambia, there were no African officers above the rank of Captain at the 
time of independence in 1980.  
The British Army had dealt with this type of situation before, as discussed above. 
Yet they had not previously been called upon to integrate a guerilla force into a 
conventional Army. The guerilla fighters had years of experience operating in the bush 
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and mobilizing the population. This type of combat experience, while useful, was not 
applicable to serving in a peacetime conventional force.  Even those members of the 
guerilla movements who had received formal training in China or the Soviet Union were 
taught how to fight as guerillas, but not how to command a platoon of thirty men 
assaulting a fortified objective. Even the ZIPRA conventional brigade was a problematic 
factor. All of those soldiers had been indoctrinated by Soviet Army doctrine focusing on 
the use of large mechanized formations.  Even if the new Zimbabwe National Army 
could obtain a sufficient number of tanks and armored personnel carriers, that part of 
Africa was not ideally suited for large-scale armored combat.  
The Rhodesian Army could not be allowed simply to become the new Zimbabwe 
National Army, but in 1979 it appeared that they were the only part of the equation that 
did not require complete retraining. In the past, British training teams would set up a 
program to prepare former guerillas to attend Sandhurst, and then work their way up 
through the officer ranks. However, it was difficult to see how they could convince 
guerilla commanders who had been fighting for well over a decade that they needed to 
start their military careers all over again.  In agreeing to be the honest broker in 
Zimbabwean independence, the British government took on a military training task 
unlike any other they had encountered, at least since 1945. They would have to call on 
thirty-five years of experience in transitioning colonies to independent nations to figure 
out how to begin to turn Rhodesia into Zimbabwe. 
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CHAPTER V  
HOW DO YOU CREATE AN ARMY?: BRITISH PLANNING FOR THE END OF 
THE ZIMBABWE CONFLICT 
 
 Planning for the end of the Zimbabwean War for Independence began long 
before the conflict was actually over.  While training armies in Africa for the three 
decades preceding Zimbabwean Independence, the British learned many important 
lessons. Kenya was the first time British military planners were forced to deal with the 
issue of Africanizing a predominantly white-led force in an area where a white settler 
population remained. In Zambia, British planners had to wrestle with the prospect of 
creating a multi-racial force that reflected Zambian society. In both cases there were 
setbacks that had a dramatic impact on the way the British approached military training. 
The 1964 East Africa Mutinies made Her Majesty’s Government (HMG) question the 
value of training men to a high standard if it took so long those infant national armies 
felt that the British trainers had were part of a neocolonial agenda.  
 The British were fearful that the same type of sentiment created in East Africa 
would be replicated in Zambia. HMG decided that it was preferable to accelerate 
Africanization rather than focus on rigorous and professional training programs. As was 
noted in Chapter Two, this notion was accompanied by significant pressure from the 
Zambian government to quickly Africanize high level command positions. Defence and 
Foreign Office planners had to come up with training and transition schemes in mere 
months prior to the colonies becoming independent. In the late 1970s, as the Rhodesian 
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situation dragged on the war became increasingly unwinnable for Ian Smith’s regime, 
the British began to make plans for an independent Zimbabwe.  
 Rather than be caught unprepared for the eventual transition from colonial rule to 
independence, the Ministry of Defence (MOD) began planning for the creation of a new 
Zimbabwean Army in 1976. These policy discussions took place at a difficult economic 
time for the British defence establishment. In 1975 inflation had reached a decade-high 
level of 24 percent. The economic crisis of 1976 forced HMG to accept spending 
restraints imposed by the International Monetary Fund in exchange for an economic 
rescue package.1 The Defence White Paper of 1975 reevaluated what kind of military 
commitments the British government could afford. The Priority 1 commitments were the 
maintenance of NATO forces in Germany, the Atlantic submarine forces, and UK 
nuclear deterrent.  Everything else was considered a Priority 2 Task.2 The White Paper 
also called for a reduction in the overall manpower of the Regular Army by 15,000 
soldiers, and a greater reliance on the Territorial Army (TA).3 The Army suffered from a 
shortage of officers and senior NCOs, the most critical groups of personnel for overseas 
training missions.  
 The two primary factors that would shape British planning for the end of the 
conflict in Zimbabwe were money and manpower. British interests in the region were a 
secondary factor throughout the process. However, world events also influenced the way 
                                                
1 Phillip Whitehead, “The Labour Governments, 1974-1979,” Chapter to Ruling Performance: British 
Governments from Attlee to Thatcher (Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1989), 248.  
2 TNA, PRO, CAB 129/181/21, “Statement on the Defence Estimates 1975.” Priority 1 and 2 was the 
MoDs term for military commitments in the Defence Estimates.  
3 The size of the Army in 1974 was 338,000 soldiers.  
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the British approached their post-conflict planning. By 1975 the South African 
government had entered a period of attempted détente with the international community. 
South African Prime Minister B.J. Vorster attempted to appease Western powers by 
scaling back support for Ian Smith’s Rhodesian government. Vorster withdrew South 
African forces from Rhodesia and reduced the amount of South Africa's financial 
support for Rhodesia. These actions by the South Africans, as well as the continued 
infiltration of liberation forces into Rhodesia, made it clear to the British that the time 
was right to start thinking about the post-conflict era.  
 
Planning for a new army 
 The first question that British officials raised regarding their post-conflict 
planning was the possible role of British forces during the pre-Independence stage. Both 
the Foreign and Commonwealth Office (FCO) and the MOD assumed that the conflict 
would eventually come to a negotiated end. The liberation armies did not have the 
military power to overrun the Rhodesian Security Forces; conversely, the Rhodesians 
did not have the manpower to suppress the growing insurgency in the Tribal Trust Lands 
(TTL).  Since the British continued to insist that the Rhodesia problem was an internal 
matter (Rhodesia had been classified as a crown colony in rebellion since 1965), HMG 
assumed they would be responsible for some sort of interim governing arrangement 
between any negotiated agreement and formal independence. Along with this 
assumption came the problem of preserving law and order during the interim.  There 
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would be a large number of armed men in the country beyond the constitutionally-
legitimate RSF.  
The FCO envisioned that the liberation organizations and the Front Line States 
might call for the introduction of British forces into Rhodesia. The major concern the 
FCO had about deploying British forces during the interim period was how these British 
forces would be perceived. Since constitutionally the Rhodesian Front government 
would still be in control until elections were held, HMG feared that the presence of 
British troops would be seen by Africans as a move to support the white regime.4 There 
was also the problem of command and control. In Northern Rhodesia the colony simply 
remained under the control of the Colonial Office until elections were held and an 
independent government was prepared to rule. The situation was quite different in 
Rhodesia; it was never under the supervision of the Colonial Office, and when the 
British reestablished control it simply would mean that a British Governor would return 
to the country. Even so, the Governor would have little power in the day-to-day 
operations of the country and would not be in control of the security forces.5 The British 
government refused to accept responsibility for the situation without accompanying 
authority.6 
                                                
4 TNA, PRO, DEFE 68/295 Policy Including the Integration of the Armed Forces (Rhodesia), “Rhodesia: 
HMG’s Attitude Following a Settlement, 10 NOV 1976,” pg. 2. 
5 Since the only statutory force in the country was the Rhodesian Security Forces. Since Rhodesia had 
been granted responsible government in 1923 the Governor was only a ceremonial position like the 
Governor-General in most Dominions.  
6 TNA, PRO, DEFE 68/295 Policy Including the Integration of the Armed Forces (Rhodesia), “Record of 
a Meeting Held in the Secretary of State’s Office on 28 July 1976.” 
  216 
The defence planners looking at the military integration problem initially decided 
that the model they had used in Kenya and Zambia might also work in Zimbabwe. The 
Rhodesian Army was already a British-trained force that had African NCOs, an NCO 
academy, and established schools based on British models. The office in the MOD 
responsible for Overseas Military Assistance, DS11, felt that it would be best to have the 
Rhodesian Army infrastructure train the guerillas who were being selected for 
integration as enlisted men into the new Zimbabwe Army.  The British government 
would focus on sending black officer cadets to Sandhurst. This model of training, based 
on its success in both Kenya and Zambia, was selected as the initial solution for 
Zimbabwe.7  
In December of 1976 the MOD formed a working group to examine what could 
be done in Rhodesia to ensure that law and order were preserved between the end of the 
conflict and independence. HMG had already established that it would be advantageous 
for Britain to maintain a long-term defence relationship with Zimbabwe after 
independence. This would be beneficial to the economically depressed British defence 
industry in the late 1970s, and it would allow the British government to moderate the 
types of technology Zimbabwe acquired. The British were worried about upsetting the 
balance of power in southern Africa by giving sophisticated military hardware to 
Zimbabwe; such acts would doubtlessly upset South Africa.8 Therefore, the British had 
                                                
7 TNA, PRO, DEFE 68/295 Policy Including the Integration of the Armed Forces (Rhodesia), “Brief for 
the Secretary of State for Defence, 22 NOV 1976, Rhodesia: The British Role During the Interim Period, 
Appendix C.”  
8 TNA, PRO, DEFE 68/295 Policy Including the Integration of the Armed Forces (Rhodesia), “Rhodesia: 
HMG’s Attitude Following a Settlement, 10 NOV 1976,” pg. 2. 
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to be extremely careful of what types of resources they made available to Zimbabwe. 
This harkens back to a similar situation they faced during the late 1960s, when they 
attempted to equip the Zambia Defence Force.  
By the time the working group began discussions regarding the future of the 
Zimbabwean military, the MOD had already established for them some procedural 
guidelines. The 1975 Defence White Paper established that the UK could not support 
anything more than a brigade diverted from Priority 1 to Priority 2 tasks. In 1975 the 
British had already violated that provision by the number of soldiers deployed on 
operations in Northern Ireland. Any sort of British military mission sent to Zimbabwe 
would have to be capped at 200 personnel. The British were in no position to pay the 
complete cost of a training mission and had to assume that there would be a significant 
Commonwealth contribution. The MOD also hoped that they would be able to convince 
the new Zimbabwean government to shoulder the costs of the military mission. The 
working group was tasked with examining five different issues: (1) the future structure 
and control of the Zimbabwe Armed Forces; (2) the control, integration and deployment 
of guerilla forces; (3) portfolios of defence and law and order in the interim 
administration; (4) the form and nature of the commonwealth mission; and (5) the future 
of individual senior members of the armed forces after the establishment of the interim 
administration.9 
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The findings of the working group were based on the assumption that the RSF 
would remain relatively intact and that the guerillas would be absorbed into it. This was 
a dramatic misreading of the political and military situation in southern Africa. The fall 
of the Portuguese empire and the rise of the FRELIMO government in Mozambique also 
led to an increase in capabilities and success rate of infiltration attempts of the ZANLA 
forces. While the Rhodesians continued to achieve tactical victories against the guerilla 
fighters, there were quickly becoming too many infiltrators for the RSF to stop. The 
momentum of the conflict had shifted in favor of the guerilla armies. British planners, 
however, continued to assume that the Rhodesian government would retain enough 
political capital to preserve the structure of the government and military in the country's 
post-colonial phase.  
This does not mean that the British did not recognize the goals of the guerilla 
armies.  The first draft of the working group's report pointed out that there were four 
major problems facing any integration of the security forces in Zimbabwe: (1) 
ideological differences over the system of government; (2) bitterness resulting from the 
fighting; (3) inequality of training; and (4) notions of discipline.10 These four points also 
succinctly sum up how the situation in Zimbabwe was different from any previous 
training mission the British planners had faced. The working group understood that the 
aim of the guerilla armies would be to dispense with the British system and create a 
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military force similar to that created by FRELIMO had in Mozambique.11 They also 
pointed out that the Rhodesian personnel who remained in the army would have to be 
vetted for loyalty to a majority-ruled government. Additionally, all of the foreign 
nationals who joined the Rhodesian Army would have to be dismissed from service if 
the liberation parties were going to agree to be a part of the new army.12These were just 
a few of the hurdles that the working group knew they had to overcome to create a 
functioning force.  
As noted, the MOD ruled out the deployment of British troops to maintain law 
and order. However, an unidentified Canadian army colonel on loan to the MOD 
authored a report suggesting the possibility of sending an observer force to Rhodesia to 
supervise the transition of power when the time came. He asserted that neither the 
Rhodesians nor the guerilla armies were prepared to maintain law and order and would 
have to be retrained.  The key reason he cited for needing such an observer force was to 
safeguard the human rights of individuals on both sides. In order to maintain any 
semblance of impartiality, neither of the combatant forces could be left to sustain law 
and order unsupervised. He suggested that a British officer be appointed the commander 
of all the forces in the country and that a commonwealth observer force be empowered 
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to ensure that the transition process was peaceful.13 At the time this report was 
published, it was ignored. The British government was more interested in exploring low 
cost options such as a UN observer mission rather than funding such missions on their 
own. However, as the end of the conflict approached HMG would be forced to revaluate 
this option.  
The final draft of the working group report was released on 20 December 1976.  
As the working group studied the problem, they became aware of two issues that would 
seriously endanger any possibility of success in Zimbabwe. If the guerilla armies were 
not satisfied with the agreement at the end of the conflict, they could simply leave some 
of their forces outside of the country rather than bring them in for integration. If this 
occurred, it would seriously threaten any security arrangement in Zimbabwe. There was 
also a real possibility that intertribal fighting could break out during the interim 
government period. There would have to be a balanced approach to preserving law and 
order so no particular tribal group would be favored (including the settlers).14 
Even though the working group acknowledged that there had to be balanced 
representation in the new army, they were hesitant to get rid of the Rhodesian Army 
altogether.  They felt that “the quality of training of the current Rhodesian forces [wa]s 
far superior to any African force…it [wa]s far better than any African force that might 
replace it.”15 The working group felt that the RSF was the best choice to maintain law 
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and order during the interim. In reference to the training of the new Army, the working 
group recommended three possible solutions: (1) training soldiers in the UK at British 
Army schools, (2) sending British officers and NCOs to serve on secondment to the 
Zimbabwean Army, or (3) sending specialists and technicians to Rhodesia to help train 
technical branches.16  The notion of seconding officers was immediately ruled out. The 
difficulties with trying to manage British officers seconded to the Zambia Army during 
the UDI period were difficult enough to manage; the MOD did not want to repeat the 
experience with Zimbabwe and South Africa.  
The most heavily favored option was a combination of sending specialists to 
Zimbabwe and bringing some trainees to the UK. The working group thought that if 
British Army specialists were sent to help train the new army, it would also open up the 
possibility of a renewal of defence sales to Zimbabwe. The British also thought that the 
cost of any specialists sent to train Zimbabwean soldiers could be paid for by the new 
Zimbabwean government. This, combined with the prospect of sales to the new country, 
made it theoretically possible for any training mission to Zimbabwe to be at best 
profitable, and at worst cost-neutral. The Zimbabwean Army that the working group 
envisioned was a slightly more Africanized version of the RSF. The group specifically 
noted that “the current forces [we]re too well trained to sacrifice them, they and the 
current structure should be maintained.”17 The examples of Zambia and Kenya were 
particularly useful to the members of the working group. They looked at the process of 
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Africanization in Zimbabwe as a gradual process based on the training and fair treatment 
of both black and white soldiers and civil servants.  
 
Negotiating an army 
 The initial working group documents were produced with the authors having 
little to no idea of how the Rhodesians or the guerillas would react to a resolution of the 
conflict. By 1977, negotiations at Geneva between the warring factions had broken 
down. However, the British government had a better idea of what type of post-conflict 
settlement each side might accept.  Additionally, the DS11 staff section had a unique 
perspective with regard to dealing with the RSF. Group Captain H. Davidson, a member 
of the working group, felt that once a ceasefire was arranged there should be a 
progressive disbanding of the forces on both sides. While this occurred, a 
Commonwealth force could be deployed to Zimbabwe to start rebuilding the military. 
GpCapt. Davidson felt that once the Commonwealth forces arrived, the only remaining 
units of any military force should be Engineering, Logistics, and Transportation units 
that could be used to form the foundation of the new Zimbabwean Army.18 This method 
would facilitate a screening process that would allow for the commissioning of long-
serving African SNCOs and WOs, the screening of former RSF members who might 
wish to reengage in the Zimbabwe Army, and a selective recruitment of guerillas. Like 
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the previous plans that originated in the working group, this one assumed that the RSF, 
rather than the guerillas, would be used to form the majority of a new Zimbabwe Army.  
 However, the British would have had a difficult time convincing any of the 
warring parties to disband their forces. Ian Smith and the Rhodesian Front refused to 
allow the disbandment of the RSF or the replacement of any officers with guerillas.  
Robert Mugabe was guarded in disclosing his views on the post-conflict military. 
However, he did indicate that he did not expect a complete disbandment of the RSF. 
Even so, Mugabe did expect the new Zimbabwe Army to be based on his own Patriotic 
Front forces. Abel Muzorewa also wanted guerillas to make up the majority of the new 
army, but wanted to retain some RSF units to counterbalance the possibility of a coup by 
PF elements. There was another important interest group in these negotiations: the 
presidents of the African states bordering Rhodesia. These Front Line Presidents wanted 
the entire RSF disbanded and an all-African force put in its place.19  
 The British were confronted with an unpleasant reality in 1977. They realized 
that they would not be able to control the military transition in Zimbabwe as they had in 
Kenya and Zambia. In Zimbabwe, the RSF did not hold a monopoly on the use of force 
(as the colonial military forces had in both of the previous examples).  A number of 
planners in the FCO repeatedly asked the MOD how the establishment of the Army in 
Mozambique worked out, thinking that the British might use Mozambique as a model 
for Zimbabwe. Much to their disappointment, the MOD pointed out that no Portuguese 
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troops remained in Mozambique after independence, so there was no need for any sort of 
integration process.20  
 After some initial posturing by both the Rhodesians and the guerillas, the British 
informed them that it was unreasonable for either side to expect the disbandment of the 
other’s forces (particularly since neither side had been defeated in the field). After this 
point had been agreed upon, the British diplomatic focus turned to convincing guerilla 
leaders that during the interim administration the only force capable of maintaining law 
and order would be the RSF.  Success on this point accomplished certain goals for the 
British: this would ensure that the basis for the new Zimbabwe National Army (ZNA) 
would essentially be the RSF, and it placed the RSF in a position to be the primary 
training organization during the transition to independence.21  The latter point, in 
particular, was important to the British government because it took the financial 
responsibility for training the ZNA off of the British.  
 The guerilla leaders were more willing to compromise on this issue than was Ian 
Smith. The British suggested that a British general take command of the ZNA during the 
transition and training period, as in Zambia. While Joshua Nkomo and Robert Mugabe 
were at least open to discussing the idea, Smith firmly rejected it. Nkomo was a 
pragmatist; he had been a railway workers' union organizer before the war, and he was 
openly willing to accept an integrated ZNA. Mugabe kept his thoughts from the British. 
The only indication that the FCO had of his opinions was intelligence gathered from 
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those around Mugabe.22 By November 1977, the Rhodesian government seemed to be 
ready to compromise on certain security issues. The Commanders of the RSF, LtGen. 
John Hickman (Commander of the Rhodesian Army) and LtGen. Peter Walls 
(Commander of Combined Operations) were both open to the prospect of integrating the 
guerillas into the new ZNA. Naturally they wanted to maintain the overall integrity of 
the RSF, but the simple fact that they admitted the need for some integration was a major 
step.23  
 The MOD and the FCO were not used to having to negotiate the direction of a 
military integration. In Kenya the MOD and Colonial Office simply directed it. In 
Zambia the negotiations took place amoung the governments of the Central African 
Federation so that they could divide up the forces. The Colonial Office and the MOD 
controlled the actual training and integration of the Zambia Army. Up to this point, the 
British had not been faced with a situation where they were to be considered responsible 
while lacking real control. The British recognized to a certain degree how the experience 
in Zimbabwe was different from their past training missions, and as a result consulted 
other world powers. Field Marshal Lord Carver was appointed British Special 
Commissioner on Rhodesia in 1977, and he consulted the U.S. State Department on the 
creation of the ZNA. The Americans also felt that the guerilla armies were not up to the 
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task of maintaining law and order, nor did they think that they could even be considered 
real armies.24 
 The consultations were not limited to Western powers.  The British Defence 
Advisor in Zambia consulted with the Zambian Defence Chief, General Kingsley 
Chinkuli. The Zambians were intimately familiar with the guerilla armies, having hosted 
them for a decade. Chinkuli thought that it was impossible for the new ZNA to be based 
on the structure used by the guerilla armies, agreeing that they had to adopt the British 
style of the RSF.25 This view was clearly reflective of the Zambian experience. Chinkuli 
was a product of the British military system. As discussed in Chapter Two, Zambian 
military culture drew its traditions from the British military system. Regardless, this was 
exactly the type of advice that the British wanted to hear.  
 Based on the collective wisdom of the MOD, FCO, and consultations with other 
countries, Lord Carver put together a proposal for the formation of the ZNA. He asserted 
from the opening of the proposal that the British goal was “to produce an army that 
[wa]s truly national, impartial and efficient.”26 Carver saw the Rhodesian African Rifles 
(RAR) battalions as the core of the new ZNA. He proposed that the force should be no 
more than 10,000 men. In addition to the technical units and supporting arms, there 
should be seven infantry battalions: four drawn from former guerillas, and three from the 
RAR battalions, and from new recruitment. Africans would be trained to fill open 
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positions in the technical and supporting armies, but these forces would remain largely 
unchanged. The Selous Scouts, Grey’s Scouts, Rhodesian SAS, and Rhodesian Light 
Infantry (RLI) would all be disbanded. Additionally, all foreign members of the RSF 
would be discharged. Finally, National Service would be brought to an end and the 
existing TA replaced by a reserve element of the ZNA. The new reserve would consist 
of two parts: the Regular Army Reserve and the Zimbabwe National Guard. The Regular 
Army Reserve was to consist of 4,000 men to bring the regular element up to operational 
strength. The Zimbabwe National Guard was to be approximately 10,000 men 
distributed throughout the country, similar to the situation with the existing TA.27  
 Lord Carver saw the plan for the actual transition as unfolding in two distinct 
phases: first members of the guerilla armies would be assigned to units to be 
incorporated into the ZNA as either regular or reserve soldiers, and next eligible men in 
the RSF would terminate their engagements in the RSF and re-attest into the ZNA.28 As 
had previously been the case, this plan kept the RSF mostly intact and absorbed some 
guerillas into its ranks. Lord Carver’s proposal remained the basis for the British 
approach to the integration problem well into 1980.  Even during the Lancaster House 
talks, the British plan changed very little from this 1978 proposal. However, Lord Carver 
was not there to see it through. He took up the position of Special Commissioner in 
January 1977, but in March 1978 he resigned. He had become increasingly frustrated by 
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the lack of progress towards an independence agreement, and could no longer stand the 
stagnation.29  
 The FCO knew that the RSF could not retain all of the special operations units 
that it operated in 1978. The Selous Scouts and the Rhodesian SAS were feared by the 
guerilla forces for their ability to strike deep into Zambia or Mozambique, as well as for 
their ferocity in battle. The guerilla forces also felt that certain Rhodesian generals 
should not have a place in an independent Zimbabwe. LtGen. Peter Walls was chief 
among those commanders considered to be unacceptable. LtGen. Walls was a former 
SAS officer who had risen through the ranks of the Rhodesian Army commanded some 
of its crack units, and he was known as a hardcore Rhodesian Front supporter. The 
British hoped to make the transition process smoother by replacing Walls with a British 
commander. They first considered this possibility in July of 1977; yet again, they looked 
to their experience in Zambia. General Tommy Reid was the commander of the Zambia 
Army until his dismissal in 1970. With his experience in establishing a newly 
independent army, the FCO felt he was a prime candidate to command the ZNA.30 Yet 
by the time the Lancaster House agreement was reached in December of 1979, LtGen. 
Walls was considered an appropriate choice for leader of the Zimbabwean forces, at 
least until a more permanent solution could be found. This demonstrated the paucity of 
choices available.  
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 The British government's formal appraisal of the military integration process 
more or less ended with Lord Carver's report to the FCO, not because of any lack of 
interest but because Carver’s plan seemed to be sound.  Until a settlement in Rhodesia 
could actually be reached, there seemed to be no use in coming up with a more detailed 
plan. Between the release of Lord Caver's report and the Lancaster House talks, 
significant changes occurred in the Rhodesian situation. As discussed above in Chapter 
Three, the Rhodesian Army began commissioning African officers on an extremely 
limited basis in 1978 and 1979. Additionally, the Internal Settlement in 1979 with 
Bishop Abel Muzorewa stalled the international resolution of the problem for almost a 
year. As the parties finally came to the negotiation table at Lancaster House in 1979, the 
British prepared themselves to act as a small-scale peacekeeping force during the 
transition period between settlement and independent elections.31  
 
Introducing the Commonwealth Monitoring Force 
 The warring parties came out of the Lancaster House conference with an 
agreement to return governing power to the British until free and fair elections could be 
held in Zimbabwe. The mission was given the name Operation AGILA.  A warning 
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order was given to the British Army in November of 1979 indicating that they should be 
prepared to deploy a 300-man force to monitor the transition to majority rule in 
Zimbabwe.  However, this number was based upon the assumption that the Rhodesians 
would provide all logistical and communications support for the British participation. 
However, when a four-man reconnaissance team left for Rhodesia in late November 
1979, they discovered that the Rhodesians did not have the resources to support the 
British mission. Any support services that the British needed, they would have to bring 
with them. This lack of local support required the British to more than triple their force 
to 1,000 men.  
 The British did not have the capacity to fly all of the necessary vehicles and 
helicopters to Rhodesia, so they had to rely on U.S. Air Force C-5 Galaxy cargo planes 
that the U.S. government pledged to the operation. The monitoring effort would not have 
been possible without the contributions of troops from four Commonwealth nations, 
including: 159 Australians, 75 New Zealanders, 51 Kenyans and 24 Fijians. Due to the 
large Commonwealth contribution to the mission, the force was known as the 
Commonwealth Monitoring Force (CMF), with MajGen. John Acland of the British 
Army in command. The CMF began to arrive in country on December 22, 1979, and 
soon thereafter were deployed to their respective assembly points.  The mission at these 
assembly points was to allow guerilla forces to gather together during the interim period 
so the CMF could ensure they were not violating the ceasefire agreement or engaging in 
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election-related violence. During this period personnel from the CMF also monitored the 
RSF.32  
 The guerillas poured into the assembly points (or APs) by the thousands after the 
ceasefire began on December 28. The CMF personnel at the APs were given orders to 
welcome the guerillas and attempt to disarm them. In fact, anyone who was not armed 
was turned away. By January 9, 1980, there were 20,634 guerillas at APs around the 
country. By the time the CMF left the country there were roughly 22,000 men at the 
APs. When the CMF initially deployed, they assumed that each entity would be 
responsible for their own logistical support. The British brought enough logistics 
personnel to provide for the 1,300 men of the CMF. Yet they soon discovered that the 
guerillas at the APs had no logistical capability whatsoever. Additionally, the 
Rhodesians did not have the available personnel to support the APs. Therefore, the CMF 
and the British government became responsible for supplying, feeding, and 
administering the APs.33  
 The logistical needs at the APs became the overriding concern for the CMF for 
the remainder of its deployment. Food became one of the primary concerns of Op Agila. 
The guerillas who reported to the APs did so under the impression that they had won the 
war and were being housed there as the first step on their journey to becoming soldiers 
in the new Zimbabwean army.  In part, this was because Robert Mugabe told the 
ZANLA fighters that anyone who wanted to be a soldier in the ZNA would have a place 
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there. Until there was some sort of constitutional change, however, the RSF was the only 
de jure military force in the country. Therefore, it was the force to which Lord Soames, 
the British Governor of Rhodesia, looked for the maintenance of law and order during 
the interim period. The guerillas challenged their status and asserted de facto equality 
with the RSF. As a part of this assertion they insisted upon better food and a role in 
maintaining law and order until the elections.34  
 This created a number of problems for the CMF and the future of the military 
integration process in Zimbabwe. According to the ceasefire accords agreed to at 
Lancaster House, the guerillas were supposed to turn in their weapons to centralized 
armories at the APs. Each of the guerilla armies, ZANLA and ZIPRA, sent liaison 
officers to work with the CMF both to bring the guerillas in and order them to disarm. 
Yet these liaison officers were often unsuccessful in convincing the guerillas to give up 
their arms. The guerillas were afraid that as soon as the CMF left the country, the RSF or 
one of the other guerilla armies would attack. Their fears were not unwarranted; 
violations of the ceasefire were common on both sides. However, the incidents were kept 
out of the press (for the most part) to maintain the fragile peace that had been achieved.35   
 The RSF attempted on numerous occasions to end the ceasefire.  LtGen. Walls 
sent a cable to his commanders on January 19, 1980, the contents of which are still 
unknown, but some Rhodesian officers told the CMF that it would have brought an end 
to the ceasefire. Were it not for the intervention of the CMF officers at the various HQs, 
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the RSF commanders might have been tempted to implement LtGen. Walls's secret 
orders.36 Even with the RSF provocations, the situation grew slightly less tense as the 
logistical conditions improved. However, the roughly 22,000 guerillas who reported to 
the APs during the ceasefire were only a fraction of the men that ZNALA and ZIPRA 
had under arms. Both parties kept portions of their forces outside the country in case 
hostilities resumed. There also were bands of guerillas who simply did not report to the 
APs. The RSF informed The Times about one such group that burnt a man to death in a 
village after the guerillas' demands for food were not heeded.37 Such incidents were 
highlighted by the RSF but disavowed by the guerilla forces. The guerilla gangs were 
accustomed to operating in the bush with a great deal of autonomy; they seldom came 
into contact with a command element. However, the guerilla commanders were reluctant 
to admit that they only had limited control over their men.  
 Some elements of ZANLA and ZIPRA operated outside of the APs during the 
lead-up to the elections in February. There were accusations from all sides that electoral 
intimidation was occurring in the countryside. As a result, the CMF had to be very 
careful in the way it approached the situation. The fact that it was British led was 
evidence enough to some that the mission was biased and supportive of the white 
government. At various points when CMF observers made public statements about 
election tampering and intimidation by guerilla forces, both ZAPU and ZANU cried 
foul. The British Governor of Rhodesia, Lord Soames, made it clear that he had no 
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delusions about the way the elections would go, saying that “it would be impossible to 
hold an election in Southern Rhodesia, as in any other African country, which was 
completely free from intimidation.”38 
Even so, the election went forward, and when all the votes were counted ZANU 
clearly won the parliamentary majority. Out of the 100 seats in the House of Assembly 
ZANU won fifty-seven, ZAPU twenty, the Rhodesian Front twenty, and Muzorewa’s 
party called the United African National Congress (UANC) three. While the British 
government had hoped that a more moderate government would be elected, they were 
eager to divest themselves of the entire situation. The CMF observers declared the 
election fair and a new government under the leadership of Robert Mugabe was formed. 
The official date of independence was set for April 18, 1980. The CMF was scheduled to 
leave the country before the end of March.  At that time, there were still three armies 
present in Zimbabwe that had hardly begun to merge into one. 
 
Training a new force 
 As we have seen, the British had intended to allow the RSF to take the lead in 
forming and training the new ZNA. The FCO and MOD had agreed that the UK was 
only capable of offering token financial support to the effort. Yet much of this planning 
was done in a vacuum, and prior to the British acquiring any real knowledge regarding 
the conditions on the ground in Zimbabwe.   During the Lancaster House Conference, 
both ZANLA and ZIPRA portrayed themselves as experienced and efficient fighting 
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forces. While ZIPRA did, in fact, have a well-trained and equipped conventional 
brigade, most of the guerilla fighters were ill-supplied and equipped. The CMF was 
faced with providing these men even the most basic supplies, such as shoes and clothing. 
Some of the guerilla fighters did not even know how to break down their weapons, let 
alone clean them.  
 The British had also planned on allowing the RSF to take the lead role in 
supervising the training and integration of the new ZNA, when the time came. After the 
elections in February, it was clear that integration plans needed to be put in place if 
Zimbabwe was to have one official armed force by the date of independence. The results 
of the elections frustrated the plans of the FCO and the MOD. Since ZANU won a 
resounding parliamentary victory, it was fair to assume that they would insist on playing 
a large role in the country's new defence arrangements. As Mugabe began forming his 
new government, he made it clear that he did not trust anyone else with the defence 
minister's portfolio. In addition to his role as Prime Minister of Zimbabwe, he also acted 
as the Minister of Defence.  Reporting directly to Mugabe was the Joint High Command 
(JHC). This temporary body was made up of the commander of ZIPRA, Lookout 
Masuka, the commander of ZANLA, Solomon Mutuswa, the commander of the 
Rhodesian Army, LtGen. Andrew Mclean, and the chair of the JHC and commander of 
the Combined Operations Headquarters, LtGen. Peter Walls.39  
 The intent of the JHC was to establish a framework for an integration program 
and a unified command structure. However, the JHC quickly turned into a forum for 
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deception and stalling tactics. Even though Musuka and Mutuswa did not have formal 
ranks, they were granted lieutenant general status. This made getting anything 
accomplished in the meetings extremely difficult; even the chair of the JHC was the 
same rank as all of the members. If one person did make a decision, LtGen. Walls did 
not have any authority to force any of the other members to comply.40 At first this was 
simply an irritating problem, but as time went on it developed into a debilitating issue.  
 In February the CMF and the RSF began training roughly 1,200 guerillas from 
both forces. The training was rudimentary; the RSF was put in the lead, with the CMF 
monitors supervising and assisting with planning.  The goal of this initial training push 
was simply to have some trained Africans available other than those in the Rhodesian 
African Rifles. It was not coordinated with any larger training plan or with the FCO and 
MOD's preliminary plan. There was relatively little oversight or reporting on this initial 
effort because it was viewed as an RSF operation rather than a CMF one.41 While this 
ill-led training program got underway, the British finally began sending officers to assess 
what kind of training the new Zimbabwean forces needed.  
MajGen. Kenneth Perkins, the Assistant Chief of the Defence Staff for 
Operations, visited Zimbabwe in March of 1980 to assess the needs of the UK military 
assistance program. He met with Robert Mugabe on March 14, 1980 to set the stage for 
his visit to the various defence establishments in the country. While Mugabe was a 
shrewd politician, he was not well versed in military matters; in many meetings he did 
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more listening than speaking. One request he did make in his first meeting with MajGen. 
Perkins was that the ZNA be trained according to British standards. However, in this 
same discussion Mugabe pointed out that the two guerilla commanders would be 
inclined to seek assistance elsewhere.42 Indeed, both Mutuswa and Musuka had received 
their military training from courses in the Soviet Union and were aware that both the 
USSR and China were offering no-cost training and low-cost equipment.  Mugabe had 
the power as both PM and Defence Minister to decide where Zimbabwe would turn for 
military assistance, and he used his position to play on British fears that Zimbabwe 
would turn into another African satellite of the communist bloc. Lord Soames himself 
pointed out that in order to counter both the communist threat and the specter of South 
African power, the British would “continue to need as many friends as we can muster in 
black Africa – and the Third World.”43 While the British were not keen on paying for the 
retraining and restructuring of the ZNA, they were more concerned about losing even 
more influence in southern Africa.  
MajGen. Perkins proposed a relatively limited aid package to Zimbabwe. The 
major element of this aid package was a training team of between fifty and seventy men.  
The training team would be responsible solely for training Zimbabwean instructors, who 
could then train the rank-and-file of the ZNA. This training team would also be prepared 
to give advice on the amalgamation process, as well as open up some courses in the UK 
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to selected Zimbabwean students.44 The white military leadership also offered numerous 
suggestions. The Zimbabwe Air Force commander Air Marshall Frank Mussell wanted 
to reestablish a relationship with the Royal Air Force so that he might begin sending 
personnel to the UK for training. However LtGen. Walls, ever the pessimist, felt that 
after the election whites would resign from the army in great numbers, and insisted that 
the British needed to do something to forestall this. He proposed the development of a 
personnel exchange program with the British Army to provide some incentive for white 
officers to stay in the ZNA.45  
From past experience in Kenya and Zambia, the British knew that staff work was 
a weakness of the newly independent African armies. In order to prevent this problem 
also from occurring in Zimbabwe, Perkins proposed that the British run a three-week 
accelerated Staff College course for officers of the new ZNA. This course was intended 
to help integrate guerilla officers into the conventional military planning process, as well 
as to be a cost-saving measure for the British. If the Africans were Staff College—
trained, a significant number of British officers would not need to be loaned to 
Zimbabwe to run the ZNA (which had been the case in Zambia).46 When Perkins 
corresponded directly with the former guerilla commanders Masuku and Mujuru, he 
suggested that basic officer and staff training should occur in Zimbabwe and that only 
selected individuals should be allowed to attend Sandhurst. Additionally, the UK would 
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provide the ZNA with significant guidance in establishing a military academy and staff 
college.  This point in itself is a remarkable departure from the way the British had 
trained African armies over the previous two decades.  
In all the previous examples mentioned in this study, the British insisted that new 
officers should either be long serving NCOs or commissioned through Sandhurst.   
Historically, this had been seen as the best way to maintain British influence over the 
independent armies. If officers were indoctrinated into British military culture as second 
lieutenants, they would be predisposed to accept British military assistance throughout 
their careers.  Sandhurst civics training was another method used to ensure that an army 
remained apolitical after independence. While there were practical reasons for the 
decision to abandon this model, it was still contrary to the desired British goal in 
Zimbabwe.   As was the case in the early 1960s when Zambia was sending officers to 
Sandhurst, there simply were not enough spots available to accommodate the country's 
need. Previously, both Zambia and Kenya had made up for the lack of Sandhurst spots 
by sending men to the Mons Officer Cadet School, a six-month long commissioning 
course. However, the Cadet School closed in 1972 when Sandhurst transitioned to a 
forty-four week curriculum from a two year training model. However, unlike Zambia 
and Kenya, the MOD made no effort to make additional spots available for the ZNA at 
Sandhurst. 
MajGen. Perkins was not hopeful at the conclusion of his visit to Zimbabwe. He 
had travelled to Zimbabwe to observe the training that was already underway, and he 
was not impressed. He pointed out that the ZIPRA recruits were doing far better than 
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those from ZANLA, a common view among the British and Rhodesian officers.  He also 
pointed out that morale in the RSF was extremely low; many of the men were concerned 
about their careers and pensions. This problem presented two immediate challenges: the 
possibility of an abrupt loss of technical knowledge, and entire units of the ZNA 
defecting to South Africa.47 Perkins was also aware of the other critical challenge facing 
the UK mission to Zimbabwe: funding. Even the small mission that the MOD envisioned 
was projected to cost £2.5 million.  However, the total budget allocated to UK military 
assistance around the world was only £5.189 million.  Of that, only £200,000 had been 
allocated to Zimbabwe.48 When the Overseas military assistance budget was planned, the 
presumption was that the Zimbabwean government would pay for the assistance 
package.  As a result, the British government only allocated enough money to pay for the 
Zimbabweans to attend certain courses in the UK. This budgeting issue was a consistent 
problem for the MOD and the FCO. British policy interests necessitated a significant 
training package, yet the necessary funding was just not available in the age of austerity 
that the British found themselves in.  
Even so, the MOD continued making plans for a British-funded training mission. 
The FCO and Lord Soames were left to petition the Exchequer and the Prime Minister's 
office for additional funds.  MajGen. Acland, the CMF commander, projected that the 
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training mission in Zimbabwe would be at least two years. On March 2nd the CMF pulled 
back all of their forces to the Air Force base in Salisbury in preparation for their return 
home. The only remaining British soldiers in the field were forty men who had 
volunteered to remain behind as an ad hoc training team. The CMF mission ended on 
March 16th when the main body of the force left the country. However, by the end of the 
month it was clear that the monitoring force had left too soon.  The training team left 
behind reported that the situation at the training camps was at best tense. The guerilla 
trainees felt they were being mistreated by white Rhodesian trainers, and on a number of 
occasions engaged in small-scale mutinies.49 The British trainers often were required to 
serve as peacekeepers in addition to their duties as training officers.  
 While the FCO was concerned about the problems with military integration, they 
were more concerned with the wider security issues in the country. Even though whites 
in Zimbabwe had lost political control, they retained almost all commercial power. The 
FCO was concerned that if the whites began fleeing the country in large numbers, the 
economy would collapse and Zimbabwe would be an easy target for communist 
influence. As a result, the FCO wanted to ensure that whites in Zimbabwe felt that they 
had a future in the country.  The primary conduits for ensuring this attitude were the 
security forces. The British felt that if white morale in the security forces was high, that 
confidence would translate to the white civilian community.  Consequently, the FCO 
made it clear to the MOD and MajGen. Perkins that supporting the confidence of the 
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white community and the emergence of a viable amalgamated army were directly 
related.50  
 With this idea in mind, Lord Soames made it clear that the first six months of 
independence would be critical. He estimated that between April 30 and June 30, 
twenty-five percent of the white officers in the army would resign as would fifty percent 
of the white SNCOs. Most of those officers were in key technical fields that could not be 
replaced internally; their absence would put the very fabric of the army at risk.  The 
MOD had proposed that a team of fifty-eight British trainers replace the ad hoc CMF 
team. Soames asserted that this number was too small to make any real difference 
considering the number of men that needed to be trained. His great fear, like that of 
many other British policy makers, was that the Zimbabweans would look to Eastern 
Europe to make up the difference.51  
 By Independence Day, April 18, 1980, there was still no singular army and even 
less agreement on how the amalgamation process should proceed. MajGen. Edward 
Fursdon, the military advisor to Lord Soames, painted a grim picture upon his departure 
from Zimbabwe. He pointed out that the ad hoc training team had a particularly difficult 
task and that the former Rhodesian Army personnel were at best not very helpful, but at 
worst were actively causing problems. However, the guerillas were also a source of 
constant worry for the trainers. Not only did they occasionally mutiny, but they also 
were terribly undisciplined. The JHC had achieved very little by this point in time. The 
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only issue they had managed to agree upon was that the army should be organized using 
a British framework. Largely, this was because the RSF was already structured in this 
way, and the guerilla commanders had no alternative structure to propose.52 
 
Crisis of command 
 The euphoria of the independence celebrations was short lived. Even though the 
country officially was independent, it was no closer to genuine stability. On May 9, 1980 
Margaret Thatcher met with Robert Mugabe in London to discuss the future of British 
involvement in Zimbabwe. During the meeting Mugabe praised the efforts of the RSF 
and their senior commanders, pointing out that they had accepted the new government 
and were willing to stay on as long as the government needed them. He claimed that the 
real problem in the integration process was the former ZIPRA guerillas. He cited acts of 
sabotage within the country and insinuated that these ZAPU men were preparing to 
overthrow the government. Mugabe also complained that the integration effort was not 
going well. He asserted that the Rhodesian commanders had been too harsh in the 
beginning and had lost their credibility. He begged Mrs. Thatcher for more trainers to 
help build up the ZNA as quickly as possible. While Mrs. Thatcher said she was open to 
the possibility of sending a larger team, she made no promises; she did, however, ask the 
MOD to look into it.53  
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 Supporting the new government in Zimbabwe was a priority for the Thatcher 
government. Mrs. Thatcher knew that Mugabe could very easily look to the Chinese or 
the Soviet Union for military support.  Naturally, HMG wanted to limit the amount of 
communist influence in the region.  More importantly, though, the British wanted to 
prevent communist forces from staging on the border of South Africa. The involvement 
of Cuban, Russian, and East German forces in Angola compounded the paranoia of the 
South African defence establishment.  If Zimbabwe became host to more communist 
forces, there was a possibility of an even larger regional conflict developing.  This 
prospect was even more dire in light of the South African development of a working 
nuclear weapon in 1979.54 
 With this in mind, the MOD went to work to find officers and senior NCOs to 
support an enlarged training mission. The goal was to increase the size of the training 
mission from fifty-eight to 127 personnel as soon as possible. While this seemed like a 
relatively small number of soldiers, and certainly was far fewer than the number required 
by OP ANGLIA, the type of men they needed were in short supply. Battalion Advisor 
positions were the most critical to fill. The ideal candidates for these positions were 
majors who had finished a period of company command, served on a battalion staff and, 
if possible, had passed Staff College. Unfortunately, officers of this description were in 
short supply in the Army and any reassignment would result in an operational shortfall 
elsewhere. Even though the Army had expressed its manning concerns to the MOD, 
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LtGen. John Stanier, Vice Chief of the General Staff (VCGS), made it clear that 
regardless of any manning concerns, the Zimbabwe BMATT was a national commitment 
of high priority.  The British Army’s goal became having all additional men in place by 
October 8, 1980.55  
 MajGen. Fursdon returned to Britain in early June.  His time as Lord Soames's 
military advisor was his last military assignment prior to retirement. However, before he 
left the Army he met with the VCGS to advise him on a way to move forward in 
Zimbabwe. Fursdon reiterated the difficulties that the BMATT would continue to face in 
Zimbabwe, and focused particularly on the deadlock within the JHC. Without any 
decisions coming out of the JHC, it would be impossible for the men on the ground to 
set any sort of policy or blue print in place to provide for the future needs of the mission. 
The only issue the JHC had agreed upon was that the ZNA would be composed of four 
infantry brigades with support services, and four special units, including: a parachute 
regiment, commando regiment, horse mounted unit, and SAS unit. The JHC had not 
come up with an integration plan and had left it to the BMATT to propose a training 
scheme.  
The urgency of Mugabe’s requests for training assistance and the lack of funds 
available narrowed down the training options.  Fursdon recommended that the BMATT 
run three four-week courses concurrently: one for senior leaders (majors and lieutenant 
colonels), one for junior officers (lieutenants and captains), and one for NCOs. At the 
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end of their respective courses the graduates could meet up to form the leadership 
element of a battalion. They would join the rank-and-file of the battalion and lead them 
through a four-week basic training period that would involve minimal British 
participation. This method of training became known as the “sausage machine.” Ideally, 
it would take roughly eight weeks to train a new battalion. While units were waiting to 
enter the “sausage machine,” they would participate in the Soldiers Engaged in 
Economic Development scheme and thus spend their time working on farms and in 
industry.56 This eight-week training scheme only applied to infantry soldiers. Specialists 
such as cooks, clerks, signalers, and drivers would be trained concurrently but in 
separate courses. This concept was met with little resistance in the JHC, and with no 
other options available the scheme was put forward by Zimbabwean officials.  Soon 
after, it was implemented as the BMATT's training scheme.  
As these plans were being finalized, the BMATT and ZNA were faced with a 
fresh challenge. LtGen. Peter Walls had promised Mugabe that he would continue in his 
position through independence to provide some continuity, and encourage former RSF 
members to stay on in the ZNA.  However, by July of 1980 Walls was hinting that his 
retirement was quickly approaching. The question arose, then, of who would command 
the Zimbabwean forces after Walls left? The British felt that the situation was so fragile 
between ZIPRA and ZANLA that the appointment of someone from either of those two 
groups would be disastrous. By the same token, the British were not sure how the 
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Zimbabweans would take the appointment of another Rhodesian officer to the position. 
That summer, Mugabe mentioned to the British High Commissioner that he might 
initially be interested in having a British general fill the position after Walls left.57  
The placement of a British general at the head of a newly independent force was 
not a unique idea. The army had provided British commanders to African forces since 
the process of decolonization had begun. This was the case in Zambia, Kenya, Nigeria, 
Ghana, and many other former colonial possessions. Lord Carrington and Mrs. Thatcher 
were both open to the prospect of placing a British general in command of the force. One 
of their main concerns with the plan, though, was the prospect of British responsibility 
for the actions of the Zimbabwean military. If a British general commanded the force 
and the Zimbabwean government decided to become involved in a war with the South 
Africans, the British government would be thrust into the middle of the conflict. They 
also would be saddled with unwanted responsibility if there were any breakdowns in 
order in Zimbabwe. While Lord Carrington did consider the possibility of the 
appointment of a general from a commonwealth nation, he concluded that the resulting 
drop in white morale would be even more damaging.  Therefore, Carrington asked the 
MOD to look into the possibility of appointing a British general to take Walls's place. He 
hoped that the MOD would be able to find a retired officer who would be able to fill the 
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position on a contract basis; this would officially distance HMG from the events in 
Zimbabwe.58 
The MOD moved quickly in finding acceptable candidates for the job in 
Zimbabwe. They immediately agreed with Carrington’s assessment of the situation and 
had identified at least three candidates for the position by August 1st.59 General Edmund 
Bramall, the Chief of the General Staff (CGS) of the British Army, visited Zimbabwe in 
August; after touring the country he met with Mugabe, who expressed his frustration 
regarding the lack of progress in the amalgamation process: a problem he attributed to 
the former RSF officers.  When Gen. Bramall mentioned that they had come up with 
some possible candidates to replace LtGen. Walls, Mugabe toned down his enthusiasm 
for British assistance.  He said he needed more time to consider the matter, and also 
indicated that he was now thinking of asking other commonwealth nations to provide 
commander candidates. He claimed he needed another two weeks to think about what he 
needed to do.  
Some in the British High Commission felt that Mugabe was having trouble 
pushing the idea of a British commander through the ZANU Central Committee. 
However, it is more likely that he was buying time with the British to figure out what 
alternatives he could find to a British officer while still drawing on British training 
resources. Mugabe alluded to the fact that he was delaying in a conversation with Gen. 
Bramall, when he said that he might not even nominate a successor to LtGen. Walls until 
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all of the force commanders had a better attitude towards the amalgamation process.60 In 
late July and early August the FCO hoped to convince LtGen. Walls to stay on as long as 
possible, offering even to pay for his leave expenses. While overtures were made to 
Walls, the MOD continued to look for retired British officers to take the position, should 
Mugabe make up his mind to accept one. The MOD was able to narrow down the list to 
three potential candidates of the proper rank and experience. However, by the first week 
of August all three had declined the opportunity.61  
On August 14th LtGen. Walls gave an interview on South African TV stating that 
he did not believe that majority rule in Zimbabwe would succeed, and that there was still 
a very high probability of civil war breaking out again in the country. This was the last 
straw for Mugabe; he had tolerated Walls's demands and obstructionist attitude because 
Zimbabwe lacked experienced generals. However, Mugabe would not tolerate public 
disloyalty from a military commander. Walls was immediately placed on the retired list, 
and the ZANU government used the Emergency Powers Act to bar Walls from returning 
to Zimbabwe. Walls's abrupt departure from the JHC left a significant power void.  With 
this turn of events in mind, the MOD made it clear that they were willing to offer up a 
serving officer.  However, Mugabe seemed deaf to this suggestion. Rather than 
immediately fill the position with a ZANLA officer, Mugabe insisted on leaving the 
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position vacant.62 The JHC meetings were now to be led by Alan Page, the Permanent 
Secretary for Defence, until the new ZNA commander could be appointed. 
 
Playing the game 
The back and forth between Mugabe and the FCO regarding Walls's replacement 
became the standard Zimbabwean strategy: delaying the British while appearing to 
remain interested, in big part because of the British sphere of influence. All the while, 
Robert Mugabe shopped around for military assistance and neglected to mention it to the 
British, unless he could use it as leverage to obtain concessions. During the May 9th 
meeting Mugabe had held with Mrs. Thatcher, he assured her that Zimbabwe was 
looking only to the British for military assistance.  By that point he had already been 
approached by the Nigerians, who had offered a training team.  In June of 1980, a 
Nigerian military delegation covertly visited Zimbabwe to assess the situation and write 
up a military assistance proposal. Through various intelligence channels, by the end of 
July the British managed to acquire a copy of the report. Not only had the delegation met 
with Mugabe but they also met with Gen. Solomon Mujuru, the ZANLA commander. 
Both the Nigerian visit and the meeting between the Nigerians, Mugabe, and Mujuru 
were kept secret from the rest of the JHC.  
The Nigerians had come to evaluate the possibility of training ZNA and ZAF 
officers. However, when they arrived Mugabe asked if they could send a group of 
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instructors to train around 12,000 soldiers by December of 1980. Since the Nigerians had 
not expected this request, they told Mugabe they would have to take the request back to 
the Nigerian government for consideration. It was not only with the British that Mugabe 
was being duplicitous. He told the Nigerian delegation that had had told the British he 
was asking for Nigerian assistance, even though he had done nothing of the sort.63 In the 
short term, the Nigerian delegation could not promise much. Training pilots for the ZAF 
would take between two and three years.  However, they Nigerians were able to 
accommodate the training requirements of some 100 ZANLA officer candidates at the 
Nigerian Defence Academy. The course was scheduled to begin the first week in July 
and run until the first week of December.64  
The Nigerian Defence delegation recommended that the government support 
Mugabe’s request for a military training team. However, since the British had agreed to 
increase the size of the BMATT Mugabe backed away from his efforts to find a Nigerian 
training team. Of course, this did not keep him from sending additional ZANLA troops 
to Nigeria for military training without informing the British or the JHC. The training 
program did not progress well, not simply because of a lack of instructors but also due to 
a lack of agreement on how the Army should be run. In June, over 500 former guerillas 
were imprisoned for mutinying against their trainers at Llewellin Barracks. A battalion 
of the former Rhodesian African Rifles was used to put down the mutiny.65 The former 
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guerillas found the official forms of training extremely taxing. Often they simply refused 
to wake up for morning physical training, or to perform any sort of labor detail. Even the 
potential officers did not want to do any additional work beyond what was required of 
the rank-and-file soldiers.66 During the war these men had operated with a considerable 
degree of independence; now they were being asked to adhere to a strict system of 
discipline. Many also lacked the education necessary to perform as part of a modern 
military force. Roughly twenty-five percent of the former guerillas were completely 
illiterate; only forty percent spoke English (at a very basic level).67 Of the 500 former 
guerillas who had mutinied, 400 were discharged; these men had been part of the total 
1,200 soldiers who had been trained up to that point. Clearly this was the type of setback 
that Mugabe was referring to in his complaints about a slow integration process. 
The escapade with the Nigerians was the first of many for the Mugabe regime. 
The Zimbabwean officer candidates left for Nigeria on July 6th; all were former ZANLA 
fighters. British intelligence and the FCO monitored the progress of the training course 
and discovered that in addition to the one hundred officer candidates, twenty ZANLA 
officers would be attending the next two Nigerian Staff College courses.68 The Nigerian 
government was extremely secretive about the training of Zimbabweans at their Defence 
Academy; however, the British were not particularly concerned. The British Defence 
Advisor in Lagos said of the Nigerian Army, “[they] have an inflated idea of their own 
capabilities. Therefore apart from CSC[Command and Staff College] the level of 
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instructive expertise will not be high.”69 The Zimbabweans later learned that they also 
should not expect too much from the Nigerian Army. By October, the Zimbabwean 
officer candidates had finished the basic course at the Nigerian Defence Academy and 
were commissioned second lieutenants in the ZNA. However, even the ex-ZANLA 
fighters were appalled by the conditions and training they received in Nigeria. These 
men stayed on in Nigeria for another three months for the Platoon Commanders Course 
at the Nigerian School of Infantry, but the damage had been done.  After their 
experience, the Zimbabweans had little interest in an increased partnership with the 
Nigerians.70  
Faced with competition for influence, the British upped the ante slightly by 
increasing the number of liaison visits by Zimbabwean officers to British Army schools 
in the UK. The British also agreed to attach nine Zimbabwean officers and NCOs to 
British regiments for one month each. The commandant of the ZNA School of Infantry 
was flown to Britain to visit Sandhurst to help him formulate a blueprint for the 
Zimbabwe Military Academy. Zimbabwean personnel were allotted spaces in a variety 
of courses in the UK.  These courses included the Signal Officer Course, Officer 
Engineering Mechanical Course, Junior Regimental Officer Course, and Parachute 
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Jumping Instructor Course, to name a few.71 The British government had to find ways to 
remain competitive, particularly because the security situation in Zimbabwe had not 
improved since independence.  
 
A plan takes shape 
 Security incidents in Zimbabwe had actually increased since the April 
independence ceremonies.  The withdrawal of the CMF, as well as the disbandment of 
the RSF Territorial Force and the BSAP Field Reserve, left many areas of the country 
with an extremely limited security presence. In some parts of the country guerillas who 
had not reported to the Assembly Point took responsibility for maintaining law and 
order. Their definition of law and order often ended up looking suspiciously like 
political terror, intimidation of opponents, and retribution for whites and ZAPU 
supporters. When the Zimbabwe Republic Police (ZRP) attempted to reassert control in 
many of these areas, they were attacked by ZANU forces.72 By the end of August 
policemen in the Northeastern region of Zimbabwe were regularly being ambushed and 
sustaining casualties.73  
 By September 1st there were 3,000 former guerillas absorbed into the ZNA who 
had completed basic training. These men made up the first three battalions. An 
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additional 1,900 remained in training but would eventually form the 4th and 5th 
Battalions. By October 30th the BMATT expected to have an additional 3,250 men 
trained and formed into the four remaining battalions. The additional 650 men who 
would form the Parachute Regiment and 400 who would compose the Air Force 
Regiment would finish their training at the same time. While on the surface it seemed 
like the BMATT was making excellent progress, there were still 14,500 men taking part 
in Operation SEED, 7,047 ZIPRA men at APs, and 14,078 ZANLA men at APs.74 What 
compounded the problem was that Robert Mugabe had promised a place in the Army to 
any guerilla fighter who wanted one. To compound the difficulties even more, there 
simply were no more tents or buildings available in the country to house the large 
number of men being brought into the ZNA.  
 The logistical problems in Zimbabwe continued to mount as both personnel and 
equipment were shipped into the country from old guerilla bases in both Zambia and 
Mozambique. In September of 1980 the ZNA received a large shipment of heavy 
equipment given to ZIPRA by the USSR. This shipment included T34 tanks, armored 
personnel carriers, and artillery pieces.75 This presented a new set of challenges to the 
ZNA such as how to train on and maintain such a wide variety of equipment, especially 
since the technical manuals provided were written in several different languages. This 
was also a challenge for the BMATT. Major R.A. Boys, who was a member of the team 
that trained 1Field Regiment, Zimbabwe Artillery, pointed out:  
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This has proved a very interesting and demanding job. The regiment has 32 British 25-
Pounders and 40 Soviet M76 guns. This combination, together with the different 
command and control philosophies, certainly has forced the instructors to return to basic 
principles. As an example one only has to consider the optics. The British dial sights 
(dated 1919) are in degrees, the compasses in 6,400 mils and the Soviet dial sights in 
6,000 mils. The author can also testify personally to the problem of translating 
Rumanian and Czechoslovakian firing tables into a common format based on 25-
pounder computation drills.76 
 
This problem was not limited to the artillery; most of the British personnel had to learn 
about the Eastern Bloc equipment as they taught the ZNA soldiers how to use it.    
 In an effort to increase the capability of the ZNA to provide for itself and manage 
its own logistics, BMATT began a quartermaster course in September of 1980. The 
course was four weeks in length and intended to provide a basic understanding of supply 
management. However, the course would not succeed in turning the men into the 
logistics professionals the ZNA so desperately needed. At the same time, to 
accommodate the incredible excess of soldiers that the ZNA was taking in, the 
government announced that they would house at least 17,000 ex-guerillas in private 
homes in Salisbury. This decision came from outside the military chain of command. 
Most of the 17,000 men to be housed were former ZANLA fighters who would be 
allowed to keep their weapons with them.77 This plan was of tremendous concern to both 
the white population and the ZAPU party members. Mugabe’s order to position 17,000 
armed men loyal to ZANU in the capital did not suggest an environment of 
reconciliation and unity. The move was meant only to secure the ZANU government in 
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its place of power. During the formation of the ZNA battalions, battalion commanders 
were selected based on merit and performance in the leaders course. The former ZIPRA 
members consistently out-performed the former ZANLA fighters and therefore were far 
more often selected to command the ZNA battalions.78 Clearly, Mugabe wanted a 
ZANLA security force prepared to defend the government against any possible ZANU 
or RSF-concocted coup.  
 The logistical problems that the ZNA faced were only one component of their 
consistent growing pains. The JHC continued to stagnate, even without Walls's presence. 
LtGen. Sandy Mclean, the commander of what had been the Rhodesian Army, was 
tasked with temporarily chairing the committee. However, his negative and sometimes 
despondent attitude did not improve the situation. This attitude was contagious among 
the white officers; Brig. Palmer predicted that there would be a substantial exodus of 
white officers between October and December of 1980. This would create such a 
significant skill deficit in the army that the BMATT would not be able to resolve the 
situation for several years. There was a group of ‘young Turks,’ lieutenant colonels who 
were dedicated to making it work, but the old guard regularly brushed their good ideas 
and recommendations aside.79  
 The drain of white personnel combined with the stagnation of the JHC gave 
ZANLA the opening they needed to assert their influence in the defence forces. Mujuru 
increasingly asserted his authority and freely stated that he believed that before long 
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ZANLA would be in control of the armed forces. He continued to make side deals with 
the Nigerians and other parties outside of the knowledge of the JHC. He also regularly 
encouraged whites to leave the army over the course of the next six months. Apparently 
he did not understand that the skills of the white servicemen and officers in technical 
arms were one of a handful of things keeping the ZNA from collapsing in on itself.80  
Mujuru clearly relied on the contributions of other nations to give the ZNA the skills it 
needed to remain a functioning force. He was often very candid with Brig. Palmer about 
his plans and goals; he seemed to put great faith in the idea that Nigeria would 
eventually come in and take over the training of the entire army. It was a commonly-held 
belief among the ZANLA commanders that the British had clear neo-colonial ambitions, 
and were attempting to reassert control over Zimbabwe.  These commanders clearly did 
not understand that the British reluctance to commit resources to Zimbabwe was a sign 
of shrinking British power in the region.  
 As Mujuru expanded his control, Lookout Masuko, the former ZIPRA 
commander, grew tired of Mujuru’s backroom dealings. He even considered walking out 
of the JHC altogether. Palmer felt that during September of 1980, ZIRPA/ZANLA 
relations were at an all time low. However, he was unable to anticipate the events that 
would take place over the coming months. By September, seven of the nine battalions 
that would eventually be formed were either trained or in the training pipeline. Palmer 
commented that they were “making good progress, by African standards, and morale is 
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good.”81 While he did not explain exactly what he meant by this comment, a report by 
one of the battalion liaison officers offers some insight:  
I recently spoke to a major who is our liaison officer with 21 Battalion: the first 
amalgamated ZIP-ZAN battalion. He told me that much of the work which he does in 
fixing things for the battalion, could be done by an NCO in the British Army but that an 
officer was necessary since everything required a good deal of negotiation and 
diplomacy. I asked him how he thought the battalion would get along if he and his 
sergeant were withdrawn. Without a moments hesitation he said that the whole thing 
would grind to a halt in a matter of days. I have no doubt that he is right and that our 
wheel-oiling will continue to be essential for some time to come.82 
 
The not-so-subtle implication here is that even after a period of training. The former 
guerillas were only capable of performing functions at a junior NCO level. Granted there 
were exceptions to this rule, but it was clear that the ZNA was nowhere near capable of 
operating like a serious military force (especially considering the amount of negotiation 
that was required to run a single battalion). It was clear to Palmer that the BMATT 
would need to remain in Zimbabwe beyond the scheduled end date of April 1981 if the 
country were to have even a small chance of success.  Palmer also encouraged the MOD 
to consider sending select African personnel to Sandhusrt and Campberley, free of 
charge. He insisted that men sent to these courses could become “the seed corn of pro-
British influence in the long term.”83 
 The goal of the overall mission, to combine all factions into a loyal and 
responsive military, was continuously in peril. Palmer ended his report on the future of 
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BMATT by saying “BMATT struggles to produce order out of chaos and sometimes 
even succeeds! In my view our continued presence here in strength next year provides 
the one hope for the future, both militarily and politically.”84 Brig. Palmer also included 
in an annex to his formal report, a tentative plan for the future of BMATT. Since the 
JHC was deadlocked, he unilaterally decided upon issues related to the ZNA and 
prioritized training needs. He said that the need for staff-qualified officers should be the 
first priority of the training mission; at least 300 staff officers were required in 1981. 
This was closely followed by officer cadet training, which included a focus on the 
training of infantry officers because that was the vast majority of the officer corps. 
Finally, he saw the training of quartermaster officers, administration officers, and 
Regimental Quartermaster Sergeants as key to the stability of the force.85 
 The security situation in Zimbabwe, however, was continuously eroding. In late 
September there were regular pay problems in the Army. They were even more severe at 
the APs where gun battles flared up between men who had been paid and men who had 
not. Mugabe created even more difficulties for the ZNA in a speech to the House of 
Assembly on September 18, 1980. While he pleaded for the violence to stop and asked 
all parties to come together, he also froze all promotions of ex-RSF personnel. This 
made it clear to many white officers that they would be marginalized in the ZNA if they 
attempted to remain in the force. Additionally, Mugabe announced that all of the 
members of the JHC would remain of an equal status and that a single commander 
                                                
84 Ibid., 3.  
85 TNA, PRO, FCO 36/2808 Military Assistance to Zimbabwe Part  D, From Brig. Palmer to Gen. 
Bramall, “Report on the Future of BMATT, 5 SEP 1980,” Annex A, 3. 
  261 
would not be appointed until the forces were amalgamated.86 The consequences of these 
policies can be seen in the disbandment of the Rhodesian Light Infantry. The 300-man 
battalion had forty-two officers; of those only seven decided to remain in the ZNA. 
Many of the rest either left military service completely or joined the South African 
Defence Force.87  
 Some of these men understood that the opportunity for whites to play a role in 
the new army had already passed. The stubbornness of the RSF officers and men at the 
initial stages of integration made them enemies of ZANLA and the new order that now 
occupied the government. As of October of 1980 none of the ex-RSF units had been 
integrated into the newly-formed battalions. The white officers thought it was best to 
maintain the integrity of units like the RAR in an attempt to preserve professional 
standards. However, it was clear to many RAR officers that they were being left behind. 
If they were to have any chance at playing a role in the new Army, they needed to be 
integrated. In late September, African officers of the RAR petitioned Mugabe directly 
for the integration of the their battalions into the new ZNA units.88 However their 
request went unanswered and they remained a separate force. Interestingly, they were 
also considered to be the only disciplined force left in the ZNA. Mugabe seems to have 
understood the stabilizing influence that both the white officers and the RAR had on the 
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force, but did not seem to think that they warranted a place in the future ZNA. In 
October of 1980, there were 700 white officers left in the Army.  At least 300 had 
resigned in April 1980.  The MOD estimated that by April of 1981 there would only be 
450 white officers left.89  
 By October of 1980 a plan embraced by the JHC began to take shape. It focused 
on keeping Mugabe’s promise of allowing any man to serve who wanted to, while at the 
same time creating an army that better fit Zimbabwe’s needs. The “Ten Year Austerity 
Plan,” as it was known, was intended to form a 58,000-strong army supported by a 
2,600-man air force. The ZNA would be divided into two parts.  The primary component 
would be comprised of five equally balanced infantry brigades that would be the first 
line of defence for the country.  The secondary component would consist of five or six 
infantry brigades and would serve as a secondary line of defence; this second component 
would focus primarily on agro-industrial work and secondarily on military training.90 
This closely reflected the lines upon which the Zambian military operated. The plan also 
recommended that Zimbabwe hold off on any large military hardware acquisitions for at 
least ten years. The designers of the plan hoped that after two or three years the army 
could begin reducing in size. Mugabe had given the JHC little feedback on the plan by 
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the end of October, and Brig. Palmer had been barred from seeing him since Gen. 
Bramall’s visit. One British staff officer concluded after visiting Zimbabwe: 
My visit left me with the impression that Zimbabwe has a chance but for the next year it 
will be touch and go. Zimbabwe’s chance is not a particularly good one but without 
BMATT it would be even less good. BMATT have achieved much, will continue to 
have an important role for the foreseeable future and in the final analysis it may be their 
efforts, which will have made all the difference.91 
 
The members of the BMATT staff who observed the missteps of the ZNA on a daily 
basis did not, unfortunately, share the generally hopeful attitude of this staff officer.  
 Brigadier Palmer was finally able to meet with Prime Minister Mugabe on 
October 15th.  Palmer made three very important points clear: (1) the ZNA needed to 
create a single and clear chain of command before a single commander could be 
appointed; (2) if Mugabe wanted a smaller and cheaper army than the one proposed 
under the Ten Year plan, the JHC needed to know soon; and (3) they needed to come up 
with a plan to merge any ZIPRA and ZANLA units that were to be on permanent agro-
industrial work.92 Mugabe indicated to Palmer that he had not read the JHC paper on the 
Ten Year Plan, and that he felt that all of the army units except the “crack troops” should 
rotate through agro-industrial work assignments. He also mentioned briefly that the army 
could be slimmed down in two to three years, but spoke no further on the matter. Rather 
than focus on plans for how to bring the army together, Mugabe wanted to discuss 
another matter: ZIPRA.  He claimed that he was not concerned about the loyalty of 
                                                
91 Ibid. 
92 TNA, PRO, FCO 36/2808 Military Assistance to Zimbabwe Part  D,  Record of Discussion with the 
Prime Minister, Mr. Mugabe on 15 October 1980.  
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whites, or ZANLA. However, he suspected that ZIPRA was completely disloyal to 
Zimbabwe because they had lost the election.93 Mugabe insisted that ZIPRA should 
disarm, and put the matter to the JHC saying “if the government gave orders they were 
to be obeyed by those concerned.”94   
Mugabe and Mujuru managed to marginalize or push out most of ex-RSF 
servicemen and officers. The only obstacle remaining to complete domination of the 
security forces were the ZIPRA elements. The prime minister’s lack of interest in the 
JHC proposals, his encouragement of Mujuru’s side dealings, and his double talk 
regarding marginalizing the ex-RSF element all indicate that Mugabe felt that the 
integration process was a charade. He had a completely separate agenda for the security 
forces that he refused to disclose to those outside of his inner circle. Whether or not 
Mugabe ever read the Ten Year Plan is unclear; by December it had been completely 
scrapped. Operation SEED was a complete failure and it was clear from that failure that 
the former guerillas would not be useful in agro-industrial work.95  
In early December of 1980 Mugabe presented a new plan to the recently 
promoted MajGen. Palmer.96 He wanted both to speed up and extend the amalgamation 
process, as well as to train an additional eighteen battalions (nine had already been 
trained).  The result would be an army of roughly 60,000 trained personnel. Naturally he 
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94 TNA, PRO, FCO 36/2809 Military Assistance to Zimbabwe Part E, From Palmer to Col. Guthrie, MOD 
27 NOV 1980.  
95 TNA, PRO, FCO 36/2809 Military Assistance to Zimbabwe Part E, From British High Commissioner 
Zimbabwe to FCO 27 NOV 1980. 
96 The MOD decided that Brig. Palmer would be more effective as a general officer, so he was given the 
local rank of major general.  
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wanted HMG to lead the efforts to train this much larger ZNA. Palmer and the High 
Commissioner both expressed misgivings about the large size of the Army, which was in 
sharp contrast to what they felt Zimbabwe actually needed.97  Mugabe argued that the 
persistent security problems that the country was facing necessitated such a large force. 
An interesting point that Mugabe left out of the conversation was that many of the 
violent clashes between the police and guerillas involved ZANLA men. Palmer and the 
High Commissioner agreed that HMG would do all they could to help and sent the 
recommendation back to the FCO.98 The FCO and the MOD had been shaken by the 
brief flirtation between Nigeria and Zimbabwe and were extremely concerned that any 
hesitation on their part would lead to an introduction of communist aid to the country.  
 
Conclusion 
 The first year of the independent Zimbabwe ended much as it had begun: with 
the security situation in the country in disarray. The ZNA could not yet be considered a 
functioning element within the country. This was clearly demonstrated in mid-December 
of 1980 when a visit to Salisbury by President Julius Nyerere of Tanzania was planned. 
MajGen. Palmer sent an urgent request to the MOD from the Zimbabwean government. 
The Zimbabwean Artillery did not have ammunition for their 25 Pounder guns, 
ammunition they'd need if they hoped to fire a 21-gun salute for President Nyerere; nor 
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did the Zimbabwean government have the funds necessary to purchase it. Palmer 
requested a donation of ammunition be sent to Zimbabwe within the week.99 The British 
were frustrated by the request but, nonetheless, they made sure the Zimbabwean 
government did not embarrass themselves.  
 By the end of 1980, the British still appeared to feel as if they could retain 
control of the situation in Zimbabwe. Even though Robert Mugabe had ignored British 
advice, demanded more money and assistance, and changed the rules of the game at 
every turn, British diplomats and military officers were confident in their assessment of 
Mugabe. The men making policy focused completely on what the communist powers 
would do in this situation:  
In my view, the continuation of our military assistance to Zimbabwe for the year 
1981/82 is one of the most important aspects of our African policy. The continued 
process of integration of the three armies in Zimbabwe is a critical element in 
preserving political stability in that country and, more widely, in Central and 
Southern Africa. Mugabe wants us to continue. There are others who would only be 
too ready to step into our shoes (e.g., the East Germans, Cubans, etc.). It would be 
disastrous if we left the field open for such influences.100 
 
Mugabe’s mentors were the dictators of the non-aligned movement. He was determined 
not to fall into either the Soviet or Western sphere of influence.101  
 The British Army, the MOD, and the FCO all wanted to accomplish the 
transition from Rhodesia to Zimbabwe by December of 1980, and at a relatively low 
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cost.  The British aversion to long and in-depth training missions grew out of their 
experiences in East Africa in 1964 and in Zambia in 1970. They seemed to believe that 
through a small training mission and an unobtrusive approach to the formation of the 
Army, they would be able to keep Zimbabwe in the British sphere of influence. Even so, 
the British Army knew that the key to creating an apolitical force was to put them 
through rigorous professional training and avoid the creation of a praetorian elite with a 
monopoly on the use of force. It was this difficult learned lesson that the British had 
ignored in their initial approach to the training mission in Zimbabwe.  
 As 1980 gave way to 1981, the BMATT began to face a whole new set of 
challenges that would test the bounds of British foreign policy. The British government 
was faced with the issues of how long would they remain in Zimbabwe and what kinds 
of challenges they would be willing to put up with. The introduction of communist 
forces in the country would be a particularly divisive issue, as well as would the creation 
of units outside of the control of the JHC chain of command. Unfortunately, the events 
of 1981 would come to signify the eventual failure of the British mission. Over the 
course of 1980, the most technically skilled members of the ZNA were pushed out 
through intimidation or fear of the future. Many of the recruits who showed the most 
potential would be frightened into leaving the military in 1981 through systematic 
political purges within the ZNA. By the end of the year, the ZNA would fully emerge as 
yet another tool of the ZANU-PF regime in Zimbabwe
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CHAPTER VI 
THE RISE OF ZANLA DOMINANCE IN THE ZNA AND THE BIRTH OF 5th 
BRIGADE 
 
 By the end of 1980, a framework for the Zimbabwe National Army (ZNA) had 
been raised on the foundation provided by the Rhodesian Security Force. In his first 
address of 1981, President Mugabe singled out the efforts of the British Military 
Advisory and Training Team (BMATT), praising their work in bringing the ZNA 
together as one.1 The initial military assistance plan involved BMATT training only a 
portion of the former guerilla forces. The Foreign and Commonwealth Office (FCO) 
projected that by April 1, 1981, the major units of the ZNA would have passed through 
the ‘sausage machine’ training scheme. However, as 1980 gave way to 1981, the mission 
expanded and the conditions changed. Operation SEED (Soldiers Engaged in Economic 
Development) was recognized as a failure, and Mugabe decided that all of the former 
guerillas needed to be brought into the ZNA.  Mugabe had promised that any man who 
wanted a place in the new army could have it, and he could ill-afford to retract this 
promise considering the number of weapons freely moving about the country.  
 In 1981, the Mugabe government expected BMATT to train a 65,000-man army.  
As previously noted, most of these men had little military training, and even fewer had a 
formal education. The British government had already accepted the challenge; they 
intended to create an integrated, apolitical military force. This mission required 
                                                
1 TNA, PRO, FCO 106/461, Cable from BMATT to MOD, 12 JAN 1981. 
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significant personnel and resources in an era when fiscal constraints were paramount. 
Over the course of that year, the inability of the British to commit more trainers and 
funding to Zimbabwe diluted the effectiveness of the mission, as well as HMG influence 
in the region.  
 
Planning for 1981 
Initially, BMATT had been scheduled to complete its mission in April of 1981. 
The FCO and MOD had agreed that once the last ZNA battalion had completed its initial 
training, BMATT would withdrawal from Zimbabwe.  It was expected that after that 
point the Zimbabweans would need to send only a handful of men to courses in the UK 
to undergo extremely specialized training.  The British government was willing to offer 
up these specialty courses to the Zimbabweans because the ZNA was responsible for 
covering the costs. It seems that the FCO felt that by the provision of specialist courses 
and the establishment of ongoing foreign military sales contracts with Zimbabwe, HMG 
would be able to maintain enough influence in southern Africa to keep communist 
powers out, and to prevent the frontline states from invading South Africa. 
Only ten days after Mugabe praised the efforts of BMATT in his New Years Day 
speech, he changed the parameters of the integration process. He announced that all ex-
guerillas would participate in the integration process and be inducted into the regular 
army.  This announcement, in effect, tripled BMATT’s workload; they would have to 
produce no fewer than three new ZNA battalions a month, every month, until August of 
1981, if they were to meet this new quota. This also meant that the size of BMATT 
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would be increased from 134 to 161 men, and remain at that level until August. Major 
General Patrick Palmer asserted that this additional assistance would give both Mugabe 
and his government confidence in the integration process and reassure them that they 
had the full support of the UK.2 
From the British perspective, the Zimbabwean government was in dire need of 
stability and support. Shortly after Mugabe announced that the integration program was 
changing, and he reshuffled his cabinet. Joshua Nkomo, the leader of ZAPU, was 
demoted from Minister of Home Affairs to Minister without portfolio. As Minister of 
Home Affairs, Nkomo had controlled the Zimbabwe Republic Police; his removal 
signaled ZAPU’s complete removal from national security decision making.3 Mugabe 
claimed that Nkomo would still have input regarding security issues as a member of the 
Cabinet Committee on Public Security, yet it is clear (based on Major General Palmer’s 
reports) that Mugabe and Solomon Mujuru were quickly consolidating their power in the 
defence sector.4 Years later, Nkomo confessed that he never saw any official papers on 
security.5 Pushing Nkomo to the side was the first sign of a concerted campaign by 
Mugabe and ZANU to wrest complete control of the national security structure and the 
ZNA from the settlers and ZAPU supporters.  
                                                
2 TNA, PRO, FCO 106/461, From BMATT to MOD, “Revised BMATT Manning Recommendation for 
81/82,” 10JAN81.   
3 Stephen Taylor, “Nkomo men take stock of Mugabe snub,” The Times, 12 January 1981, 4. 
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While London considered Palmer’s recommendation to increase the size of 
BMATT, the situation in Zimbabwe deteriorated even further. Up to this point, the 
British had successfully maintained exclusive control over military training in 
Zimbabwe. This position was finally challenged during the last part of January 1981. At 
a Joint High Command (JHC) Meeting, Emmerson Mnangagwa, the Zimbabwean 
Minister for State Security, mentioned to Palmer the possibility of North Korean military 
assistance. Mnangagwa said that Kim Il Sung offered Zimbabwe equipment for an entire 
armored brigade and trainers to accompany it, all without cost.6  
The possibility of a Nigerian training team had been a frustrating notion for both 
BMATT and the FCO, largely because of the dubious quality of the Nigerian Army 
training program. The FCO and the MOD felt that they could overcome any challenges 
they might confront with a Nigerian training team, partially because the Nigerian Army 
was modeled off of the British Army and continued to receive British assistance. 
However, the introduction of the North Koreans into Zimbabwe had the potential to 
completely change the country’s security dynamic. The North Korean military system 
was, by definition, political in nature. Military officers underwent an extensive political 
education prior to receiving any military training.  Additionally, the North Korean 
military had an entirely different military style that focused on massed armored warfare 
and strict adherence to orders.7  
                                                
6 Ibid., This idea was proposed to the JHC without any details or timeline. Every member on the JHC was 
completely surprised by the announcement, except for Mujuru.  
7 James Minnich, The North Korean People’s Army: Origins and Current Tactics  (Annapolis: Naval 
Institute Press, 2005), 30.  
  272 
The British Army attempted to endow its men with the ability to exercise their 
own judgment and make the best decisions in light of any specific circumstances.  The 
North Korean system and the British system were nothing alike; Palmer feared that 
Korean trainers would have a devastating effect on all the work BMATT had already 
done. The FCO was concerned about the damaging nature of a situation where British 
trainers would work alongside soldiers from a country with which Britain had no 
relations.8 From Palmer to the Cabinet, everyone agreed that something had to be done 
to keep the North Koreans out of Zimbabwe.  
 Palmer met with Mnangagwa about the North Korean mission on January 30th.  
A North Korean delegation was already in Salisbury; they met with Mugabe and 
Solomon Mujuru, and made their offer. The Zimbabwean government felt that the 
package was too good to refuse, and also pointed out “beggars can’t be choosers.”9 This 
comment seemed to slip past Palmer as unimportant, but it actually indentifies the major 
complaint the Zimbabwean government had with the British military aid package.  
Despite the British commitment to helping Zimbabwe form its army, the Zimbabweans 
felt that the British should be more forthcoming with their resources.  During the 
Liberation War, ZANU relied on no-cost military support and training from China, 
North Korea, East Germany, and Tanzania. After independence, the British arrived to 
help the new government with a small training team, a limited number of courses in 
Britain for Zimbabwean soldiers, and an offer to sell the Zimbabweans military 
                                                
8 TNA, PRO, FCO 106/461, From Salisbury to FCO, “North Korean Military Assistance” 22JAN81. 
9 TNA, PRO, FCO 106/461, From Salisbury to FCO, “Meeting with Mnangagwa,” 30JAN81.  
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equipment at a discounted rate. In comparison to the other offers that Zimbabwe 
received, the British aid package seemed paltry. Palmer and the other members of his 
staff did not recognize their disadvantage, compared to the non-aligned nations. More 
importantly, the FCO and the British Prime Minister’s office failed to recognized that 
Britain was not as competitive as they believed themselves to be.  
Palmer did recognize that he was walking a thin line in his capacity as head of 
the training team. His access to the JHC and Mugabe was not something guaranteed to 
him by his position. On February 6th, he finally had the opportunity to meet with Mugabe 
regarding the North Korean offer. On this occasion Mugabe was full of ideas regarding 
the military future of the country, many of which involved departing significantly from 
the plan the British recommended.  The Prime Minister wanted Palmer and his men to 
help establish a ZANLA-only Presidential Guard to protect key points in Salisbury.  
Palmer did not refuse Mugabe’s request, but did ask that he include some ex-RSF 
personnel in the unit to make it more inclusive; he did not, however, go as far as to 
suggest the inclusion of former ZIPRA personnel. Mugabe did not bring up the North 
Korean offer, so Palmer was forced to broach the subject himself. Apparently the North 
Koreans had offered military assistance when Mugabe visited North Korea the previous 
year. Specifically, Kim Il Sung offered to help equip and train a special field brigade for 
“counter coup and counter revolutionary” purposes.10 
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Interestingly, the idea of a counter-revolutionary Brigade did not seem to concern 
Palmer. He pointed out to Mugabe that the inclusion of North Korean advisors could 
cause even further losses of white manpower, and could endanger the possibility of civil 
aid from Western nations. Finally, Palmer made it clear that the Army could not have 
two completely different military systems and functions. Mugabe countered that the 
Tanzanian Army had a mixture of military systems.  Palmer responded, “Tanzania is not 
an example for Zimbabwe to follow.”11 The remark about Tanzania angered Mugabe; he 
informed Palmer that North Korea had assisted ZANU during the liberation struggle and 
wanted to continue to help Zimbabwe. Additionally, the Prime Minister did not care if 
the Americans or anyone else objected to this friendly gesture. 
This exchange was indicative of the fine line that Palmer had to walk. While he 
possessed a wealth of military knowledge that he offered to Mugabe, he was also an 
outsider, a British officer who represented the last vestiges of the imperial world.  The 
High Commissioner and Palmer both felt that they had to react very carefully to the 
North Korean aid package. Any scaling down of the British mission or withdrawal of 
British troops might destroy what influence the British had left in the country.12  
The British saw white manpower in the Army as a form of influence. While these 
men did not necessarily represent the views and goals of the British government, they 
were viewed as Western military professionals, something that was in increasingly short 
supply in Zimbabwe. On December 31, 1980, there were 686 white officers left in the 
                                                
11 Ibid.  
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ZNA; BMATT projected that by the end of April, 1981 there would only be 404 white 
officers remaining.13 Western influence in Zimbabwe was becoming a scarce commodity 
in early 1981, and the events in February of that year brought even more complicated 
problems to the integration process.  
 
Chaos in Bulawayo  
 While there had been some interfactional disturbances in the military training 
program, they seemed to become less common as time passed. In November of 1980 
there was a minor incident in Bulawayo; fighting erupted between ex-ZANLA and ex-
ZIPRA soldiers from ZNA battalions stationed there. The fighting was brought to an end 
quickly when British officers and party officials from both ZANU and ZAPU 
intervened.  The ringleaders of the incident were rounded up and imprisoned. This 
incident was seen as a setback, but since order and discipline remained intact for the 
Army as a whole, there was no general sense of alarm among the BMATT officers.  
 Between November 1980 and February 1981, the situation seemed to calm.  
However, both ZIPRA and ZANLA troops in the ZNA, as well as unintegrated fighters 
moving in and out of the remaining assembly points, were stockpiling heavy weapons in 
direct violation of the ceasefire accords and the Lancaster House Agreement. 14 The 
scholar Luise White has insisted that by late January it was clear that the ZNA was 
falling apart. While this may have been apparent at the lowest levels of the Army, it was 
                                                
13 TNA, PRO, FCO 106/461, Report on Military Budget.  
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not clear at the ministerial level, among individual ex-ZANLA and ZIPRA soldiers, or to 
the BMATT staff.15 Palmer never indicated to the FCO or the MOD that there were any 
serious problems in the integrated battalions.  In fact, just prior to the fighting in 
Bulawayo, the MOD was discussing the possibility of scheduling a media visit to 
Zimbabwe to publicize the good work that BMATT was doing there.16 
 The major questions occupying the minds of Major General Palmer and his 
superiors at the MOD and FCO were the possibility of North Korean intrusion and the 
funding situation for the upcoming year. When Joshua Nkomo was demoted in the 
cabinet there was some concern about the possibility of disturbances in the ZNA. 
Mugabe said publicly that Nkomo would remain involved in security policy, likely to 
prevent the Army and police from descending into anarchy.17 It seems that the British 
were unaware of the undercurrent among rank-and-file soldiers who believed that 
conflict was inevitable in the ZNA.  
 On February 9, 1981, tense ex-ZIPRA combatants fired upon a Zimbabwe Air 
Force jet that flew over Chitungwiza Barracks while the soldiers there were on parade.18 
This incident is telling; these soldiers were so concerned about the possibility of attack 
that they carried loaded weapons on parade. Carrying loaded weapons during this type of 
training would never occur unless these men thought they might be attacked while they 
practiced in the drill square. The very next day, a beer hall disagreement between former 
                                                
15 Ibid., 624. 
16 TNA, PRO, FCO 106/461, From Brigadier GH Watkins, DPR(A) to Permanent Under Secretary of State 
for the Army, 18FEB81.  
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guerillas quickly turned deadly as ex-ZIPRA and ZANLA fighters opened fire on each 
other. Interfactional fighting quickly spread throughout the Army.  
 The ZNA seemed to be falling apart; Mugabe called in political and military 
leaders from all sides to quell the violence.  Since violence was spreading throughout the 
ZNA, none of the integrated battalions could be relied upon to put down the uprising. 
Some of the former RSF units remained unintegrated. The 1st Battalion Rhodesian 
African Rifles (1RAR) was still led by white officers and had simply been renamed the 
11th Infantry Battalion.  These battalions, with the assistance of the unintegrated 
Armored Car Squadron (RACS), were dispatched to Bulawayo to quell the interfactional 
fighting. Joshua Nkomo was asked to help bring ex-ZIPRA troops under control.  
 The former RSF soldiers of the 11th Infantry Battalion secured Brady Barracks in 
Bulawayo and the nearby airfield. The RACS, along with elements of the 11th Infantry 
Battalion, stumbled upon a ZIPRA column of armored vehicles. During the battle that 
ensued, at least sixty ZIPRA soldiers were killed. During this time, C Company of the 
11th Infantry Battalion withstood an assault by a numerically superior ZIPRA force on 
the north side of the city.19 Throughout the rest of the country, British advisors worked 
to put down disturbances at their respective bases. They worked extremely closely with 
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the Zimbabwean government and former-RSF units to ensure that order was restored and 
mutinous elements were rounded up.20  
 The complete breakdown in discipline throughout the Army demonstrated the 
precarious point the ZNA had reached. While there were a growing number of ex-
guerillas who quickly were becoming semi-trained soldiers, there was a complete lack of 
corporate identity in the force. In a way, soldiers were internally resisting any unity with 
their former opponents by planning against them. The events in Bulawayo were far from 
spontaneous, as the Regimental Sergeant Major of the 12th Infantry Battalion, Julius 
Neube, told the commission of inquiry.  He remarked that once the fighting started, the 
mutinous soldiers removed their caps to differentiate friend from foe.21 The ZNA existed 
on paper but not in spirit; beyond a small number of specialized units and former RSF 
battalions, there was no espirit de corps.  When the 11th Infantry Battalion deployed to 
Bulawayo, the white officers specifically instructed their subordinates to wear the berets 
and insignia of their former Rhodesian Army unit, the 1st Battalion of the Rhodesian 
African Rifles.22 While this seems like a simple adjustment on the part of white officers 
in the unit, it was actually a much more dramatic demonstration, specifically of the fact 
that the Zimbabwean government had limited their control of the ZNA.  The soldiers 
who saved the regime were representing the old Rhodesian Army and showcasing their 
professionalism (as compared to the ex-guerillas).  
                                                
20 However, the entirety of the British role in putting down the ZNA disturbances in 1981 is (as of yet) 
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 The lack of corporate identity among the soldiers of the ZNA was a clear 
illustration that the short training period many of the new soldiers had experienced was 
insufficient to create lasting ties to their new military units. The years of conflict in the 
Zimbabwean wilderness ensured that the ex-guerillas could not effectively separate their 
military from their political identity.  BMATT, the MOD, and the FCO all realized that 
there was a serious and continued need for BMATT to remain in the country at the same 
level (161 men) beyond April, the previously agreed upon time for the mission to be 
scaled down.23 The training mission instead waited until at least September to reduce the 
number of British soldiers in Zimbabwe.   
 After the events of February, Col. Henshaw, the British Defence Advisor to the 
High Commission, made a tour of a number of ZNA units to access their status. His 
report showed the low level of readiness among Zimbabwean units and revealed some of 
the issues that hindered the progress of BMATT in their mission. His trip took him to 
three different units, the Infantry Training Depot, Grey’s Scouts (the mounted infantry 
unit), and the 1st Parachute Battalion. Due to their specialized mission and skills, the 
Grey’s Scouts had only just begun to integrate. Of the 500 men in the unit, only 105 
were ex-guerillas, most of whom had just begun their equestrian training. A group of 
about ten Africans were shadowing the white instructors, hoping eventually to take over 
their role in training. Most of the leadership in the unit at that time, including both 
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officers and NCOs, were white. However, at the end of March five white officers and 
twenty NCOs resigned from the Army.24  
 The 1st Parachute Battalion, similarly, had only just begun to integrate. There 
were 1,150 men in the battalion; a former RSF officer, LtCol. Lionel Dyke, had just 
recently taken command. LtCol. Dyke, formerly of 1 RAR, was extremely enthusiastic 
and not reluctant to make dramatic changes. Shortly after he took command he fired the 
Battalion Adjutant (a white officer), the Regimental Sergeant Major (a former ZANLA 
fighter), and a major in the battalion (a former ZANLA fighter).25 Additionally, even 
though the men had been through a selection course, Dyke believed there were still 
undesirable men in the ranks. To remedy this, he decided to hold another selection 
course to further reduce the ranks of the battalion. Henshaw hoped that the PARA 
battalion and the Grey’s would become two of the more effective units, largely because 
at least a third of the personnel in each were formerly of the RSF. Even so, neither was 
even close to being considered fully operational.  
 The regular units were not anywhere near to the standards of the specialist units. 
The unit that Henshaw visited at the Infantry Training Depot was in a sorry state. Many 
of the soldiers were there because they had failed either Parachute or Commando 
selection.  The ZIPRA and ZANLA men segregated themselves and did not interact off 
duty. Worst of all, neither the battalion commander nor the second in command reported 
to the depot to attend training with the battalion; both men were former ZANLA 
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fighters.26 All of these units required months of training before they would approach a 
point where they could operate without the assistance of the mentoring team from 
BMATT. The reports submitted to the FCO and MOD were very clear; even after a year 
of training, the ZNA was still an embryonic organization that could fall apart at the 
slightest interfactional provocation. It seemed clear to the British officers working in 
Zimbabwe that both the former RSF men and the ex-guerillas had the ability and 
potential to form an effective force. What they would require was long-term mentorship 
and training similar to what had been done in both Kenya and Zambia. Training guerillas 
to become conventional soldiers was a time-consuming task made exponentially more 
complicated by the need to integrate the force.  
 Despite these major training setbacks and the troublesome direction in which the 
ZNA was headed, the FCO and MOD were intent on establishing a long term 
relationship with the Zimbabwean military (but on a much more cost-effective scale). 
Rather than increase the size of the training mission or extend its lifespan, the MOD 
assigned an Army officer to the ZNA on a loan service agreement with the purpose of 
serving as an advisor to the newly established ZNA Staff College.27 This arrangement, 
while far less comprehensive, was much more attractive to the British because it 
installed a British officer in the ZNA military education system for the long term, yet 
was comparatively inexpensive. However, the idea that the British would be able to exert 
any influence through a presence in ZNA staff education was short sighted. For years 
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both the British and the Americans had utilized their culture to win favor and influence 
with foreign military officers. These Western forces invited officers at all stages of their 
careers to attend long duration courses in their military education systems in order to 
create long-lasting favorable relationships with military contacts. While a British officer 
in the ZNA Staff College would give Zimbabwean officers some idea what the British 
Army was like, it most likely would not convert anyone to change their view of the role 
of the military in the political process.  
 Were there no other factors distracting the soldiers from British influence, there 
may eventually have been some resonance among the ex-guerillas. Yet this was not the 
case.  In late May, Mnangagwa announced in the middle of a JHC meeting that three 
North Korean officers had arrived in Zimbabwe a few days earlier to serve as the 
advanced party for the North Korean Training Team.28 The issue had last been 
mentioned among the JHC in January; since then there had been silence from Mugabe’s 
office regarding the possibility of North Korean assistance.  
 During the same time period, the Zimbabwean government concluded that all ex-
guerillas who had been integrated, as well as those who had yet to be integrated, should 
be disarmed. Since the fighting in February, it had been determined that the country 
would be more stable if all military hardware was stored in government armories.29 
While the threat of large scale clashes between armed camps of unintegrated men had 
dissipated to a certain degree, the overall security situation in Zimbabwe was not much 
                                                
28 TNA, PRO, FCO 106/461, From Defence Advisor Salisbury to MOD, “North Korean Military 
Assistance,” 20 May 1981.  
29 Nicholas Ashford, “Zimbabwe to Disarm both Guerrilla Factions,” The Times, 18 February 1981, 7.  
  283 
improved. Heavy weapons and crew-served weapons were difficult to hide, and thus had 
to be turned over to the government. However, the guerilla armies had never cataloged 
small arms; there was no way of knowing how many weapons were in circulation. Men 
stored their rifles at home or hid them in the bush for later use.  Some men who were 
still waiting to be integrated turned to banditry instead, or used their weapons of war to 
settle old scores. Violence increased in rural areas, and murders became more and more 
frequent. Former guerillas were not the only people with weapons; the civilian white 
population had become highly militarized and extremely well armed. Men who had been 
in the Territorials were allowed to keep their rifles at home. The Rhodesian government 
had actively encouraged whites to arm themselves and to defend their farms if attacked.  
The country was awash with weapons, which posed a problem for Mugabe’s 
government. One of the things that give governments legitimacy is a monopoly on any 
legal use of force. With so many weapons freely available in Zimbabwe, the government 
could hardly claim to have a monopoly. While not a military man himself, Mugabe 
understood Mao’s ideology of a people’s war.  With weaponry widely available, any of 
his rivals retained the ability to wage an insurgent war against the new government.  
Mozambique was a living example for Mugabe of what could befall a newly 
independent government that faced rival armed groups at the outset of independence.30 
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Too many actors on the stage  
 As the North Koreans began to arrive in Zimbabwe, BMATT found itself in the 
odd position of trying to justify its existence. There seemed to be a breakdown in 
communication between Mrs. Thatcher’s cabinet and HM Treasury. The Cabinet wholly 
agreed that the job that BMATT was doing was integral to the security of Zimbabwe, 
and concluded that “the maintenance of law and order in Zimbabwe depended on 
bringing the three armies which at present existed into a new integrated national army. 
The presence and assistance of British officers and other ranks was essential to this 
process.”31 While the cabinet applauded the efforts of BMATT, the Treasury insisted 
that the mission was far too expensive. The Zimbabwe military mission depleted over a 
third of the UK Military Training Scheme budget for 1981/1982.32   
 The Thatcher government was looking to make severe reductions in defence 
spending. While the 1981 Defence Review made it clear that deep cuts were needed, it 
focused mainly on reductions of the Navy’s surface fleet.  However, all branches of the 
armed forces had been hollowed out by two decades of defence cuts.33 The priorities for 
the MOD were NATO, Home Defence, and the RAF, with everything else making up a 
distant fourth. The United States hoped that Britain would play a key role in the 
continued strength of the NATO alliance, as well as maintain a strong military presence 
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in Belize.34 There was pressure from NATO for all member nations to increase spending 
by three percent each year until 1986.35 This increase in spending was to focus on items 
personnel, and equipment that could be of use in Northern Europe, and not for military 
assistance missions in the Third World. These commitments and the British promise to 
support Zimbabwe’s special needs in the post-conflict era did not necessarily align. The 
Thatcher government continued to make commitments to the Zimbabwean government.  
However, the amount of funding and military aid promised were nowhere near what the 
Zimbabweans wanted from Britain.  
 Britain organized a donor’s conference for Zimbabwe in March of 1981, in an 
attempt to marshal the goodwill of Western nations interested in the future of Zimbabwe.  
The conference was focused on raising money for civil development in the war-ravaged 
nation. The British government had promised a total of £30 million to the newly 
independent nation for land resettlement alone.36 HMG seemed to be convinced that the 
most effective way to wield power in Zimbabwe was through land reform monies, and 
not through the military assistance fund (which amounted to a comparatively trifling  £3 
million). In their correspondence, Thatcher impressed upon Mugabe that the civil 
                                                
34 Ibid., 248. Even though Belize achieved independence in 1981, the British continued to maintain a 
military presence in the country until 2010 when the British Army Training Unit - Belize was closed. The 
force was there primarily to dissuade the Guatemalans from invading the small Caribbean nation.  
35 TNA, PRO, PREM 19/161 f126, “Pym minute to MT (“The Defence Budget and Cash Limit”)”. 
36 Churchill Archive Centre, Thatcher MSS THCR 3/2/73 f133, Margaret Thatcher letter to Prime Minister 
Mugabe of Zimbabwe (aid for Zimbabwe) [land resettlement, fees for students from Zimbabwe in the 
UK.] The clear commitment of the UK to provide large amounts of money for land purchases from white 
farmers is an indication of the overall British goal in the country. Rather than attempt to maintain 
influence in the majority rule government HMG government wanted to ensure that it protected the white 
citizens of Zimbabwe. While this could be seen as a racial issue I believe it is far more economic and 
consular in nature. Many white Zimbabweans held dual citizenship in the UK, and in spite of the newly 
formed majority rule government HMG expected whites to retain economic control of the Zimbabwean 
economy.  
  286 
commitments that Britain made to Zimbabwe “demonstrate[d] the importance we attach 
to helping Zimbabwe in the early years of independence.”37 
 While Prime Minister Thatcher outlined the special place that Zimbabwe held in 
the British sphere of influence, BMATT pointed out the dramatic impact they were 
making with the minimal resources available to them. The High Commissioner in 
Salisbury, Robin Byatt, as well as the FCO, were mindful of the fact that the critical 
issue in Zimbabwe was the security situation. If the country were not stabilized, any 
hope of economic recovery or renewed foreign investment would become a pipe dream. 
Byatt made it clear to the FCO that the end of the “sausage machine” training of the 
regular battalions was only the beginning of the creation of the ZNA. “Once the sausage 
machine project is done the papering over of the divisions will be done. But that is it. 
There is little point in producing an ‘amalgamated’ army only to watch it fall apart.”38 At 
this point, the British plan was to reduce significantly the amount of military assistance 
after the initial training of the regular battalions of the ZNA.  British military influence 
was intended to take the form of a single officer on loan service terms to the ZNA who 
was running the Staff College. This officer was scheduled to begin in January 1982, and 
was slated to teach a series of mid-level, three month staff courses.39  
 By the end of May, 1981, British diplomats and military officers in Zimbabwe 
had discovered that they had no control over Mugabe. Byatt pointed out that “any doubts 
about Mugabe being in charge are gone. He has craft fully [sic] shifted the decision 
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making power from his party’s central committee to his cabinet of which he is the clear 
master.”40 In spite of the excellent job that BMATT was doing with the ZNA, the British 
found themselves more and more isolated from the military decision-making process. 
This became even clearer when discussions began regarding North Korean military 
assistance.  
 When the North Korean presence became a reality in May of 1981, the British 
were flabbergasted. They had vastly overestimated their ability to scare off military 
assistance from other nations. Mugabe and his ministers played the fool; they claimed 
that the North Koreans were overzealous in their desire to help Zimbabwe, and that the 
ZANU-PF government was in no position to refuse.41 The British government was 
caught unaware of the significance of the North Korean offer of assistance.  Initially, 
HMG thought that the North Koreans were only planning on training a small presidential 
guard force. However, when Byatt broached the subject during a meeting, Mugabe made 
it clear that the North Korean offer of a brigade’s worth of equipment was just too good 
to refuse. However, Mugabe indicated that the unit that was to be trained would be 
utilized as a “special brigade,” and in a “counter revolutionary role.”42 Strangely, the 
mention of a counter-revolutionary unit trained by the North Koreans did not raise any 
alarms in High Commission or the FCO.  
 Since the beginning of the military mission to Zimbabwe, one of the primary 
goals had been the establishment of an apolitical force loyal to the Zimbabwean 
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constitution. This North Korean issue was clearly a warning sign of what was to come. 
Mugabe’s government was planning on training a brigade of soldiers in a counter-
revolutionary role; terminology like this was politically charged. This was the first overt 
indication of the ZANU-PF intention of intertwining the military with the party system 
in Zimbabwe. If it was not clear to the public at large that Mugabe wanted to create a 
one-party state, the British, at least, were given fair warning of what the future held. 
 Rather than focus on the implications of the creation of this new brigade for the 
internal security and political situation in Zimbabwe, the British focused on what it 
meant in the diplomatic world. Mrs. Thatcher’s “Iron Lady” persona was notably absent 
from the African continent. While she is popularly known as the consummate Cold 
Warrior in Europe, her toughness did not permeate into the Foreign Service. Byatt did 
not challenge Mugabe on the subject of North Korean aid, nor did he indicate that 
acceptance of it would have any implications for the British relationship with Zimbabwe. 
Rather, he indicated that the United States would be less inclined to maintain her 
commitment to the pledge of civil aid to Zimbabwe if North Korean aid was accepted.43 
British officers and diplomats continued under the impression that the arrangement was 
forced on the Zimbabweans because of their wartime relationship with North Korea. 
Alternatively, white members of the ZNA seemed to view the issue as yet another in a 
series of problems that would degrade the professionalism of the force.44 
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 The British government was content to believe that the Zimbabweans did not 
understand what was going on, despite the fact that Byatt had made it very clear that 
Mugabe knew his own mind and was firmly in control in the country.  Rather than meet 
with the JHC first, the North Korean officers met with Mugabe privately. The British 
read this as a sign that the Zimbabweans were attempting to stall the North Koreans. All 
the while, Solomon Mujuru freely proclaimed that the North Koreans were ready to ship 
the equipment necessary for a 5,000 man heavy brigade that would not be a part of the 
ZNA chain of command. Instead, this unit would report directly to the Minister of 
Defence, one of the many positions that Mugabe held.45  
 In spite of the intelligence that the British were receiving from the JHC and 
Mujuru, they continued to believe that they maintained more influence in military 
matters than they actually did. However, Mrs. Thatcher was, in fact, more concerned 
about the issue than the FCO was.  She voiced her concerns to the ministry in a memo, 
saying that the arrival of the North Koreans was a worrisome indication of the direction 
Zimbabwe was headed.46 The concern on Thatcher’s part did not translate into a policy 
shift regarding Zimbabwe.  The FCO had been convinced of the importance of BMATT 
in the country, in part because of Byatt’s assessment of their work. The mission in 
Zimbabwe would continue, but as soon as it was feasible the mission would be reduced 
in size.47  The sausage machine would continue until the end of November, when the last 
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of the untrained battalions would graduate from basic training. After that, the British 
military presence in the country would be dramatically reduced.  
 While the British were looking at ways to reduce their presence in Zimbabwe, 
the North Korean government was cementing relations with the Mugabe government. 
The Prime Minister of North Korea, Li Jong-ok, made an unofficial visit to Salisbury in 
late June of 1981. The visit concluded with a bilateral agreement between the two 
nations to provide £12 million worth of military equipment and 103 trainers.48 The 
British government felt somewhat reassured by the fact that the North Korean advisors 
would only be used to train the 5th Brigade of the Army. This organization was intended 
to be entirely self-sustaining and not involved in any other part of the ZNA.  Shortly, it 
became clear that the 5th Brigade was to be composed entirely of former ZANLA 
fighters who had yet to be trained or integrated into the new ZNA.49 The personnel of the 
new brigade were to undergo no British military training whatsoever, and would not be 
assisted by any soldiers from the former RSF. Strangely, British officer diplomats in 
Zimbabwe did not view this as a loss of influence. In fact, they were comforted by the 
fact that the North Korean government had never provided quality military training to 
any country.50  
 At the ministerial level, the British also overestimated the effectiveness of their 
“sausage machine” training program. In July, the FCO boasted to the Australians that at 
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that point, the BMATT had already trained thirty battalions and had thirteen more to 
train.51 This did not explain the level of training that the ZNA actually received. In June 
of 1981, the British Defence Advisor in Zimbabwe visited three of the newly trained 
ZNA battalions to report on their progress. His first stop was 14th Battalion (14BN) 
stationed in a rural area 150 km north of Bulawayo.  Even though 14BN completed their 
initial training in February, they could not be considered a functional military unit. The 
unit suffered from a lack of instructors, training aids, and basic military equipment. 
According to the report, they had only 150 rifles to service a battalion of 1,000 men. The 
British advisor to the unit, Major D.M. Chappel, concentrated all of his time on teaching 
the ex-guerillas who were now serving as officers the administrative skills necessary to 
keep the battalion paid and provisioned.52 The unit was nowhere close to being able to 
function without a British advisor, or even move on to more advanced infantry training. 
 The two other battalions that Henshaw visited (the 45th and 46th Battalions) were 
not in any better shape than 14BN. Former ZIPRA fighters dominated the command 
team in both units. These units also suffered from a lack of equipment and training aids; 
they had not conducted any additional training since they finished their basic course. 
They were in better administrative shape than 14BN; however, it would be at least three 
months until a BMATT mobile training team was able to visit and conduct even 
rudimentary training.53 
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 In the eyes of the British government, this still seemed to be considered progress. 
These units were counted as trained formations once they had passed through the 
sausage machine. The level of North Korean influence became more apparent in June 
1981, as former ZANLA fighters returned to Zimbabwe from their overseas training. 
That month, 200 men who had undergone training in North Korea for the previous year 
were set to return to Zimbabwe. However, this left sixty former ZANLA men in North 
Korea finishing up their training. This number included Perence Shiri, who was selected 
to serve as the commander of the 5th Brigade. He had been in North Korea for the 
previous three years in an unspecified training course.54 The men who were trained in 
North Korea had clearly been identified to form the core of the 5th Brigade.55  
 North Korea was not the only non-Western state offering military training to 
Zimbabwe. In June of 1981, an Egyptian aircraft arrived in Salisbury to pick up forty-
five personnel to attend training courses in Egypt. Most of the men sent to Egypt were 
from the Central Intelligence Organization. The Chinese had also offered a military aid 
package consisting of a number of F6 fighter jets and T59 tanks.56 The non-aligned 
nations were clearly forming close military partnerships with the Zimbabwean 
government. Again, it seemed that only the highest levels of the British government 
were concerned with the way the tide was turning in Zimbabwe. Mrs. Thatcher indicated 
in her personal notes on the subject that the Zimbabwean move to accept aid from the 
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North Koreans was “very worrying. It indicates the underlying attitude [of Mugabe].”57 
Still, this concern did not filter down to the men who executed policy in the Central 
Africa Department. The FCO and Byatt continued to believe that they would gain more 
ground in Zimbabwe by registering a halfhearted protest with Mugabe and then ignoring 
the North Korean presence altogether.  
 Only the British applied a very low level of pressure on Mugabe; Byatt only 
brought up the matter in a private meeting with Mugabe, and Mugabe’s tepid response to 
Byatt’s protestations signaled a turning point in Anglo-Zimbabwean relations. London 
attempted to navigate around the North Koreans altogether. The FCO wanted to foster a 
tripartite relationship between Britain, Kenya, and Zimbabwe. Relations between HMG 
and Kenya were much more cordial; the British Army maintained a training presence in 
the Kenya Army Staff College, as well as at a training base 200 km north of Nairobi. 
Kenya was the model of success that the British hoped to emulate in Zimbabwe, so the 
MOD believed that any influence from Kenya would be perceived as similar to British 
Army influence.58 
 The general impression among diplomatic and military observers was that the 
security situation inside Zimbabwe was improving. Officially, they called it “reasonably 
stable.”  Settler farmers were frequently targeted by the less disciplined elements of the 
ZNA, and were subject to frequent harassment.59 There were also an increasing number 
of men deserting from the ZNA; while some took to banditry, others were simply afraid 
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for their safety after the factional fighting in February. The country was considered 
stable enough for a visit from the Commander of the General Staff of the British Army, 
Field Marshal Sir Edwin Bramall, in mid-July, 1981. London was comfortable allowing 
the international press to believe that he was there to challenge the Zimbabwean decision 
to bring in North Korean trainers.60 However, the British knew what the press did not: 
that it was too late to challenge Mugabe on the issue of North Korean involvement in 
military assistance.  
The infant ZNA was also being forced to serve in an operational capacity long 
before it was ready or properly trained to do so. In 1981, RENEMO began engaging in 
cross-border raids into Zimbabwe with increasing frequency.61 This was not the only 
border security issue that the Zimbabwean government faced. The South Africans had 
consistently tried to destabilize Zimbabwe since the Lancaster House Agreement was 
signed. The South African Bureau of State Security (BOSS) and its descendent, the 
National Intelligence Service (NIS), launched Operation DRAMA in late 1979. OP 
DRAMA involved recruiting Rhodesian intelligence and security personnel into South 
African service and then utilizing them to degrade and, at times, destroy Zimbabwean 
facilities.62  
By August of 1981, BMATT had trained over thirty infantry battalions; the 
sausage machine was due to end in November. At that time, all of the regular units of the 
ZNA were scheduled to be formed. Once the units were formed and had been put 
                                                
60 Stephen Taylor, “British hope to keep up the good work in Zimbabwe,” The Times, 25 July 1981. 
61 Ibid. 
62 Truth and Reconciliation Commission South Africa, Truth and Reconciliation Commission of South 
Africa Report (Cape Town: Truth and Reconciliation Commission, 1999),  90. 
  295 
through training, together they would form a single corporate identity. Bonds of loyalty 
would begin to form and charismatic commanders would be able to exert influence over 
their soldiers. In the first week in August, 1981, Mnangagwa announced to the JHC a 
variety of new appointments in the ZNA that were to take place immediately. At the 
same time, it was announced that the JHC would be disbanded on August 17th because 
the new ZNA appointments effectively created a single, unified chain of command for 
the armed forces.63  
The appointments abruptly were made by the Prime Minister’s office, which did 
not consult Palmer, the current ZNA commander Gen. Sandy Maclean, or any officials 
from ZIPRA. Sandy Maclean, formerly the ZNA commander, had been appointed the 
Defence Forces Commander. Solomon Mujuru, the former ZANLA commander, took 
over the role of Commander of the ZNA. Former ZANLA officers also occupied the 
other top positions in the Army Headquarters, the Chief of Staff for Operations and the 
Brigadier for Equipment. Additionally, ZANLA men took command of two of the 
Army’s four brigades, as well as the Salisbury Military District.64  
The reaction to the new appointments was further division among the factions 
within Zimbabwe. ZAPU/ZIPRA men were extremely unhappy about the appointments; 
it was clear to them that the appointments were political in nature, and had little to do 
with skill or merit.65 Former RSF officers were also very disturbed by the turn of events; 
upon the appointment of Brigadier Freddie Matanga, a particularly bombastic former 
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ZANLA officer, to command of the Salisbury District, all of the white members of his 
staff walked out of the headquarters. The British Defence Advisor described Matanga as 
“a volatile character who symphonizes the white fear of Africanization.”66 This 
comment is illustrative of the way that British observers viewed former ZNALA 
officers; others were described as “a disruptive influence,” and “politically motivated.”67 
This was true of the ZANLA men all the way up to the new ZNA commander.  
London was particularly concerned about Mujuru; he was described as “uncouth 
but possessed of an innate animal cunning he is anti-British and would like to see 
BMATT removed.”68 However, just as Palmer and Byatt had underestimated Mugabe, 
they also underestimated Mujuru. The British officials thought that once Mujuru 
“learned his job,” he would change his mind about the need for BMATT.69 However, 
this assumption was made with no knowledge of the extent of the cooperation between 
the Zimbabwean government and other non-aligned powers. In the short term, Palmer 
and Byatt were comforted by the fact that Mujuru was scheduled to attend a year-long 
Staff College Course in Pakistan. 
In the days and weeks following the announcement, London waited with 
anticipation to learn how these changes would impact the effectiveness of their mission 
in Zimbabwe. Interestingly, they felt that the new single chain of command would 
actually damage Palmer’s ability to influence.  Under the JHC model, Palmer had a seat 
at the table where all of the commanders met; additionally, he had direct access to the 
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Prime Minister on a biweekly basis. All of this came to an end with the disbandment of 
the JHC.  MOD Planners were particularly concerned about the impact that the new 
appointments had on the white officers who remained in the ZNA. Initially, officials in 
London were reassured by the fact that Maclean was appointed Defence Forces 
Commander. This was the first time the position had been filled since General Walls had 
been retired from the Army. Even so, Palmer was not impressed with Maclean’s record. 
Maclean was a very negative person who had done little to reassure the white officers of 
the Army since Zimbabwe’s independence.70  The British realized that they might find 
themselves frozen out of the Zimbabwean command structure, and therefore unable to 
influence policy.  
On August 14, 1981, Col. Henshaw sent a report on the stability of the 
Zimbabwean military to the British Defence Advisor in Pretoria. At this point, BMATT 
had produced a total of thirty-six infantry battalions, all of which were fifty percent 
ZIPRA, fifty percent ZANLA. There were three additional infantry battalions that were 
composed of ZIPRA/ZANLA/RSF troops. The former RAR battalions all remained 
unintegrated. The last three units were scheduled to finish training in mid-November. 
Henshaw claimed that factionalism was at an all-time low, and that morale and overall 
enthusiasm in the units was high, though this was balanced out by the fact that the 
standard of training in the units was extremely low.71 The officer corps seemed to be the 
foundation of the issue. The standards among the former guerilla officers were low; 
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Henshaw specifically commented that they “lack[ed] a sense of responsibility to their 
men: a gulf therefore exists between officers and men which was borne out in the 
mutinies in February when the officers tended to be unaware of what was going on.”72 
As had been the case in Kenya and Zambia, the level of training and professionalism 
was considered to be the bedrock of an effective military organization.  
Lack of knowledge on the part of former guerilla officers, as well as the exodus 
of white officers from the ZNA, began to take a dramatic toll on the ability of the ZNA 
to function. The Army had swelled to such a size that the Zimbabwe Army Service 
Corps was no longer able to provide effective, or even minimal, logistical support to the 
force. The significant body of equipment that the guerilla armies had brought into the 
country was suffering. The guerillas had not maintained the equipment well, and the 
Service Corps did not have the technical knowledge necessary to keep it running.73  
The situation was further complicated by Zimbabwe’s difficult relationship with 
South Africa. South African agents were responsible for no less than four sabotage 
operations in 1980, from the theft of weapons to blowing up army vehicles. In August of 
1981, South African agents set off and explosion at Inkomo Barracks near Bulawayo 
that destroyed $50 million worth of weapons.74 The man who orchestrated the operation 
was the white Commander of the Zimbabwe Army Corps of Engineers. This further 
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damaged Mugabe and Mujuru’s view of the 320 settlers who remained in the ZNA. 
While the British were concerned about these incidents, they did not seem to have any 
impact on British plans in Zimbabwe.  
Officials in London continued to be convinced that the authorities in Zimbabwe 
had no idea what to do with the North Korean military assistance. The North Korean 
training team, led by a Lieutenant General, arrived in Zimbabwe on August 13, 1981, 
and immediately began their work. It was at that point that Mugabe unveiled the details 
of the training plan to his senior military officers. Two thousand men were selected from 
the ZANLA-only battalions that had already been trained; an additional 1,000 men were 
selected from the unintegrated ZANLA camp, and a further 1,000 men were to be 
brought in from an unspecified source.75 This last group ended up being fighters who 
had returned from training in North Korea and elsewhere. The FCO said that it was not a 
surprise that this brigade was entirely ZANLA. Even so, no one in the chain of command 
raised the alarm. By this point in 1981, Mugabe had already told Palmer on numerous 
occasions that the unit trained by North Korea would be a counter-coup force. The fact 
that it was entirely composed on ZANLA men, as well as the continued efforts by 
Mugabe’s regime to marginalize both ZIPRA and ZAPU, were open indicators that the 
military was intended to be a political force and a full partner in a one-party state. 
By the end of August, the full impact of the new appointments had begun to sink 
in to both BMATT and ZIPRA. Palmer and Henshaw both realized that there would 
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soon be a mass exodus of those whites still remaining in the ZNA. Many of these men 
were commanders, at least until they had been replaced by the new political appointees. 
Palmer fully expected most of the remaining settlers to leave the Army by April of 
1982.76 This situation was paired with the sweeping Africanization of the Army staff, or 
more accurately, the ZANLAization. ZANLA men who had little experience or training 
in staff work were tapped to replaced experienced staff officers, European and African 
alike.77 While it was possible that this inexperience among staff officers could have led 
to further dependence on BMATT, Henshaw correctly predicted otherwise. It was the 
opinion of the British officers in the country that the appointment, combined with the 
creation of the 5th Brigade, would only increase tension between Mugabe and Nkomo 
and increase the possibility of a repeat of the events of February 1981, only on a larger 
scale.78   
This was not an opinion solely held by the British.  Joshua Nkomo frequently 
spoke out in parliament and in ministerial meetings against the establishment of the 5th 
Brigade.  Later, he even claimed that the 5th Brigade reported directly to the ZANU 
Central Committee, rather than any part of the Zimbabwean government.79 Even the 
Times reported that the 5th Brigade was being trained for an abnormal purpose that could 
threaten the balance of power in Zimbabwe.80 As August gave way to September, the 
specter of a one-party state increased. Mugabe began to include the notion in public 
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speeches, and the Minister of Youth, Sport, and Recreation, Ernest Kadungure, 
organized large youth demonstrations advocating a one-party state led by ZANU.81 At 
the same time, Mugabe began to make references to youth military training programs. 
His intention was for ZANU to establish military training centers across Zimbabwe, 
ostensibly to keep the youth occupied.82  
This was a troublesome prospect for the British who felt the program was 
analogous to those found in Cuba, the USSR, and East Germany. However, the 
Zimbabweans very easily could have framed it as a revival of the Army Cadet Programs 
that had been present in Rhodesia prior to independence. The key difference for both 
Mugabe and London was that ZANU ran the program, rather than the Zimbabwean 
government. This is an excellent example of the fundamental misunderstanding by the 
British of what had occurred in Zimbabwe up to this point. By this point, Mugabe and 
ZANU had dispensed with the trappings of a unified government; the de facto condition 
for Zimbabwe at this point was that it had become a one-party state.  
 
5th Brigade takes shape 
As personnel of the North Korean training team continued to arrive in 
Zimbabwe, the British persisted to try to understand what Pyongyang stood to gain. Col. 
Henshaw informally consulted with the Chinese diplomatic mission in an attempt to gain 
some sort of insight into the intentions of the North Koreans. Sun Guotung, the Deputy 
                                                
81 Stephen Taylor, “Zimbabwe youth march to back one-party state,” The Times, 22 September 1981, 2. 
82 TNA, PRO, FCO 106/466, From DL McMillian (Salisbury) to FCO, Military Training of Zimbabwe’s 
Youth, 11 September 1981.  
  302 
Chief of Mission, told Henshaw that the Chinese had no knowledge of Kim Il-Sung’s 
plans in Zimbabwe. However, Guotung did say that if the 5th Brigade made up entirely 
of ZANLA men (as was currently planned), it would have “sinister implication[s].”83 In 
spite of the warning provided by this Chinese diplomat, Henshaw and the rest of the 
British mission failed to recognize the seriousness of the situation. 
 The 5th Brigade began to absorb many of the highly trained ZANLA specialists 
who had previously been integrated into the ZNA service units. The brigade was 3,100 
men strong by the end of September, 1981. At the same time, Mugabe began a 
demobilization program. The ZNA had grown far too large, and had absorbed almost a 
third of the government’s budget.84  By September of 1981, 9,000 former guerillas had 
volunteered to leave the Army as part of a demobilization scheme.  Those who left the 
ZNA were given $Z400 in severance pay and $Z185 per month for two years.85 A 
further 2,763 men were involuntarily demobilized; of this number, 2,432 were former 
ZIPRA fighters.86 The new ZNA command structure actively encouraged ZIPRA men 
and RSF soldiers to leave the Army, claiming that “they had [already] served for so 
many years.”87 Only six months earlier, Mugabe had argued that Zimbabwe needed to 
maintain a large army to counter the possibility of a South African invasion. However, it 
seems that what he really meant was that Zimbabwe needed a large Army of soldiers 
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loyal to ZANU to consolidate power inside the country and then face off with South 
Africa. As the ZNA units passed through their training program and the integration 
exercise continued, the Army became more and more partisan.  
 Matters at the Defence Forces Headquarters did not improve with the 
rearrangement of the command structure. Even though Sandy Maclean was the titular 
Defence Force Commander, he had little real power. He had set up a small HQ staff 
inside the Zimbabwe Ministry of Defence; however, his duties and powers still were not 
defined by the Prime Minister’s office.88 While Maclean was slipping into irrelevance, 
Mujuru was quickly becoming more and more dominant inside the Zimbabwean security 
forces. Mugabe and ZANU were satisfied with the progress of the ZNA; however, the 
Air Force of Zimbabwe (AFZ) was far from satisfactory. Almost all of the African pilots 
who had been trained in the Eastern Bloc nations had failed all of the initial tests to serve 
as pilots in the AFZ. At that point the AFZ maintained the same standards as the old 
Rhodesian Air Force, and by virtue of this fact, of the Royal Air Force. All of the 
officers and pilots in the AFZ were white, except for a handful of administrative officers 
who had been trained in Nigeria.89 The commander of the AFZ, Air Marshall Norman 
Walsh, who had served in the Rhodesian Air Force since 1949, had hoped to maintain 
their high educational standards. As had been the case in Zambia and Kenya before, the 
maintenance of educational standards had merely been the thinly veiled racism that was 
present throughout the colonial world.  
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 Mujuru was behaving more like the Commander of Defence Forces than the 
Commander of the ZNA. He insisted that the AFZ make immediate changes. Particularly 
in terms of the chain of command, it would not do for the Air Force to remain a bastion 
of white control in an independent Zimbabwe. Particularly since the AFZ was the 
component of the security forces that the South Africans were most concerned about, it 
was considered to be the most modern force on the continent (second only to the South 
African Air Force). While Mujuru did not immediately insist that an African replace 
Walsh, he did request that an African be named Deputy Commander of the AFZ. 90 
Palmer feared that Mujuru’s insistence and the overall lowering of the educational 
standards in the AFZ would lead to more resignations by white officers from the service. 
Even members of the Non-Aligned Movement were concerned about the direction the 
Zimbabwean services were taking. The Egyptians approached Byatt to discuss his 
concerns about the AFZ.  The Egyptian ambassador to Zimbabwe, Mohamed El-
Farnawany, felt that the Air Force was the perfect place for the USSR to insert 
themselves into Zimbabwean affairs. Mugabe had already approached the Egyptians, 
Pakistanis, and Chinese with a request to train Zimbabwean pilots, but they had all 
declined, claiming that the cost was too high to provide these services for free. The 
USSR was the only country willing to offer pilot training at no cost. The British 
government had insisted that the Zimbabweans share the costs of the two flying 
instructors that were training the forty-two air cadets in Zimbabwe.91 The British 
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solution to this problem was to attempt to get other parties to pay for the training. As 
was the case with the ZNA, London was simply unable to fund a large technical training 
mission for the AFZ that would prevent them from seeking assistance elsewhere.  
 In October of 1981, the last three newly-created ZNA battalions began training, 
and BMATT was schedule to start reducing its strength by the end of the month. Rather 
than solidifying the defence relationship between Britain and Zimbabwe, it seemed that 
Mugabe had opened up the country to any nation wanting to be involved in southern 
Africa. A team from Pakistan had arrived in Salisbury to determine how best to provide 
military assistance. The French were actively looking to sell arms to the newly 
independent nation, and Mugabe had sent a delegation to Bulgaria to solicit military 
assistance.92 Affairs had come a long way from the point when Mugabe had sat in Mrs. 
Thatcher’s office and insisted that he wanted Britain to be Zimbabwe’s only military 
assistance provider.  
 The 5th Brigade was quickly growing into something much larger and more 
complex than had initially been anticipated. The ZNA only possessed one field artillery 
regiment in October of 1981.  However, the British learned that the 5th Brigade was to 
have its own artillery regiment and had already absorbed a large number of other 
specialists.93 Even so, Palmer and Byatt seemed to be comfortable with the apparent lack 
of progress the North Korean trainers were making. As of October, the 5th Brigade’s 
training had been confined to political indoctrination. With the stated British goal of 
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ensuring that the military was a force that stayed out of domestic politics, it was curious 
that a heavy regimen of political indoctrination did not concern them.94 
 The hastily planned demobilization scheme seemed to be unraveling before it 
even got started. As a test for the system, 500 men were scheduled for demobilization in 
November; however, the sparsely staffed Ministry of Social Services did not have the 
resources to manage the plan properly. The desire to discharge 2,000 men from the 
Army every month, with benefits, was simply unattainable at the time.95 It seemed more 
and more likely that the former ZIPRA men were simply going to be discharged without 
ceremony and forced to fend for themselves.  
 It was also becoming more technically challenging for the British to train the 
ZNA. In October, the rest of the ZNA was brought into line with the new 5th Brigade 
when the decision was made to equip the Army with AK-47 assault rifles and Chinese 
Type 56 Light Machine Guns, as opposed to the FN FAL battle rifle and the FN General 
Purpose Machine Guns that had been used by the Rhodesian Army.96 The 5th Brigade 
had been equipped with these weapons, and the rest of the Army followed suit. This 
decision brought an end to any real possibility of a sale of British or Western-
manufactured equipment to the Army. The Mugabe regime made a conscious decision to 
change suppliers. The FN and the AK-47 used completely incompatible ammunition, 
7.62mm NATO and 7.62x39, respectively. This meant major supply chain changes for 
the Army and a complete reorientation of the acquisition system from the West to the 
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East.  BMATT had already had some difficulty with attempting to train ZNA personnel 
on Eastern Bloc equipment with which they were unfamiliar; now all of the standard 
issue equipment was to be Eastern Bloc in origin.97  
 Military assistance offers from other nations continued.  The Pakistanis offered 
pilot training and places for Zimbabweans at their Staff College. The Bulgarians 
promised that they would provide some military equipment. As this occurred, fresh 
delegations were dispatched to Algeria and East Germany also seeking military aid.98 
The Zimbabweans were clearly shopping around among the Communist and non-aligned 
nations. They were making no effort to seek aid from Western nations other than the 
UK. However, it is unlikely that this was because of any dramatic ideological differences 
between ZANU and the West.  Military assistance from Western nations came at a much 
higher monetary price, and frankly Zimbabwe was not strategically important enough to 
countries like the United States, France, or Israel to warrant aid being granted on a cost-
free basis. Additionally, all of the above-mentioned countries were far too invested in the 
maintenance of the status quo in southern Africa to give Zimbabwe any tools that could 
possibly lead to a larger regional confrontation with South Africa.99 
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 However the Zimbabweans were beginning to sense that the South Africans were 
behind the growing number of security incidents in the country. After the arrest of the 
white officer in charge of the Zimbabwe Engineer Corps, Mugabe’s government 
suspected the SADF was responsible for almost every report of sabotage and violence. 
To a degree they were right; in November of 1981, RENEMO fighters destroyed a 100 
m span of bridge inside Zimbabwe.100 While RENEMO forces were certainly behind this 
action, after the fall of the Smith regime the CIO had passed off support and direction of 
RENEMO sabotage operations to the South Africans.101 Operation DRAMA was also 
becoming much more active. As more and more disgruntled ZIPRA men left or were 
forced out of the ZNA, the South Africans recruited them for retention in their effort to 
destabilize Zimbabwe.102  
 
BMATT moves into a new phase 
Officially, the integration process ended on 11 November 1981, sixteen years 
after UDI. The ZNA’s officer corps was under-strength by 205 officers; the Army was 
authorized 2,341 officer positions and only had 2,136 men in uniform. However, the 
force was drastically over strength in other ranks; 39,496 were authorized.  However, as 
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of 11 November there were 55,449 men serving.103 This number also did not include the 
3,000 men who were now serving in the 5th Brigade. This excessively large number of 
troops made the ZNA one of the largest armies in Africa, far larger than a country of its 
size required or could afford.  
 The British government had come to terms with the necessity of continuing the 
military mission in Zimbabwe. Mrs. Thatcher and Mugabe spoke on 6 October 1981 
about the internal situation in Zimbabwe. In their conversation, Mugabe appealed to 
Thatcher regarding Zimbabwe’s need for continued training of the Army after the end of 
the integration exercise. However, he made it clear to her that the Army needed to 
develop “a single allegiance to the government in power.”104 He was very specific when 
he chose his terms; the implication was that the Army should be loyal to the ZANU 
government, not necessarily the Zimbabwean constitution. This was an important 
distinction about which Mugabe was, in fact, quite clear. At the end of October 1981, 
Mugabe presented the 1st Commando Battalion with their colors, making them the first 
unit in the ZNA to receive the Zimbabwean colors. In his remarks at the parade, he 
emphasized the duty the men had to remain loyal to the nation and the government.105 In 
any other circumstances this speech would have sounded the same as any other given by 
an elected official at a military event, yet the implication was clear: loyalty to the 
government meant loyalty to ZNAU. The ministers in Mugabe’s government had openly 
campaigned for and were in the process of creating a one-party state. In January 1981, 
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the Zimbabwean government created the Mass Media Trust and purchased all of the 
major newspapers in the country including The Herald. Throughout the course of 1981, 
the paper and its Editorial Board were used to extol the virtues of a one-party state for 
the betterment of the future of the country.106 ZANU was the government; the two were 
inseparable, and so by design the ZNA would also have to be loyal to ZANU.  
 The end of the integration exercise passed unceremoniously in November of 
1981. The last of the ZNA battalions graduated from basic training during the first week 
of November. There was no mention of the graduation in The Herald; the first report of 
the end of the exercise was an article that announced that both the British and Korean 
military training teams would remain in Zimbabwe past integration.107 However, the 
article was far from flattering; it exposed the financial commitment made by each 
country in the military training process: 
 Mr. Mugabe has several times praised the British for their help in training the four 
infantry brigades, and the Koreans for their willingness to equip and train the fifth 
brigade. About 160 British instructors had come to Zimbabwe and a little over 100 
Koreans. The British were paid by the United Kingdom government while the Koreans 
were paid by Zimbabwe in return for having supplied several million dollars’ worth of 
arms.108  
 
This attempt to demonstrate the high level of commitment that North Korea had made to 
Zimbabwe was not the first time that the Zimbabwean government had called out the 
decline in British aid. In the October 6th “Army Review” series of articles in The Herald, 
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the article on BMATT had been lukewarm in tone. It pointed out that while the British 
had sponsored a number of Zimbabwean soldiers in courses in Britain, this number had 
dramatically declined over the past year and would continue to do so.109 The language of 
reconciliation that had been the order of the day only a year ago had simply fallen away. 
Mugabe and his ministers spoke plainly in public about their intentions for a one-party 
state, as well as the need of the Army to be loyal to that state. Concurrently, government 
ministers and the state-controlled media slowly began to expose the lack of support from 
Britain in the areas of military assistance and funds for land reform.  
However, it seems that by November of 1981, Margaret Thatcher’s government 
had decided that military aid was not the best way to gain influence in Zimbabwe. In a 
letter to Mugabe at the beginning of November, Thatcher outlined the level of 
commitment that the British government had displayed in support of the reconstruction 
in Zimbabwe. The focus of her comments was the £20 million the British had pledged to 
Zimbabwe to support of land resettlement.110 She made it very clear to Mugabe that this 
was the largest British aid program in Africa, and that it demonstrated a very firm British 
commitment to the future of Zimbabwe. Mugabe, the consummate politician, made sure 
that he thanked Mrs. Thatcher for her support of Zimbabwe. Yet he did not muzzle his 
ministers or the newspapers in their criticism of the British, and by extension the whites 
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who remained in Zimbabwe.111 As Mugabe had played political games with Palmer, 
Byatt, and Walls when he denied being able to control the inflammatory partisan 
statements of his ministers, he played the same game with the Iron Lady.  
Only a week after The Times reported that the military integration exercise had 
been completed, it was announced publicly that the ZNA would shrink by 20,000 
soldiers over the course of the next year.112 Interestingly enough, this move by the 
ZANU government passed unnoticed in the government-controlled press in Salisbury. 
While The Times reported that the men who would be demobilized were volunteers, the 
reality was far different. While some ZANLA men were forced out of the Army, for the 
most part it was former ZIPRA fighters who received involuntary discharges. Joshua 
Nkomo recounted one incident where he was asked to go and speak to a group of ZNA 
soldiers who had been selected for discharge but had refused to leave their posts.113 
Nkomo was able to convince the men to lay down their arms and accept that they were 
to be discharged. However, as he was driving away he saw that the men were being told 
to take off their Army uniforms and change into civilian clothes on the public road at the 
front gate. Not only were the men targeted because of their political affiliation during the 
war, they were also publicly humiliated.  This intentionally emasculated these men by 
indicating publicly that they did not possess the same martial spirit that ZANLA men 
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did, and were not even allowed to wear their uniforms on their return trip home (which 
was common practice at the time).114 
 These incidents focused on undermining the position of ZANU supporters 
(mostly Ndebele’s people) in Zimbabwe. Such practices became more and more 
common in 1983 when the 5th Brigade was committed to Matabeleland. Since there were 
British officers attached to most of the ZNA battalions, these events were reported to the 
BMATT HQ. After the end of the initial training phase of the integration exercise, the 
FCO and MOD needed to reevaluate what kind of role they were to play in Zimbabwe, 
particularly considering Mrs. Thatcher’s decision to focus on civil aid. In doing so, they 
needed to consider the situation in Zimbabwe as it stood in December of 1981.  
The fissures in the ZNA were becoming increasingly problematic. While fewer 
and fewer white officers remained in the Army, racial problems were still cause for 
concern. In mid-November Captain Frank Gericke, the man responsible for the 
destruction of the ZNA armory, escaped from prison with the assistance of a senior 
officer of the Zimbabwe Republic Police Criminal Investigation Division (CID).115  This 
type of subversion from within one of the most elite organizations in the Zimbabwean 
Security Forces worried Mugabe and his government, and made them increasingly 
suspicious of whites. On December 5, 1981, an odd event occurred at the ZNA HQ 
officers’ mess. Some settler officers attempted to hold two events; black officers were 
invited to both. However, none of the black officers who were invited decided to attend. 
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Gen. Mujuru caught wind of these events and personally intervened, claiming that 
“relics of colonialism were on display.”116 The European mess officer was arrested and 
the rest of the group was detained overnight on charges that they were involved in 
subversive activities.  
As the racial tensions in the Army grew, the white officers who remained seemed 
simply to be waiting until they could qualify for their pensions.117 Very few were 
committed to the task of training the ZNA to a high standard. However, a small number 
of European officers committed themselves to the future of the Zimbabwean regime. 
Colonel Lionel Dyck commanded a company of the RAR in 1980, and went on to 
command the Zimbabwe Parachute Battalion. He continued to serve in the Zimbabwe 
National Army well into the late 1980s and was implicated in the atrocities committed 
by the Mugabe regime in Matabeleland throughout the decade.118 Some white personnel 
remained in the special units of the ZNA into the 1990s.119  
The 5th Brigade had been relatively well concealed from the Zimbabwean public 
at large until December of 1981, when news of tourists being harassed by members of 
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the unit surfaced.120 Four British tourists had accidentally driven into a restricted area, 
where they were accosted by a group of soldiers from the 5th Brigade.  The soldiers 
ransacked the car the tourists were traveling in, and then assaulted them. Only direct 
intervention by Colonel Prentice Shiri kept the situation from getting any more out of 
hand.121 This was an early sign of the type of problems stemming from lack of discipline 
from which the Brigade suffered. However, it is not surprising considering the level and 
quality of training they received from the North Koreans. The Zimbabweans themselves 
complained about the unprofessional conduct of the Korean trainers, who continued to 
insist that the Zimbabwean government pay for their expensive liquor-fueled outings.122 
There also were continuous problems because of the language barrier between the 
Zimbabwean soldiers and the Korean trainers. However, these issues were not unusual; 
the Australians had come to the conclusion as early as July of 1981 that the North 
Korean foray into Zimbabwe would be militarily counterproductive. The Australian 
Office of National Assessments (ONA) concluded that the creation of the 5th Brigade 
would only further destabilize the country. Additionally, the ONA asserted that the only 
real utility of the 5th Brigade was as ZANU’s “private army and a counter-weight to the 
British trained ZNA.123 However, this assessment was not passed along to the British 
government because it was classified as being for “Australian Eyes Only.” 
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The British government continued along the path it had set well over a year 
before with its military assistance plan. British officers remained as advisors with the 
ZNA battalions in an attempt to set them on the proper path in the areas of training and 
administration. As had been the case in June, BMATT officers posted to battalions 
quickly realized that most of the ZNA battalions were simply incapable of operating as 
military units.124 Even though advanced training for these units was needed, there 
seemed to be no interest on the part of most of the ZANLA officers in following 
BMATT’s recommendations.  
The security situation in Zimbabwe became even more tense in the first months 
of 1982. While racial tensions had escalated in the Army in December of 1981 and 
continued into January, factional tensions in Zimbabwe as a whole became the leading 
cause for concern in February of 1982.125 Early in the month, Mugabe’s government 
announced that they had found no less than thirty-five caches on property either 
controlled by ZAPU or owned by party leaders.126 Mugabe asserted that ZAPU’s 
leadership was planning a military coup in concert with the remaining whites in the 
country.127 Nkomo and other ZANU leaders denied any connection to the caches, and 
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pointed out that up until that point weapons stores had been discovered all over the 
country and no one had even bothered to find out to whom they belonged.128  
Even though there was no concrete evidence linking ZAPU with a planned 
military coup, the die was cast, and ZANU used these arms caches as ammunition to 
destroy their rival party. In December of 1981, ZANU, and by extension the 
Zimbabwean government, made a very simple case to the public that the party was under 
attack. South African agents antagonized the situation when they planted a bomb at the 
ZANU party headquarters in Salisbury.129  
 Nkomo was dismissed from the Cabinet on February 18th.130  The deputy 
commander of the ZNA, LtGen. Lookout Masuku was arrested, along with other high-
ranking ZAPU Army officers, for allegedly plotting against the government. However, 
this was simply the beginning; former ZIPRA men made up roughly thirty percent of the 
officer corps in the Army at the time. Many ZIPRA officers were battalion commanders, 
deputy brigade commanders, or chiefs of staff. While not at the highest levels of 
command, these positions held significant influence over the daily operations of the 
Army. The CIO and Special Branch targeted mid and low level officers for both arrest 
and harassment. Publicly, the government made statements that there would be no 
retribution against former ZIPRA men in the security forces; however, the reality was far 
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different. In September of 1982, the Mechanized Battalion in the 2nd Brigade was purged 
of all ZIPRA men. Over 250 soldiers were sent elsewhere in the ZNA; many ended up 
being discharged.131 
This became common practice in the Army; even ZIPRA men who were not 
personally attacked or harassed saw what was happening around them and simply left 
the Army. Unfortunately, there are no statistics available that shed light on how many 
ZIPRA men left the Army. However, by the end of 1983 the ZNA reduced its size from 
almost 65,000 to 50,000 soldiers. Based on the accounts available from ZNA soldiers at 
the time, it seems that the vast majority of those who left were ZIPRA men.132 This is 
not to say that there was a Soviet-style purge of the Army. The intimidation was often 
localized and kept out of the media; however, it was not hidden from BMATT. British 
officers were well aware of what was occurring, but they often felt that all they could do 
was attempt to keep the situation from getting worse. Major General Colin Shortis, who 
commanded BMATT from January of 1982 until June of 1983, commented that BMATT 
continued to encourage Mujuru and the ZNA to pursue their demobilization plan more 
vigorously. Mujuru’s solution was to “parade all officers and demob all the ZIPRA 
officers. We can reduce the army and solve the ZIPRA problem.”133 Shortis was able to 
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convince the Defence Minister that the Army would be far worse off than it already was 
if it lost that many officers. Yet this attitude towards ZIPRA had clearly become an 
institutional norm in the ZANLA-controlled ZNA. During this same period, Mugabe met 
with Mrs. Thatcher in London. At their meeting she restated the British commitment to 
Zimbabwe and promised that her government intended to continue supporting Mugabe’s 
government with both military and civil aid.134 By December of 1981, BMAT had been 
reduced to seventy-three soldiers; however, with the rising factionalism in the Army and 
the renewed commitment by Thatcher, thirty-four more advisors were dispatched from 
Britain in October of 1982.135 
However, it was not only the ZANU supporters in the Army who were targeted 
by the Mugabe regime.  Civilians also suffered for their political associations. On July 
26, 1,982 South African agents infiltrated Thornhill Airbase and blew up ten AFZ 
planes, including four newly-arrived BAE Hawk jet aircraft.136 In July of 1982, the 
Mugabe government claimed that there was such a dramatic rise in sabotage, banditry, 
and other violent acts committed by ZAPU dissidents, the government was forced to 
reinstate the Emergency Powers Act.137 This Act protected members of the security 
forces from any form of prosecution for acts committed combating dissident forces.138 In 
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a way, he was correct.  There had been a rise in the activities of the South African-
trained fighters, known at the time as Super ZIPRA.139 However, for the most part 
ZIPRA men who had fled the Army or simply taken their demobilization settlement 
returned to their homes. Since ZAPU largely represented those who were either 
Ndebele’s men or who had politically aligned themselves with the Ndebele group, the 
bastion of ZAPU supporters resided in the southern part of the country known as 
Matabeleland.  
In order for Mugabe to secure power in the country and accomplish his goal of a 
one-party state, this region of opposition had to be broken. The dismissal of Nkomo 
from the cabinet and the arrest of high level ZAPU military leaders helped criminalize 
the leadership element of the party. Now, he had to deal with the rank and file. The true 
purpose of the 5th Brigade finally materialized in December of 1982, after the brigade 
graduated from its training program and was deployed directly to Matebeleland North 
the following month, along with a number of other ZNA units that were sent in a 
supporting role.140 Counting South African trained Super ZIPRA, it has been estimated 
that there were never more than roughly 200 dissidents operating in the Matabeleland 
area.141  The 5th Brigade embarked on a campaign of rape, murder, pillaging, and a 
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variety of other shameful acts over the course of the next year. During the first six weeks 
of the 5th Brigade’s time in Matabeleland, they killed roughly 2,000 civilians.142 
Publicly, the British played down these incidents. When a crew from the British TV 
show Panorama interviewed Col. Charles Ivey, he addressed the stories of the atrocities 
by casting doubt on the reports, saying “there are stories in Matabeleland and there are 
stories in Ireland and you want to believe who writes what story?”143 The British 
commander was doing his best to turn a blind eye to the excesses that occurred in 
Matabeleland, in order to preserve a tenuous diplomatic and military relationship with 
the Mugabe government.  
 
Conclusion 
The atrocities that occurred throughout Matabeleland over the course of the next 
decade have been extensively documented by a variety of organizations.144  Mugabe’s 
knowledge of what occurred in the area is also quite certain. Not only did the 5th Brigade 
get their orders directly from the Prime Minister’s office, but a former ZNA officer, 
LtCol. Esau Sibanda, confirmed that Mugabe received a daily briefing of the Brigade’s 
activities through its deployment.145 The 5th Brigade deployment and the aftermath were 
the point at which it became clear that the British had failed in their military mission. 
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The goal from the beginning had been to secure British influence in the Zimbabwean 
security apparatus, and create a military force divorced from political parties and 
domestic politics. In fact, what had occurred over the course of the first three years of 
independence was that a completely politicized military force had been created that 
acted as the military arm of the party in power.  
The British government prioritized military assistance in their 1981 Defence 
Statement. The government considered assistance requests based on the following 
considerations: “the United Kingdom’s strategic interests, the nature of our defence 
relationship with the country concerned, and whether their armed forces operate 
similarly to our own and use British equipment.”146 In mid-1983, it seemed as though 
only the first of the four criteria had been met. By this point, the defence relationship 
between Britain and Zimbabwe was growing tense. The Zimbabweans seemed to know 
they needed the British for their technical proficiency but wanted none of their policy 
advice. The ZNA was leaning closer and closer to operating like a Soviet-style force, 
with their introduction of political commissars into the force, the prevalence of party 
membership being connected to promotion prospects, and the rigidity of the command 
structure.147  
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The British had high hopes in 1979, during Operation AGILA, that Zimbabwe 
would be an African success story. They imagined that the existing infrastructure could 
be used to create a professional force that stayed out of domestic politics. The training 
that they conducted had given the Zimbabweans a framework for a military force, but 
had not made any significant impact on the culture of the Zimbabwean military. The 
Zimbabwean military bore more of a cultural resemblance to the guerilla forces that 
preceded it than to a modern military force. Promotion, posting, and other benefits were 
attached to political patronage and proximity to the ruling elite in ZANU, rather than to 
any sort of professional excellence.  
In both Kenya and Zambia, the British recognized that the officers most willing 
to work with them were men whom they had brought to the United Kingdom and trained 
in British military institutions. The connections these men had to the traditions instilled 
in them at Sandhurst and Mons were not easily broken.  Not only were these officers 
more likely to work with the British, they were better trained than those who underwent 
brief commissioning courses in their own country. Finally, many of the African officers 
in both Kenya and Zambia who had been trained at Sandhurst were firmly committed to 
remaining aloof from domestic politics. This was one of the many hard lessons the 
British Army, FCO, and MOD had learned since 1945 in training African armies. Yet in 
spite of this knowledge, BMATT, the FCO, and the MOD overestimated their ability to 
project training power in Zimbabwe, with only thin resources. Relying on influence that 
they did not have, the British government felt confident that they would be able to carry 
favor with the new Zimbabwean government through only minimal military assistance.  
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Britain’s failure in Zimbabwe was clear to many observers by 1983. While the 
British had managed to place a British officer, on loan service terms, as the army 
commanders in both Kenya and Zambia, they were not able to do so in Zimbabwe. 
However, after the arrest of Air Marshal Walsh the Zimbabwean government replaced 
him with a Pakistani officer, Air Marshal Mohammed Azim Daudpota. The British 
government was no longer the primary resource for military training and resources for 
the Zimbabwean government. The North Koreans were the primary arms supplier; the 
Pakistanis provided a significant amount of professional education to Zimbabwean 
senior leaders.148 Even though much of the world was protesting the actions of the 
Mugabe government in Matabeleland by February of 1983, the British refused to retract 
their military assistance program. In September of 1983, Margret Thatcher told the US 
Ambassador to London that even though they were not pleased with Mugabe, they 
would not cut off military aid unless the situation got much more out of hand.149 That 
day did not come until 2001, when the Mugabe government seized land from white 
farmers and began cracking down on Western journalists.150 The 1981 Statement on 
Defence made it very clear that the British government only provided military assistance 
to those nations where there were British strategic interests at stake. The displacement of 
much of the remaining white population seemed to be the last of any lingering strategic 
interests in Zimbabwe.
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CHAPTER VII 
CONCLUSION: MILITARY ASSISTANCE AS A DIPLOMATIC WEAPON 
  
The process of transition from colony to independent nation is typically fraught 
with difficulty. Often, one of the biggest challenges is filling the void left by the colonial 
power in the military and representative democracy.  This transition is made even more 
difficult when the colonial power leaves, but its progeny remain. Minority settler 
communities complicate the transition because they are seldom willing to give up their 
place of privilege in society or government. In Africa, race exacerbated the difficulties. 
White settlers in African nations maintained power even after the end of colonialism; 
often it was simply the type of power that changed. Political power gave way to 
economic power, and even though many settlers left their African homes after 
independence, it was the protection of those who remained that became a cornerstone of 
British strategy in these former colonies.  
 As the 1980s continued, British strategic interests in Zimbabwe quickly faded 
away. By 1990 China was Zimbabwe’s largest arms supplier, and the largest supplier of 
weapons to the third world.1 BMATT remained in Zimbabwe, but its role was 
dramatically changed by the late 1980s and early 1990s.  The difference for the British 
came in April of 1982 when the Argentines invaded the Falkland Islands. The entire 
military focus of Margret Thatcher’s government shifted from military assistance around 
the world to meeting a military challenge in the South Atlantic. This massive military 
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effort pulled resources from across the MOD to liberate the islands. While the Falklands 
War brought a military victory and was an example of the value of a well-established 
logistical system, it also exposed some weaknesses in British defence. The British 
government saw the shortcomings of their land, air, and sea systems on the battlefield. It 
also refocused the British government’s objectives and priorities such as the NATO 
commitment, independent nuclear deterrents, and out-of-area operations. The defence 
budget did rise during the remainder of the 1980s; however, the additional funds were 
used to make up for war losses and to address communication, equipment, and training 
issues that were discovered during the conflict. The British Army refocused itself on the 
continental commitment, home defence, and contingency operations outside of the 
NATO area.2 
 All of this meant that Britain was even less focused on military assistance 
missions than it had been in 1980. After the departure of Major General Shortis as 
BMATT commander in June of 1983, the mission was downgraded. His replacement 
was a Brigadier whose primary focus was staff training.3 The mission continued well 
into the 1990s, while the quality of the Zimbabwean forces continued to deteriorate. By 
the early 1990s, the once-skilled AFZ and Zimbabwean Parachute Battalion were a 
shadow of their former selves. They no longer had the skills and capacity to train their 
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own Parachute Jump Instructors (PJI) or Pathfinders.4 American Special Forces trainers 
were brought in to provide this training to the ZNA and AFZ. One American soldier 
recounted that the Zimbabwean SAS was quite skilled and professional; however, the 
parachute battalion was at a very low state of readiness. He also mentioned that while 
conducting a jump with the Parachute Battalion, both the pilot and the Zimbabwean 
Pathfinder on the ground miscalculated and the troopers were dropped on the Harare 
International Airport parking lot rather than the military drop zone.5  
 The ZNA were deployed on active service against RENAMO in Mozambique 
throughout the 1980s, which took a tremendous toll on the force itself and its feeble 
logistical system.6 The ZNA was deployed on a number of UN missions throughout 
Africa, including Somalia, Southern Sudan, and Liberia. In 1998, Mugabe committed 
himself and his army to support Laurent Kabila, the president of the Democratic 
Republic of the Congo (DRC). The Second Congo War was a tremendous drain on 
Zimbabwean resources. Government ministers made financial deals with the Kabila 
government for both land and diamond mining claims.7 The five year conflict drained 
the resources of the cash poor nation at a time when Zimbabwe was in a difficult 
economic situation. Zimbabwean special operations forces and the AFZ were a 
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tremendous asset in the conflict, but the Mugabe government could not sustain the $15 
Million a month expense.8 The experience wore down the ZNA and had a dramatic 
impact on their readiness.  
 The position of the military in Africa has been the source of volumes of research 
over the course of the last fifty years. Claude Welch separated military involvement in 
Africa into three broad categories: the non-political army, resentment against neo-
colonialism, and coups d’états.9 Interestingly, the ZNA does not fall precisely into any 
one of these categories. The ZNA was completely politicized by the mid-1980s, and 
never feared neo-colonialism because the former colonial masters did not exert real 
influence in Zimbabwe.10 Of course, the political nature of the ZNA made sure that there 
was no attempted coup d’état against the government. One issue that feeds military 
involvement in the domestic political realm is a lack of professionalism. A high level of 
professionalism generally is one of the primary barriers for military involvement in 
democratic states. Herbert Howe points out that unprofessional forces have a far greater 
tendency to become involved in domestic politics, or be used as the enforcement arm of 
a repressive regime.11 Zimbabwe, like many other African nations, was guilty of 
exhibiting many of the factors that Howe highlights as preventing professionalism in the 
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military: the ethnicization of the military, domestic deployments, a lack of foreign 
threats, and the advent of personal rule of the country.12  
Mugabe’s personal rule in Zimbabwe broke down one of the key components of 
military professionalism, the partition of civil and military affairs. From the beginning of 
the integration exercise, the military was involved in civilian affairs. Operation SEED 
put soldiers to work in the exclusively civilian world of economic development. The use 
of ZNA in fighting dissidents and putting down domestic political opposition in 
Matabeleland blurred the line forever for Zimbabwean soldiers. By the mid-1980s, the 
majority of the soldiers in the ZNA had received some form of political indoctrination 
designed by the ZANU leadership.13 The ZNA lacked an external perspective; their 
focus was both on internal politics and internal threats to the regime. This outlook 
created further problems within the military system.  As one British officer put it, 
Western commanders work through their staffs. They rely on their staff officers to keep 
them informed so they can make the best decisions possible. However, he noted that in 
Zimbabwe knowledge is power.  Therefore, giving up knowledge is ceding power. 
Zimbabwean commanders horded knowledge and kept it from their staff officers and 
other commanders.14 This created endemic problems within the military system that, at 
times, had the potential to bring the entire machine to a standstill.  
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 This was most apparent in the support services; the Zimbabweans were unable to 
provide sufficient logistical support for the ZNA. At the outset of independence, officers 
from the settler community kept the logistical system functioning. However, as the army 
swelled to a size that was well beyond what the ZNA logistical system was designed to 
support, the quality of support services dropped dramatically. This issue was further 
inflamed by the loss of knowledge possessed by European officers who left the army. By 
the early 1990s, the main priority for BMATT was to help fix the logistical system.15 
ZNA officers who were focused on advancing their careers through political 
appointments to higher command were not interested in professional development in 
support areas.  These types of jobs required significant technical expertise and education, 
whereas command in line units did not. So even though the British were expending a 
great deal of time developing support officers, the investment did not come with much of 
a return.  Officers in the support services were not likely to rise to positions of influence 
in the Zimbabwean security services.  Therefore, those who spent the most time with 
British officers or on British courses were likely to be the least influential on a national 
scale.  
 This raises an important question regarding the use of military assistance 
programs overseas by countries like the UK and US. What is the real purpose and how 
comprehensive do these programs have to be in order to be effective? There are different 
sets of goals at each level of government. In each case examined in this study, ministries 
seemed to have the same basic goal: to buy British influence with military assistance. 
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The MOD sought currency in the military-to-military sphere, and the FCO in the 
international relations realm.  However, for those at the country level or the military 
training team level, the goal was to create a stable environment within which one might 
operate, while also achieving British influence. HMG intended to establish functioning 
democracies out of the former African colonies. In a democracy, military 
professionalism and non-involvement in the political process are key components in 
maintaining civilian control of security forces. So in the eyes of those British officers on 
the ground, it was imperative to attempt to ingrain professionalism into the officers of 
the African forces, as was demonstrated by the British teams in all three examples in this 
study.  
 Zimbabwean officers who exhibited the most professionalism in all of these 
cases were also the men who received the most substantive and professional training. 
What constituted professional training? Often times it was completely outside of the 
control of the beneficiary government, as was the case in Zimbabwe when BMATT 
wanted to implement a staff training program for all officers, including senior officers. 
However, the intervention of Zimbabwean political leaders kept the most senior guerilla 
officers (who were politically appointed) from any sort of training or evaluation 
program.  Officer training in Zimbabwe was conducted under the supervision of the 
Mugabe government, and therefore officers were susceptible to the political pressures at 
play throughout the training.  Yet in both Kenya and Zambia, the British removed officer 
candidates from the country and brought them to the UK for training at either Mons or 
Sandhurst. These courses were either six months or 24 months, and indoctrinated 
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students into the Western view of military professionalism which encouraged an 
aloofness from domestic politics and a focus on technical skill. Additionally, African 
officers in Kenya and Zambia were given progressively higher levels of responsibility at 
an accelerated rate, from the lowest officer rank up to higher levels of command. This 
phase of training and development was absent in Zimbabwe. Those who had achieved 
senior rank in guerilla armies through political maneuvering maintained that rank in the 
ZNA.  The carryover and continuation of a politicized officer corps in Zimbabwe 
directly effected the ability of the British trainers to carry out their mission of 
professionalizing the force and establishing British influence.  
 Did policy makers in London recognize that they needed to instill 
professionalism in an officer corps in order for it to function as a subordinate element to 
the elected civilian government? The colonial office considered establishing a military 
academy to train officers in Kenya in 1960, as Ghana had done. However, they decided 
against it because they felt that an academy in Kenya would not meet the high standard 
of training that cadets received at either Mons or Sandhurst. Additionally, those in the 
MOD and Colonial Office, as it was then know,  recognized that those African officers 
who trained at Sandhurst often attempted to replicate their experience in their home 
nation. So if the first several cohorts of Kenyan or Zambian officers were trained in the 
UK, they would return to their home countries and attempt to replicate their time at 
Sandhurst in their own officer training programs. As was discussed in Chapters one and 
two, the MOD and the Colonial Office preferred that African officers undergo extensive 
training rather than short training courses that accelerated Africanization.  
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However, in 1964 the British learned that longer training courses and slow 
Africanization had certain shortcomings. The 1964 East African mutinies were, in part, 
caused by the continued presence of British officers in command roles in the 
independent armies. If the soldiers did not see change after independence, they tended to 
believe that colonialism had simply continued.  British intervention in East Africa had 
significant monetary and political costs. The MOD, Colonial Office, and Foreign Office 
did not want to repeat the events of 1964 in any other African country. The result was an 
increased focus on Africanization over professionalization. The desire to decrease the 
likelihood that British forces would need to intervene in Africa also ensured that the 
British were less committed to leaving their colonies with an officer corps that was able 
to separate military from civil affairs.  
In many ways the training missions in both Kenya and Zambia were successful. 
The British were able to maintain a significant amount of influence, as well as supply 
both countries with a wide variety of military weapons.16 In comparison to places like 
Uganda and Nigeria, the military has remained largely removed from domestic politics. 
In fact, on numerous occasions the Zambia Army has put down coup attempts that 
originated from within its own ranks.17 As has been previously mentioned, the British 
                                                
16 This is true in spite of the fact that the Chinese and the United State became the primary suppliers for 
both of these countries.  
17 Hanania Lungu and Naison Ngoma, “The Zambian Military - Trials, Tribulations and Hope,” Chapter to 
Evolutions & Revolutions: A Contemporary History of Militaries in Southern Africa (Pretoria: Institute for 
Security Studies, 2005), 313-330. 
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continue to enjoy a fruitful military relationship with both countries, Kenya in 
particular.18   
However, Zimbabwe took a wildly different course than either of the other two 
examples discussed here. The focus of policy makers at the time, and to a degree of 
scholars today, when looking at the establishment of the ZNA remains how to reconcile 
these former enemies into one army. While this was a concern, the primary goal of the 
military mission was to create a functional and professional army that gave the British a 
modicum of influence inside Zimbabwe. In the planning stages, the FCO and MOD 
looked at the examples of both Kenya and Zambia and discounted them because they 
lacked the integration of an opposing force. Yet in doing so the British government 
turned a blind eye to all of the lessons learned in these training missions. Interestingly, 
this is similar to the views of some scholars and security professionals. The fact that 
opposing forces were integrated in Zimbabwe overshadowed the many similarities to 
previous British training missions in Africa.19 
The importance of professional training for African officers was subjugated to a 
need for the British to extricate themselves from Zimbabwe as quickly and cheaply as 
possible. Rather than relying on a comprehensive military mission with officers on loan 
service and extensive training programs in the UK, the British government attempted to 
execute a similar mission to those in Kenya and Zambia at a fraction of the cost and time 
                                                
18 At time of writing, the British Army was in the process of an unprecedented expansion of the British 
Army Training Unit in Kenya.  
19 In my interviews with various military officers who have knowledge of the subject and of scholars of 
other portions of Zimbabwean history, they have insisted that the integration aspect of the Zimbabwean 
mission makes the experience without comparison. However, the similarities of the situations in the three 
examples given in this study have more than merited the comparison of these cases.  
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required. Instead of trying to buy influence with an extensive aid package, the British 
government relied on buying influence with prestige and the continued presence of the 
settler community. The offer of a small military training team and limited arms sales to 
Zimbabwe did not create the type of dependence that the British needed to create in 
order to wield the political influence they desired.  
 During her ministry, Margaret Thatcher intended for Britain to be a bastion of 
strength against communism.  She valued three things above all others in foreign affairs: 
increased respect for Britain as a leading power, a close alliance with the United States, 
and skepticism about closer ties with Europe.20 The partnership with the United States 
and the maintenance of an independent nuclear deterrent were important components of 
Mrs. Thatcher’s policy to fight the influence of communism in the world. However, the 
United Kingdom was not a super-power like the United States or the Soviet Union.  
Military aid packages from one of these super powers created dependency that bought 
compliance, to a degree. US military aid to the Shah in Iran, the Saigon government until 
1975, and Noriega in Panama all produced results for a time. Soviet military aid created 
an even higher degree of dependence.  For example, in Ethiopia the government was 
unable to afford any other supplier because of the reasonable grant conditions and the 
variety of equipment available.21  
                                                
20 Eric Evans, Thatcher and Thatcherism (New York: Routledge, 2004), 87. 
21 Gebru Tareke, The Ethiopian Revolution: War in the Horn of Africa (New Haven: Yale University 
Press, 2009). The downfall was that there were no maintenance packages and the Soviets dictated what 
equipment the Ethiopians got, which was not necessarily what they needed. The Ethiopian army had far 
too many tanks and interceptor aircraft and not enough counterinsurgency equipment.  
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 As was demonstrated in Kenya and Zambia, effective military assistance 
programs were expensive long term commitments.  British officers serving on loan 
service to both armies were present almost a decade after independence. In Kenya, 
British officers continue to serve on loan service in the Kenya Army Staff College. As 
the Empire fell away, so did a great deal of Britain’s ability to project power; as this 
waned, an exclusive military partnership with Britain carried little weight. The UK 
simply could not compete with the Chinese or the Soviets by 1980 as a purveyor of 
military hardware and training. HMG and Mrs. Thatcher did not recognize this reality, 
particularly with regard to Zimbabwe. The goals of the British government in Zimbabwe 
outmatched what was possible to achieve with the scant resources allocated. Even 
though London had significant policy goals when they sent BMATT to Zimbabwe, the 
officers on the ground treaded lightly with the party in power.  
The British government never directly confronted Mugabe regarding the 
atrocities in Matabeleland. The High Commissioner at the time said that it would be 
counterproductive to push Mugabe on the issue of the activities of Fifth Brigade. “I think 
to have protested to Mugabe or to have gone on record as not liking what was going on 
there would not have been helpful. Mugabe would have resented it very acutely.”22 The 
guidance from the government was simply to look the other way.  Even the US 
government was concerned about the atrocities that occurred in Matabeleland. However, 
when the US Ambassador to the UK broached the issue with Mrs. Thatcher, he 
                                                
22 “The Price of Silence,” Panorama, BBC1, 10 March 2002. 
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discovered that the British were not planning on leaving Zimbabwe unless things got 
much worse.23 
 Interestingly enough, the British government felt comfortable applying pressure 
at all levels when white AFZ officers were imprisoned after the sabotage of the Hawkes 
in 1983. Not only did Mrs. Thatcher write directly to Mugabe asking for the men to be 
released, but the British government also threatened to cut off military assistance if he 
did not comply. After divesting themselves of responsibility for Zimbabwe as a colonial 
relic, the British government’s true interests in the region were extremely limited.  On 
the surface it would seem that the British wanted to keep communism and other bad 
actors out of Southern Africa.  However, as time went by the British were less and less 
committed to this goal. It is well known that the North Koreans trained the Fifth 
Brigade; however, it is less well known that their training mission expanded beyond this 
single unit.  In June of 1982, the North Korean training team became involved with the 
establishment of the Zimbabwe People’s Militia.24 The stated goal of the organization 
was to “mobilize all Zimbabweans to be loyal to the ruling party and Government.”25 
The Zimbabwe People’s Militia formed the reserve component of the ZNA. By the end 
of 1983, the North Korean Military Training Mission was responsible for training a far 
higher percentage of the Zimbabwe National Army than was BMATT.  
By the middle of the 1980s, communist nations in East Asia had overtaken 
Britain as the primary purveyors of military hardware and training. In spite of this 
                                                
23 Reagan Library: European & Soviet Directorate NSC (Thatcher Visit - Dec 84 [4] Box 90902). 
24 ZNA Public Relations Directorate, “People’s Militia a Strong Base for Defence,” Zimbabwe National 
Army Magazine, January 1986, 4.  
25 Ibid., 4.  
  338 
development, the British government remained committed to a continued presence in 
Zimbabwe in the security sector. Even though the Thatcher government threatened to 
withdraw military assistance in 1984, such a plan did not come to fruition. The threat of 
the withdrawal of aid did not deter Mugabe’s actions in Matabeleland in 1984, nor did 
the final withdrawal of British trainers in 2001 stop the land occupations that displaced 
most of the remaining white farmers in Zimbabwe. Even though British military power 
was demonstrated in the Falklands in 1982, it was clear to many observers that the 
British government was not capable of that kind of unilateral intervention on a regular 
basis. The British government had been unable to support the movement of the 
Commonwealth Monitoring Force to Zimbabwe, and had been forced to ask the United 
States to provide airlift assets. Most British military operations since the Falklands War 
have been multinational efforts under the banner of the United Nations, European Union, 
or NATO.  
Unilateral deployments of forces outside of the United Kingdom have been 
limited in both scale and scope; OP PALLISER in Sierra Leone involved one battalion 
from the Parachute Regiment and an SAS Squadron.26 British politicians in the 1980s 
behaved as if they had the ability to replicate the Falklands operation at a moment’s 
notice. However other nations, such as Zimbabwe, recognized that British power had 
long since faded.  The embarrassment of Suez in 1957 continued to be a stain upon 
British legitimacy in the world. Nations like Zimbabwe were in a position to accept aid 
                                                
26 OP PALLISER was launched to assist the United Nations Mission in Sierra Leon. The Parachute 
Regiment was deployed to cover the evacuation of civilians from the capital. They also conducted a 
number of operations against portions of the RUF rebel group while deployed.  
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from Britain and Non-Aligned powers as long as they kept clear of the conflict between 
the United States and the Soviet Union. Mugabe’s decision to avoid the USSR and Cuba 
as sources of military training and aid was a shrewd political decision that kept him from 
attracting the ire of the United States. Additionally, his maintenance of the status quo 
with South Africa kept both Britain and the United States from being put in an awkward 
position in their very delicate dealings with Pretoria.  
Mrs. Thatcher and the diplomats in the Foreign Service had grown up in an era 
when British forces were able to extinguish security threats that flared up across a vast 
empire. Operations in Palestine, Malaya, Kenya, Oman, Belize and many other places 
had been commonplace throughout the 1950s and 1960s. The 1970s and 1980s were an 
era of security stagnation for Britain; the Forces were focused on operations in Northern 
Ireland and commitments to NATO on the continent. The international prestige of 
British power decayed right alongside the declining British economy and defence 
budgets. The British desire to remain a prominent player on the world’s stage outpaced 
the country’s military capability in the late 1980s and 1990s. After the 1981 Defence 
Review, it was not until the end of the Cold War that the Commons reexamined UK 
security policy. The 1990 Options for Change report was launched at the insistence of 
the service chiefs who were looking for cost-saving measures.27 The continental 
commitment and the overall size of the Army were targets for reduction. Even so, there 
were continued requests for British military trainers in Southern Africa. British teams 
                                                
27 Claire Taylor, A Brief Guide to Previous British Defence Reviews, (London: House of Commons 
Library, 2010): 8.  
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were dispatched to both Namibia and South Africa, in 1990 and 1994 respectively. The 
teams in both of these instances were only a fraction of the size of what BMATT 
Zimbabwe had been.28  However, in both cases British officers served in more of a 
supervisory role than an actual training role. The next time the British government 
undertook a training mission as ambitious as the one in Zimbabwe was in Afghanistan in 
2002 in coordination with the United States; it required the deployment of as much as 
ten percent of the Army. 
The tragedies that occurred in Zimbabwe from 1965 to 1987 were an early 
indication of the decline of British power in the world. Whereas London had previously 
been able to use military assistance as a weapon in the Cold War, economic decline and 
an unwillingness to spend limited defence funds on assistance programs sterilized the 
effectiveness of the programs. In a world where the coffers of rogue states were open to 
those willing to flout the designs of the West, trainers who did not bring money and 
equipment with them were simply an opportunity to exploit. The British endeavored to 
create a situation in Zimbabwe where the military remained uninvolved in domestic 
politics but supported a democratic system.  However, what they enabled was the 
establishment of a politicized military force that supported the foundation of Mugabe’s 
authoritarian state. The British idea of democratizing through military professionalism 
worked in a European context; it was far less effective when those who the British 
intended to influence were not overpowered by British culture. As in many cases, the 
                                                
28 AW Dennis, “The Integration of Guerrilla Armies into Conventional Forces: Lessons Learnt from 
BMATT in Africa,” South African Defence Review (1992). BMATT in Namibia was only fifty five men 
strong at the start of operations, and was in Namibia until 1994.  
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most effective tool that the British government could bring to bear in a military 
assistance scheme was the weight of hundreds of years of military history and culture, 
reaching all the way back to Oliver Cromwell’s reforms of his army.  
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